In the House of the Hangman One should not Mention the Noose: Jewish Voice for Labour’s Attack on the Equality and Human Rights Commission

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-92
Author(s):  
Derek Spitz

Abstract In May 2021 Jewish Voice for Labour (“JVL”) published a combative document entitled How the EHRC Got It So Wrong-Antisemitism and the Labour Party. The document criti­cises the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s October 2020 Report of its investiga­tion into antisemitism in the Labour Party. The Commission found the Labour Party responsible for antisemitic conduct giving rise to several unlawful acts in breach of the Equality Act 2010. In addition to its legal findings, it also made critical factual findings, identifying a culture of acceptance of antisemitism in the Labour Party, which suffered from serious failings in leadership, where the failure to tackle antisemitism more effectively was probably a matter of choice. The essence of JVL’s attack on the Commission’s Report is as follows. First, it is said that the Commission did not and could not lawfully investigate antisemitism as such; to the extent that it purported to do so, its findings of unlawfulness are purportedly meaningless. Secondly, JVL claims that the Commission made no finding of institutional antisemitism. Thirdly, by failing to require production of evidence referred to in a certain leaked report, probably prepared by Labour Party officials loyal to Jeremy Corbyn, the Commission is accused of nullifying at a stroke the value of its own Report as a factual account. Fourthly, JVL claims the Commission’s Report is not just legally unten­able, but purportedly a threat to democracy. Finally, JVL claims the Commission’s analysis was not just wrong, but that it exercised its statutory powers in bad faith. This article offers a response to each of the five pillars of JVL’s attack, all of which collapse under scrutiny. As to the first pillar, the article identifies the disappearing of antisemitism as the linchpin of JVL’s argument and shows how JVL’s criticism is underpinned by a political epistemology of antisemitism denialism. As to the second pillar, it shows that the absence of the term “institutional antisemitism” in the Commission’s Report is a semantic quibble. In sub­stance, the Commission found that the conduct under investigation amounted to institu­tional antisemitism. As to the third, the article demonstrates that JVL’s complaint about the Commission’s failure to call for production of the leaked report is perverse because that report constitutes an admission of the correctness of the complaints put before it. More­over, the Corbyn-led Labour Party itself decided that it did not want the Commission to consider that material. As to the fourth pillar, the article shows that far from being a threat to democracy, the Commission’s Report grasps the nettle of antisemitism denial. It con­cludes that continuing to assume and assert that Jews raising concerns about antisemitism are lying for nefarious ends may itself be, and in at least two cases was, a form of unlawful anti-Jewish harassment. As to the fifth, the article rebuts the extraordinary charge that the Commission exercised its powers in bad faith. Rather strikingly, neither JVL nor Jeremy Corbyn was willing to take the Commission on judicial review. The article concludes by considering how the poverty of JVL’s reasoning, coupled with the extravagance of its accu­sations, invites a symptomatic reading of Antisemitism and the Labour Party as a disap­pointing illustration of left-wing melancholia.

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dave Rich

In April 2020, shortly after Keir Starmer replaced Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the UK Labour Party, an internal party report concerning the workings of Labour's internal disciplinary unit in relation to antisemitism was leaked to the media. This report was over 850 pages long and was intended to be submitted to the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which is conducting an inquiry into allegations of antisemitism in the Party. However, Labour's lawyers refused to allow it to be used, almost certainly because the content was so damaging to the Party's own defence. It confirmed many of the claims made by Jewish Party members and community organisations during Corbyn's leadership of the party, namely that the disciplinary system was not fit for purpose and cases of alleged antisemitism were ignored or delayed and punishments were too weak. When it was leaked the report caused a scandal because it claimed that Corbyn's efforts to deal with antisemitism were sabotaged by his own Party staff, who were mostly drawn from factions opposed to his left wing project. Furthermore, the report claimed that this was part of a broader conspiracy against Corbyn that even extended to Labour Party staff trying to prevent a Labour victory in the 2017 General Election. The leaked report is selective and inaccurate in many respects and ignores the role played by Corbyn and his close advisers in denying the problem of antisemitism existed. Nor does it address the reasons why people with antisemitic views were attracted to Labour under his leadership. It is most likely that it was written to allow Corbyn and his supporters to continue to claim that their project did not fail on its own merits, but was betrayed by internal saboteur


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dave Rich

In April 2020, shortly after Keir Starmer replaced Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the UK Labour Party, an internal party report concerning the workings of Labour's internal disciplinary unit in relation to antisemitism was leaked to the media. This report was over 850 pages long and was intended to be submitted to the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which is conducting an inquiry into allegations of antisemitism in the Party. However, Labour's lawyers refused to allow it to be used, almost certainly because the content was so damaging to the Party's own defence. It confirmed many of the claims made by Jewish Party members and community organisations during Corbyn's leadership of the party, namely that the disciplinary system was not fit for purpose and cases of alleged antisemitism were ignored or delayed and punishments were too weak. When it was leaked the report caused a scandal because it claimed that Corbyn's efforts to deal with antisemitism were sabotaged by his own Party staff, who were mostly drawn from factions opposed to his left wing project. Furthermore, the report claimed that this was part of a broader conspiracy against Corbyn that even extended to Labour Party staff trying to prevent a Labour victory in the 2017 General Election. The leaked report is selective and inaccurate in many respects and ignores the role played by Corbyn and his close advisers in denying the problem of antisemitism existed. Nor does it address the reasons why people with antisemitic views were attracted to Labour under his leadership. It is most likely that it was written to allow Corbyn and his supporters to continue to claim that their project did not fail on its own merits, but was betrayed by internal saboteur


