scholarly journals Broken Physics: A Conjunction-Fallacy Effect in Intuitive Physical Reasoning

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (12) ◽  
pp. 1602-1611
Author(s):  
Ethan Ludwin-Peery ◽  
Neil R. Bramley ◽  
Ernest Davis ◽  
Todd M. Gureckis
Keyword(s):  
Conjunction Fallacy ◽  
Mental Simulation ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Single Event ◽  
Physical Reasoning ◽  
Conjunction Errors ◽  
Intuitive Physics ◽  
Logical Impossibility ◽  
Rule Out

One remarkable aspect of human cognition is our ability to reason about physical events. This article provides novel evidence that intuitive physics is subject to a peculiar error, the classic conjunction fallacy, in which people rate the probability of a conjunction of two events as more likely than one constituent (a logical impossibility). Participants viewed videos of physical scenarios and judged the probability that either a single event or a conjunction of two events would occur. In Experiment 1 ( n = 60), participants consistently rated conjunction events as more likely than single events for the same scenes. Experiment 2 ( n = 180) extended these results to rule out several alternative explanations. Experiment 3 ( n = 100) generalized the finding to different scenes. This demonstration of conjunction errors contradicts claims that such errors should not appear in intuitive physics and presents a serious challenge to current theories of mental simulation in physical reasoning.

scholarly journals Limits on the Use of Simulation in Physical Reasoning

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan Ludwin-Peery ◽  
Neil R Bramley ◽  
Ernest Davis ◽  
Todd Matthew Gureckis
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Conditions ◽  
Simulation Theory ◽  
Conjunction Fallacy ◽  
Mental Simulation ◽  
Physical Reasoning ◽  
Temporal Identity ◽  
Spatio Temporal

In this paper, we describe three experiments involving simple physical judgments and predictions, and argue their results are generally inconsistent with three core commitments of probabilistic mental simulation theory (PMST). The first experiment shows that people routinely fail to track the spatio-temporal identity of objects. The second experiment shows that people often incorrectly reverse the order of consequential physical events when making physical predictions. Finally, we demonstrate a physical version of the conjunction fallacy where participants rate the probability of two joint events as more likely to occur than a constituent event of that set. These results highlight the limitations or boundary conditions of simulation theory.

scholarly journals Partial Mental Simulation Explains Fallacies in Physical Reasoning

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilona Bass ◽  
Kevin Smith ◽  
Elizabeth Bonawitz ◽  
Tomer David Ullman
Keyword(s):  
Simulation Model ◽  
Human Performance ◽  
Simulation Models ◽  
Conjunction Fallacy ◽  
Mental Simulation ◽  
Cognitive Resources ◽  
Physical Reasoning ◽  
The World ◽  
Computationally Expensive ◽  
Full Simulation

People can reason intuitively, efficiently, and accurately about everyday physical events. Recent accounts suggest that people use mental simulation to make such intuitive physical judgments. But mental simulation models are computationally expensive; how is physical reasoning relatively accurate, while maintaining computational tractability? We suggest that people make use of partial simulation, mentally moving forward in time only parts of the world deemed relevant. We propose a novel partial simulation model, and test it on the physical conjunction fallacy, a recently observed phenomenon (Ludwin-Peery, Bramley, Davis, & Gureckis, 2020) that poses a challenge for full simulation models. We find an excellent fit between our model's predictions and human performance on a set of scenarios that build on and extend those used by Ludwin-Peery et al. (2020), quantitatively and qualitatively accounting for a deviation from optimal performance. Our results suggest more generally how we allocate cognitive resources to efficiently represent and simulate physical scenes.

scholarly journals Limits on Simulation Approaches in Intuitive Physics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan Ludwin-Peery ◽  
Neil R Bramley ◽  
Ernest Davis ◽  
Todd Matthew Gureckis
Keyword(s):  
Mental Simulation ◽  
Simulation Approach ◽  
Apparent Contradiction ◽  
Physical Reasoning ◽  
Human Ability ◽  
Intuitive Physics

