Management expenses in the context of Federal Accounting Standard (FSBU) 5/2019 – Inventories

Subject. This article deals with the issues of accounting and write-offs of management costs and disclosure in reporting, their role for top managers, as well as improving the delineation and qualification of the types of costs to be accounted for as managerial, and the impact of the proposed approaches on reporting performance. Objectives. The article aims to justify the need for a clearer definition of management costs and a more logical, cost-effective division of costs into production and management ones. Methods. For the study, I used the systems approach, logical generalization and abstraction. Results. The study shows that not all expenses that organizations account for as the management ones are actual. Many of the costs relate to production activities. Since the methodological guidelines for accounting for material and operational costs have been abolished in connection with the adoption of FSBU 5 – Inventories, they may not be applied any more. Conclusions and Relevance. The subject terminology and a clear concept of management costs need to be defined. IFRS 2 – Inventories gives a more logical notion of management costs in combination with administrative costs. This makes it possible to adapt the accounting according to the Russian standards to the running accounting practice with a minimum recalculation. The presented study results are intended to develop theoretical views on the formation of the actual cost of finished products, the full cost of implementation and interpretation of these indicators for management. The results can be used for scientific and practical activities related to financial and management accounting research.

Probabilistic truthlikeness, content elements, and meta-inductive probability optimization

The paper starts with the distinction between conjunction-of-parts accounts and disjunction-of-possibilities accounts to truthlikeness (Sects. 1, 2). In Sect. 3, three distinctions between kinds of truthlikeness measures (t-measures) are introduced: (i) comparative versus numeric t-measures, (ii) t-measures for qualitative versus quantitative theories, and (iii) t-measures for deterministic versus probabilistic truth. These three kinds of truthlikeness are explicated and developed within a version of conjunctive part accounts based on content elements (Sects. 4, 5). The focus lies on measures of probabilistic truthlikeness, that are divided into t-measures for statistical probabilities and single case probabilities (Sect. 4). The logical notion of probabilistic truthlikeness (evaluated relative to true probabilistic laws) can be treated as a subcase of deterministic truthlikeness for quantitative theories (Sects. 4–6). In contrast, the epistemic notion of probabilistic truthlikeness (evaluated relative to given empirical evidence) creates genuinely new problems, especially for hypotheses about single case probabilities that are evaluated not by comparison to observed frequencies (as statistical probabilities), but by comparison to the truth values of single event statements (Sect. 6). By the method of meta-induction, competing theories about single case probabilities can be aggregated into a combined theory with optimal predictive success and epistemic truthlikeness (Sect. 7).

L’opposition moral(e) / éthique : une approche linguistique

This paper examines the semantics of French éthique (as opposed to moral[e]) on the basis of its etymology, its history, its combinatorial properties and a semantic analysis based on the semantic-logical notion of validity (linked to the notion of conditions of validity).

The Mystery of the Fifth Logical Notion (Alice in the Wonderful Land of Logical Notions)

We discuss a theory presented in a posthumous paper by Alfred Tarski entitled “What are logical notions?”. Although the theory of these logical notions is something outside of the main stream of logic, not presented in logic textbooks, it is a very interesting theory and can easily be understood by anybody, especially studying the simplest case of the four basic logical notions. This is what we are doing here, as well as introducing a challenging fifth logical notion. We first recall the context and origin of what are here called Tarski-Lindenbaum logical notions. In the second part, we present these notions in the simple case of a binary relation. In the third part, we examine in which sense these are considered as logical notions contrasting them with an example of a nonlogical relation. In the fourth part, we discuss the formulations of the four logical notions in natural language and in first-order logic without equality, emphasizing the fact that two of the four logical notions cannot be expressed in this formal language. In the fifth part, we discuss the relations between these notions using the theory of the square of opposition. In the sixth part, we introduce the notion of variety corresponding to all non-logical notions and we argue that it can be considered as a logical notion because it is invariant, always referring to the same class of structures. In the seventh part, we present an enigma: is variety formalizable in first-order logic without equality? There follow recollections concerning Jan Woleński. This paper is dedicated to his 80th birthday. We end with the bibliography, giving some precise references for those wanting to know more about the topic.