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Whiteley ◽  
Monica Poletti ◽  
Paul Webb ◽  
Tim Bale

This article investigates the remarkable surge in individual membership of the Labour Party after the general election of May 2015, particularly after Jeremy Corbyn was officially nominated as a candidate for the leadership in June of that year. Using both British Election Study and Party Members Project data, we explain the surge by focussing on the attitudinal, ideological and demographic characteristics of the members themselves. Findings suggest that, along with support for the leader and yearning for a new style of politics, feelings of relative deprivation played a significant part: many ‘left-behind’ voters (some well-educated, some less so) joined Labour for the first time when a candidate with a clearly radical profile appeared on the leadership ballot. Anti-capitalist and left-wing values mattered too, particularly for those former members who decided to return to the party.


2019 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 275-302
Author(s):  
Álvaro Paúl

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights developed a doctrine called conventionality control. In general terms, this doctrine is somewhat similar to the idea of judicial review of legislation, but applied in a transnational forum. According to the Court, conventionality control would require domestic judges and other bodies of States parties to the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) to depart from domestic legislation that runs counter to the ACHR or the Inter-American Court’s interpretation of the ACHR. Many scholars contend that the application of this doctrine should be carried out even if the domestic bodies that apply it have no constitutional power to do so. Others have a more restrictive interpretation and consider that domestic bodies would have to apply it to the extent of their power, according to their national constitutions. Apparently, the latter interpretation is gaining a wider support, which is desirable, because only this reading would be compatible with the principles of international law, and possibly accepted by all member States.


Leadership ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 174271502096719
Author(s):  
Andrea Whittle

When Jeremy Corbyn was first elected as leader of the Labour party in 2015, he was framed in the media as a new type of authentic political leader. Corbyn seemed to represent everything that a typical politician was not: honest, straight talking, principled and someone who always stayed true to his beliefs. In the aftermath of the December 2019 general election and the worst defeat for the Labour party since 1935, this article takes stock of how authenticity featured in the media discourse during Corbyn’s tenure as a party leader. Three competing discourses are identified. The first discourse categorised Corbyn as authentic and framed his authenticity as a leadership strength. The second discourse framed Corbyn as inauthentic. The third discourse framed Corbyn’s authenticity as a leadership problem. The study reveals a deeply ambivalent and contradictory set of discourses of authenticity that circulated in the media and highlights the ideological function performed by these competing discourses, which juxtapose ideas and ideals of personal authenticity against ideas and ideals about what constitutes effective political leadership. The article concludes by advancing an ambiguity-centred approach (Alvesson M and Spicer A (eds) (2010) Metaphors We Lead By: Understanding Leadership in the Real World. London: Routledge) to understanding authentic leadership, where authenticity is understood as a set of ambiguous and competing discursive attributions made within a contested social and political context.


2002 ◽  
pp. 167-194
Author(s):  
Miodrag Rankovic

The paper consists of four sections: the situation immediately after the end of the NATO bombardment, Euro-American restructuring, main coordinates of state sovereignty and the results achieved so far within the so-called negotiating policy in Kosmet. The paper discusses the dilemma about the final outcome of the 1999 war, about the arrival of NATO to Kosmet, when the state of "the controlled chaos" really began. Serbia was left with the victims (2.500 dead) and material destruction (estimated damage of 12 to over 100 billion dollars) rapid impoverishment (over 600 thousand jobless) and over 300 thousand expelled. The first "external coordinate" of the Serbian statehood in Kosmet (reliance on the Russian-Chinese-Indian alliance) completely disappointed mostly because of further decrease in the Russian initiative in the Balkans the second "coordinate", support of the international public and left-wing groupations (illustrative example) was not enough to restrain American expansionism, while the third one, the achievement of national consensus about Kosmet was a complete failure - the Serbs remained divided both in Serbia and in Kosmet. Thus the entire period after the change of power in Serbia has been marked by yielding and concessions (Kouchner's institutional restructuring Haekkerup's "institutional framework", Steiner's decrees). There followed a planned "demographic cleansing" (influx of new immigrants from Albania, almost 200 thousand), further destruction of the monuments of Serbian spirituality false demilitarization ("the Kosovo Protection Corps"), installment of NATO bases, cleansing of non-Albanian settlements (over 40 thousand houses and about 300 schools burnt), continuation of terrorist activities, "underground economy" etc. Serbia now shares sovereignty with KFOR and with the organs of authority of the prevailing Albanians, all within the realm of "human rights" "multiethnic Kosovo" and Islamic-Turkish lobby.


