LA POSIBILIDAD DE UNA ESTÉTICA EN LA FENOMENOLOGÍA DE E. HUSSERL. SOBRE LA IMAGINACIÓN, LA FANTASÍA Y LA CONCIENCIA DE IMAGEN

Si bien es cierto que Husserl no ha escrito sistemáticamente sobre estética, consideramos no sólo posible y legítimo, sino también establecer las condiciones de posibilidad para una conciencia estética desde el punto de vista de la fenomenología trascendental de Husserl. Motivados por esta idea, en el presente trabajo examinamos, en primer lugar, el tipo de estética que puede deducirse de aquellos pasajes en los que Husserl considera explícitamente experiencias artísticas, para arribar a la idea de que, analizado desde la perspectiva de la conciencia de imagen, el fenómeno estético del que se puede dar cuenta es limitado. Así, en segundo lugar, intentamos mostrar que esta pobreza no es esencial al fenómeno y, por tanto, que dichas limitaciones pueden ser superadas, o al menos trascendidas, si en vez de considerar la estética desde el punto de vista de la conciencia de imagen, se la considera desde la perspectiva de la fantasía.While it is true that Husserl has not written systematically about Aesthetics, we believe it is possible and legitimate to study how Aesthetic Consciousness works from Husserl's point of view of transcendental Phenomenology. Hence, in this paper we consider, in the first place, the virtues and limitations of the Aesthetic that can be deduced from the passages in which Husserl explicitly refers to artistic experiences, to arrive to the idea that, analyzed from the perspective of image-consciousness, the aesthetic phenomenon that can be described is limited. So, secondly, we try to show that this poverty is not essential to the phenomenon and, therefore , such a limitation can be overcome, or almost transcended, if we contemplate the Aesthetic considerations taken by Husserl not from the point of view of image-consciousness but from the perspective of phantasy

Sobre a elaboração progressiva dos pensamentos de Husserl acerca da fantasia e da consciência de imagem através da escrita

This paper consists in a study of the development of Husserl’s thought on the notions of phantasy and image consciousness. It shows how, following a first phase in which he still identified phantasy with image consciousness, Husserl gradually began to distinguish the two and define what is proper to each in an increasingly precise manner. The paper then shows how Husserl came to view pure phantasy as a modification of perception. Concerning image consciousness, it shows how the status of the image-object and the nature of its reference to the image subject evolved throughout Husserl’s thought. The problems raised by this model are also discussed, in particular when it comes to cases where there is no image subject, e.g. in theatre. Finally, the paper shows how the development of these concepts in Husserl’s work involves a new conception of the notion of “phantasm” – one that goes hand in hand with rejection of the ‘content of apprehension-apprehension’ scheme.

Attention and the Subject of Depiction Some Remarks on Husserl’s Approach to the Function of Attention in Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Pictorial Experience

This study aims at exposing the phenomenological description of attention as presented by Husserl in his 1904-05 Göttingen-lecture Principal Parts of the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge, in its relevance for the study of so-called “intuitive re-presentations”, that is, phantasy and image-consciousness. Starting with the exposition of the fundamental traits of the intentional theory of attention, this study discusses the definition of attention in the terms of meaning [Meinen] and interest, which allows it to become an encompassing modification of all kinds of lived experiences that does not imply an alteration of their act-character (Husserl, 2004: 73). We refer to this character of attention as “plasticity”. In what follows, the study underlines these two definitions of attention and their importance for the understanding of phantasy and image-consciousness. Both kinds of re-presentations will be described stressing the role of attention in the “structuring” of the intentional act and in its affective basis. Finally, the study deals more specifically with the complex description of image consciousness from the viewpoint of the attentional meaning of the image subject.

Merleau-Ponty and Barthes on Image Consciousness: Probing the (Im)possibility of Meaning

Why exactly do paintings and photographs affect us, despite being flat, inanimate objects? Merleau-Ponty and Barthes both attempted to answer just as much and arrived at two conflicting accounts of the ontology of image consciousness. In Merleau-Ponty’s conception, paintings offer an infinite number of hermeneutic possibilities, while in Barthes’, photographs are a “closed field of forces,” thereby making their meanings necessarily contingent and circumscribed. In an effort to identify the point of contention between the two theories, this paper first outlines Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of painting and contrasts it with Barthes’ theory of photography. Next, it considers both theses through the lens of psychoanalytic theory, positing that both Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of art and Barthes’ notion of the studium correspond to Sigmund Freud’s idea of the pleasure principle, while the Barthesian notion of the punctum maps onto the Freudian concept of the death drive. Finally, I argue that the crux of Merleau-Ponty’s and Barthes’ disagreement on the metaphysical status of images has to do with the possibility -- or impossibility -- of meaning.

Para una fenomenologia de las muñecas hiperrealistas

ABSTRACT (TO BE TRANSLATED INTO SPANISH):Hyperrealistic artefacts are increasingly and rapidly spreading: “real dolls” are used as life- or sex partners; “reborn dolls” uncannily replicate the physical features of real infants; in the short term, androids are likely to play a crucial role in virtually all domains of society; and the rapid pace of technological development already suggests that there will be an exponential growth in the application of artificial intelligence to human replicas. By adopting a phenomenological perspective, this essay means to provide a theoretical explanation of hyperrealism and its walking the line between “perception” and “image consciousness” on the one hand, and between “deception” and “aesthetic illusion” on the other.