A popular explanation of the human ability for physical reasoning is that it depends on a sophisticated ability to perform mental simulations. According to this perspective, physical reasoning problems are approached by repeatedly simulating relevant aspects of a scenario, with noise, and making judgments based on aggregation over these simulations. In this paper, we describe three core tenets of simulation approaches, theoretical commitments that must be present in order for a simulation approach to be viable. The identification of these tenets threatens the plausibility of simulation as a theory of physical reasoning, because they appear to be incompatible with what we know about cognition more generally. To investigate this apparent contradiction, we describe three experiments involving simple physical judgments and predictions, and argue their results challenge these core predictions of theories of mental simulation.

scholarly journals Limits on the Use of Simulation in Physical Reasoning

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan Ludwin-Peery ◽  
Neil R Bramley ◽  
Ernest Davis ◽  
Todd Matthew Gureckis
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Conditions ◽  
Simulation Theory ◽  
Conjunction Fallacy ◽  
Mental Simulation ◽  
Physical Reasoning ◽  
Temporal Identity ◽  
Spatio Temporal

In this paper, we describe three experiments involving simple physical judgments and predictions, and argue their results are generally inconsistent with three core commitments of probabilistic mental simulation theory (PMST). The first experiment shows that people routinely fail to track the spatio-temporal identity of objects. The second experiment shows that people often incorrectly reverse the order of consequential physical events when making physical predictions. Finally, we demonstrate a physical version of the conjunction fallacy where participants rate the probability of two joint events as more likely to occur than a constituent event of that set. These results highlight the limitations or boundary conditions of simulation theory.

scholarly journals Limited Domain Structure for Conjunction Errors

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan Ludwin-Peery
Keyword(s):  
Domain Structure ◽  
Social Judgment ◽  
Conjunction Fallacy ◽  
Physical Reasoning ◽  
Conjunction Errors ◽  
Pure Chance ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Universal Relationship ◽  
Reasoning Tasks

People make conjunction errors, rating a conjunction as more likely than one of its constituents, across many different types of problems. They commit the conjunction fallacy in problems of social judgment, in physical reasoning tasks, and in gambles of pure chance. Doctors commit the fallacy when making judgments about hypothetical patients. Do all these errors share an underlying cause? Or does the fallacy arise independently in different types of reasoning? In a series of studies, we look for structure in conjunction errors across various types of problems. We find that error magnitudes are related for some clusters of items, but there does not appear to be a universal relationship between all cases of this fallacy.

scholarly journals Cross-linguistic evidence for cognitive universals in the noun phrase

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Martin ◽  
Theeraporn Ratitamkul ◽  
Klaus Abels ◽  
David Adger ◽  
Jennifer Culbertson
Keyword(s):  
Noun Phrase ◽  
Word Order ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Language Experience ◽  
Artificial Languages ◽  
Linguistic Evidence ◽  
Rule Out ◽  
Nominal Position

AbstractNoun phrase word order varies cross-linguistically, however, two distributional asymmetries have attracted substantial attention. First, the most common orders place adjectives closest to the noun, then numerals, then demonstratives (e.g., N-Adj-Num-Dem). Second, exceptions to this are restricted to post-nominal position (e.g., N-Dem-Num-Adj, but not, for instance, Adj-Num-Dem-N). These observations have been argued to reflect constraints on cognition. Here we report on two experiments, providing support for this claim. We taught English- and Thai-speaking participants artificial languages in which the position of modifiers relative to the noun differed from their native order (post-nominal position in English, pre-nominal in Thai). We trained participants on single-modifier phrases, and asked them to extrapolate to multiple modifier phrases. We found that both populations infer relative orders of modifiers that conform to the tendency for closest proximity of adjectives, then numerals, then demonstratives. Further, we show that Thai participants, learning pre-nominal modifiers, exhibit a stronger such preference. These results track the typology closely and are consistent with the claim that noun phrase word order reflects properties of human cognition. We discuss future research needed to rule out alternative explanations for our findings, including prior language experience.