2012 ◽  
Vol 52 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 400-429
Author(s):  
Orit Bashkin

This article looks at the changing significations of the word “fascist” within communist discourses in Iraq and in Israel. I do so in order to illustrate how fascism, a concept signifying a political theory conceptualized and practiced in Italy, Germany, and Spain, became a boarder frame of reference to many leftist intellectuals in the Middle East. The articles shows that communist discourses formulated in Iraq during the years 1941-1945 evoked the word “fascist” not only in order to discredit Germany and Italy but also, and more importantly, as a way of critiquing Iraq’s radical pan-Arab nationalists and Iraq’s conservative elites who proclaimed their loyalty to pan-Arabism as well. In other words, the article studies the ways in which Iraqi communist intellectuals, most notably the leader of the Iraqi Communist Party, Fahd, shifted the antifascist global battle to the Iraqi field and used the prodemocratic agenda of the Allies to criticize the absence of social justice and human rights in Iraq, and the Iraqi leadership’s submissive posture toward Britain. As it became clear to Iraqi communists that World War II was nearing its end, and that Iraq would be an important part of the American-British front, criticism of the Iraqi Premier Nūrī al-Saʿīd and his policies grew sharper, and such policies were increasingly identified as “fascist”. Within this context, Fahd equated chauvinist rightwing Iraqi nationalism in its anti-Jewish and anti- Kurdish manifestations with fascism and Nazi racism. I then look at the ways in which Iraqi Jewish communists internalized the party’s localized antifascist agenda. I argue that Iraqi Jewish communists identified rightwing Iraqi nationalism (especially the agenda espoused by a radical pan-Arab Party called al-Istiqlāl) as symptomatic of a fascist ideology. Finally, I demonstrate how Iraqi Jewish communists who migrated to Israel in the years 1950-1951 continued using the word “fascist” in their campaigns against rightwing Jewish nationalism and how this antifascist discourse influenced prominent Palestinian intellectuals


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (7) ◽  
pp. 712-721
Author(s):  
Gilead Cooper

Abstract The principle that court hearings must be open to the public is regarded as sacrosanct. It has recently been invoked by the Court of Appeal in MN v OP as the reason for refusing an application to anonymise the approval of an arrangement under the Variation of Trusts Act 1958 Act. Yet the reasons generally given for insisting on open justice as a matter of principle are unconvincing when applied to civil cases as opposed to criminal cases or those, such as judicial review, in which the power of the state is pitted against the individual citizen. If private citizens are free to resolve their disputes privately through arbitration or mediation, why should they not be allowed to have their cases heard by the court in chambers unless there is some special feature of the case requiring publicity? Why are anonymised judgments not sufficient to ensure that justice is administered fairly and in accordance with the law? Could not more use be made of reporting restrictions? In this article, it is argued that the courts should do more to protect the privacy of litigants, and should not bow to populist demands to pry into the affairs of others (particularly the very wealthy). If they do not, those who can afford to do so will choose arbitration, or litigate in off-shore jurisdictions that are more sympathetic to their reasonable desire for privacy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lindiwe Ndlovu ◽  
Faith Sibanda

Indigenous African societies have, for a long time, been using their knowledge for the betterment of their lives. They have also demonstrated an ability to manipulate their immediate or remote surroundings to live sustainably. Those who claim to fight for equal and human rights in Africa do so under the misconception that they, and the developing world, have historically and inherently violated, and continue to violate, human rights in numerous ways. While this might not be completely dismissed, there is a plethora of evidence from African folktales to demonstrate that Africans have not only respected human rights, but have also encouraged equal opportunities for every member of their society. This article cross-examines Ndebele folktales with the intention of demonstrating that African indigenous knowledge exhibited through folktales was a well-organised system, which ensured respect for human rights for all members, regardless of their physical or social stature. Central to this discussion are the folktales which focus on the role played by the vulnerable members of the animal community, who replicate their human counterparts. Folktales are unarguably a creation by the indigenes and emanate from their socio-political experiences, as well as their observations of the surroundings. This suggests that indigenous people already had an idea about human rights as well as the need for equal opportunities since time immemorial. 


Author(s):  
Sarah Song

Chapter 6 examines three rights-based arguments for freedom of movement across borders. Three rights-based arguments have been offered in support of freedom of international movement. The first claims that freedom of movement is a fundamental human right in itself. The second adopts a “cantilever” strategy, arguing that freedom of international movement is a logical extension of existing fundamental rights, including the right of domestic free movement and the right to exit one’s country. The third argument is libertarian: international free movement is necessary to respect individual freedom of association and contract. This chapter shows why these arguments fail to justify a general right to free movement across the globe. What is morally required is not a general right of international free movement but an approach that privileges those whose basic human rights are at stake.


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