Counterpossible Reasoning in Physics

This article explores three ways in which physics may involve counterpossible reasoning. The first way arises when evaluating false theories: to say what the world would be like if the theory were true, we need to evaluate counterfactuals with physically impossible antecedents. The second way relates to the role of counterfactuals in characterizing causal structure: to say what causes what in physics, we need to make reference to physically impossible scenarios. The third way is novel: to model metaphysical dependence in physics, we need to consider counterfactual consequences of metaphysical impossibilities. Physics accordingly bears substantial and surprising counterpossible commitments.

The Roots of Occasionalism? Causation, Metaphysical Dependence, and Soul-Body Relations in Augustine

It has long been thought that Augustine holds that corporeal objects cannot act upon incorporeal souls. However, precisely how and why Augustine imposes limitations upon the causal powers of corporeal objects remains obscure. In this paper, the author clarifies Augustine’s views about the causal and dependence relations between body and soul. He argues that, contrary to what is often thought, Augustine allows that corporeal objects do act upon souls and merely rules out that corporeal objects exercise a particular kind of causal power (that of efficient or sustaining causes). He clarifies how Augustine conceives of the kind of causal influence exercised by souls and bodies.

Quasi-Dependence

Quasi-realists aim to account for many of the trappings of metanormative realism within an expressivist framework. Chief among these is the realist way of responding to the Euthyphro dilemma: quasi-realists want to join realists in being able to say, “It’s not the case that kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it. Rather, we disapprove of kicking dogs because it’s wrong.” However, the standard quasi-realist way of explaining what we are up to when we assert the first of these two sentences rests on a mistaken identification of metaphysical dependence (or grounding) with counterfactual covariation. This chapter proposes a better way for expressivists to understand such sentences, on which they serve to express complex states of mind in which an attitude bears a relation of psychological dependence (or basing) to another state of mind. It is argued that this proposal is a natural, versatile, and fruitful approach for expressivists to take that helps them secure the first half of the Euthyphro contrast—but at the cost of making it difficult to see how expressivists can make sense of that contrast’s second half.

Fictional Entities

This chapter addresses the existence and nature of fictional entities. It identifies two distinct conditions sufficient for the existence of fictional entities, each of which is grounded by a reference-fixing rule of fiction institutions. One of these rules describes conditions sufficient for the existence of fictional entities that are not constituted by anything, while the other describes conditions sufficient for the existence of fictional entities that are constituted by other things. It identifies the metaphysical dependence base for the existence of fictional entities and argues that this does not include anything metaphysically mysterious. It then describes the nature of fictional entities and their identity and individuation conditions. Finally, it compares the account fictional entities provided with that of Amie Thomasson and argues that, despite obvious similarities, there are fundamental differences between the accounts.

Conceptual Dependence Monism

Chapter three examines Spinoza’s views on metaphysical dependence, in which the role of the conceptual is arguably the clearest. Spinoza uses some twenty-two different terms for dependence in the opening pages of the Ethics, and a fierce interpretive debate has erupted over how to understand the relations among these seemingly different forms of dependence. This chapter argues that Spinoza holds an especially austere view, which is here named conceptual dependence monism: there is exactly one form of metaphysical dependence, and it is conceptual in kind. This interpretation is defended on both textual and systematic grounds, pointing out some of its implications for our understanding of other, more familiar Spinozistic doctrines. Along the way, a clearer understanding is also gained of Spinoza’s explanatory requirements in metaphysics.

The Many Moral Rationalisms

This volume of thirteen original essays investigates the four core theses of moral rationalism: (i) the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgement; (ii) the metaphysical thesis that moral requirements are constituted by the deliverances of practical reason; (iii) the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori; and (iv) the normative thesis that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action. The essays explore a variety of interpretations of these core theses, offer new arguments in their favour, and explore challenges to the rationalist project. The five essays in Part I (“Normativity”) offer contemporary defences or reconstructions of Kant’s attempt to ground the normative thesis, that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action (thesis iv), in the nature of practical reason and practical rationality. Some, but not all, rely on constructivist commitments about the metaphysical dependence of moral requirements on practical reason (thesis ii). The four essays in Part II (“Epistemology and Meaning”) consider the viability of claims to a priori moral knowledge (thesis iii). The authors of all four essays are sympathetic to a realist moral metaphysics and thus forgo the straightforward constructivist road to a priority. The four essays in Part III (“Psychology”) each grapple with the implications for rationalism of the role of emotions and unconscious processes in moral judgement and action (thesis i). The volume demonstrates that moral rationalism identifies not a single philosophical position but rather a family of philosophical positions, which resemble traditional rationalism, as exemplified by Kant, to varying degrees.

Reality and its Structure

This volume brings together fourteen essays from leading and emerging scholars that address issues relating to the view that has come to be known as metaphysical foundationalism, and explore possibilities regarding its alternatives. According to the foundationalist, reality is hierarchically arranged with chains of entities ordered by metaphysical dependence relations that terminate in a fundamental ground populated by consistent and contingent entities. Each essay in this volume addresses some aspect or other of at least one of these core commitments. Must there be anything fundamental? Is reality hierarchically structured? Why should we be foundationalists? Is metaphysical infinitism possible? Is metaphysical coherentism possible? What does reality look like if we allow inconsistent fundamentalia? These are the sorts of pertinent questions seldom asked in the current literature, and exactly the kinds of questions addressed in this volume. The volume, then, aims to open up a much broader perspective on metaphysical dependence than currently exists, and point to ways of exploring new avenues of thought on the subject.

Buddhist Dependence

Many issues in Western philosophy were discussed with great sophistication in the Eastern philosophical traditions. A prime example of this is metaphysical dependence. This is absolutely central to Buddhist metaphysics. Indeed, there is a wide variety of views about the structure of metaphysical dependence. This paper explains some of these views and discusses some of their connections with issues in Western philosophy. Three Buddhist views, in particular, are discussed. The first is the oldest tradition, Abhidharma, which was foundationalist. The second is the Madhyamaka view, which is infinitist. The third is the Chinese Huayan view, which is coherentist. Issues from Western philosophy discussed include mereology, causation, and universals. The paper presupposes no knowledge of the history and philosophy of Buddhism.

The Geography of Fundamentality

The dominant view amongst contemporary analytic metaphysicians working on notions of metaphysical dependence and the overarching structure of reality is one according to which that reality is hierarchically structured (the hierarchy thesis), well-founded (the fundamentality thesis), populated by merely contingent fundamentalia (the contingency thesis), and consistent (the consistency thesis). The introduction to this volume addresses the reasons commonly offered in defence of these theses and evaluates their merits. If it is correct that these are the core commitments of the metaphysical foundationalist, then it is proposed that the view is not nearly on such firm footing as one might suppose. The chapter also argues that the alternatives to this view—metaphysical infinitism and metaphysical coherentism—ought to be taken more seriously.