The Influence of Effortful Thought and Cognitive Proficiencies on the Conjunction Fallacy: Implications for Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning and Judgment

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (6) ◽  
pp. 874-887 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura D. Scherer ◽  
J. Frank Yates ◽  
S. Glenn Baker ◽  
Kathrene D. Valentine
Keyword(s):  
Conjunction Fallacy ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Tripartite Model ◽  
Human Judgment ◽  
Conjunction Errors ◽  
Judgment Error ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Deliberative Reasoning

Human judgment often violates normative standards, and virtually no judgment error has received as much attention as the conjunction fallacy. Judgment errors have historically served as evidence for dual-process theories of reasoning, insofar as these errors are assumed to arise from reliance on a fast and intuitive mental process, and are corrected via effortful deliberative reasoning. In the present research, three experiments tested the notion that conjunction errors are reduced by effortful thought. Predictions based on three different dual-process theory perspectives were tested: lax monitoring, override failure, and the Tripartite Model. Results indicated that participants higher in numeracy were less likely to make conjunction errors, but this association only emerged when participants engaged in two-sided reasoning, as opposed to one-sided or no reasoning. Confidence was higher for incorrect as opposed to correct judgments, suggesting that participants were unaware of their errors.

Computer-Supported Imagination

2017 ◽  
pp. 33-60
Author(s):  
Franco Landriscina
Keyword(s):  
Computer Simulation ◽  
Teaching And Learning ◽  
Mental Simulation ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Explicit Statement ◽  
Simulation Based ◽  
Instructional Units ◽  
School Programs ◽  
Computer Based ◽  
Scientific Imagination

The purpose of this chapter is to explore some conceptual and methodological issues related to computer-based simulation as a teaching and learning method for STEM education. Two major themes will be examined in detail: 1) the barriers to the penetration of simulation into school programs; 2) simulation as a way to enhance scientific imagination in students. It is argued that scientific imagination is linked closely with mental simulation, a fundamental capacity of the human brain which allows us to move from static to dynamic mental representations. The role of mental simulation in understanding scientific concepts is discussed and an explicit statement is provided of the relation between computer simulation and mental simulation. On these grounds, computer simulation is viewed as a tool for extending human cognition by overcoming the limits of mental simulation. Finally, the implications of these findings for designing simulation-based instructional units and conducting lessons are discussed.

scholarly journals Different physical intuitions exist between tasks, not domains

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Smith ◽  
Peter Battaglia ◽  
Edward Vul
Keyword(s):  
Human Behavior ◽  
Fundamental Question ◽  
Universal System ◽  
Physical Reasoning ◽  
Physical Knowledge ◽  
Ballistic Motion ◽  
Accurate Knowledge ◽  
The World ◽  
Intuitive Physics ◽  
Physical Principles

Does human behavior exploit deep and accurate knowledge about how the world works, or does it rely on shallow and often inaccurate heuristics? This fundamental question is rooted in a classic dichotomy in psychology: human intuitions about even simple scenarios can be poor, yet their behaviors can exceed the capabilities of even the most advanced machines. One domain where such a dichotomy has classically been demonstrated is intuitive physics. Here we demonstrate that this dichotomy is rooted in how physical knowledge is measured: extrapolation of ballistic motion is idiosyncratic and erroneous when people draw the trajectories, but consistent with accurate physical inferences under uncertainty when people use the same trajectories to catch a ball or release it to hit a target. Our results suggest that the contrast between rich and calibrated, versus poor and inaccurate patterns of physical reasoning exist as a result of using different systems of knowledge across tasks, rather than as a universal system of knowledge that is inconsistent across physical principles.

Language as a mental travel guide

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles P. Davis ◽  
Gerry T. M. Altmann ◽  
Eiling Yee
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Travel Guide

Abstract Gilead et al.'s approach to human cognition places abstraction and prediction at the heart of “mental travel” under a “representational diversity” perspective that embraces foundational concepts in cognitive science. But, it gives insufficient credit to the possibility that the process of abstraction produces a gradient, and underestimates the importance of a highly influential domain in predictive cognition: language, and related, the emergence of experientially based structure through time.

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