Ayer, Alfred Jules (1910–89)

A.J. Ayer made his name as a philosopher with the publication of Language, Truth and Logic in 1936, a book which established him as the leading English representative of logical positivism, a doctrine put forward by a group of philosophers known as members of the Vienna Circle. The major thesis of logical positivism defended by Ayer was that all literally meaningful propositions were either analytic (true or false in virtue of the meaning of the proposition alone) or verifiable by experience. This, the verificationist theory of meaning, was used by Ayer to deny the literal significance of any metaphysical propositions, including those that affirmed or denied the existence of God. Statements about physical objects were said to be translatable into sentences about our sensory experiences (the doctrine known as phenomenalism). Ayer further claimed that the propositions of logic and mathematics were analytic truths and that there was no natural necessity, necessity being a purely logical notion. Finally the assertion of an ethical proposition, such as ‘Stealing is wrong’, was analysed as an expression of emotion or attitude to an action, in this case the expression of a negative attitude to the act of stealing. During the rest of his philosophical career Ayer remained faithful to most of these theses, but came to reject his early phenomenalism in favour of a sophisticated realism about physical objects. This still gives priority to our experiences, now called percepts, but the existence of physical objects is postulated to explain the coherence and consistency of our percepts. Ayer continued to deny that there were any natural necessities, analysing causation as consisting in law-like regularities. He used this analysis to defend a compatibilist position about free action, claiming that a free action is to be contrasted with one done under constraint or compulsion. Causation involves mere regularity, and so neither constrains nor compels.

Mis-Taking in Halakhah and Aggadah (Jewish Responses to Kant II)

The chapter accounts for how the rabbinic political was constructed and thereby productively lost in Jewish secularizing modernist thought and literature of Franz Kafka, Chaim Bialik, and Walter Benjamin. Modernist notions of logical implication, literary expression, and language are at the center of analysis in this chapter, as it articulates a crisis in the relationships between law and literature in how these thinkers navigate both the human condition and both the Jewish and general law as its part. The chapter further shows how a departure from neo-Kantianism in these thinkers lead to a reconsideration of the role of mistake and failure in human condition, and how their understanding of both mistaking and failing both purports to capture and misses the Talmudic understanding of mistake in terms of self-refutation. The result is a new vision of the otherwise purely logical notion of implication, a vision in which the very being implicit rather than explicit remains fundamental for human condition, and that no explication of the implicit can ever either replace or tame the power of the implicit in human condition.

Modal Adventures between Leibniz and Kant

This paper explores the philosophical transitions in the relations between existence and possibility in Leibniz and Kant. It begins with Leibniz’s formulation of a strictly logical notion of possibility; proceeds with Kant’s pre-critical statement in 1763 that existence is not a predicate; and ends with the Critique of Pure Reason in which the theory of possibility is constrained by the subjective conditions of experience (to supply the material for thinking possibilities) and is thus relativized to the human mind. I present Leibniz’s view of possibility against the traditional view of temporal modalities; and, in this light, his dual notion of existence. I then argue that, in Kant’s pre-critical essay of 1763, the view that existence is not a predicate is strongly related to the logical view of possibility advanced by Leibniz. I conclude with Kant’s transition to the critical period and its implications on the analysis of modality.

Rejectivism and the Challenge of Pragmatic Contradictions

Rejectivism is one of the most influential embodiments of pragmatism within contemporary philosophy of logic, advancing an explanation of the meaning of a logical notion, negation, in terms of the speech act of denial. This paper offers a challenge to rejectivism by proposing that in virtue of explaining negation in terms of denial, the rejectivist ought to be able to explain the concept of contradiction partially in terms of denial. It is argued that any failure to achieve this constitutes an explanatory failure on the part of rejectivism, and reasons are then provided to doubt that the challenge can be successfully met.

HARMONIC INFERENTIALISM AND THE LOGIC OF IDENTITY

Inferentialism claims that the rules for the use of an expression express its meaning without any need to invoke meanings or denotations for them. Logical inferentialism endorses inferentialism specifically for the logical constants. Harmonic inferentialism, as the term is introduced here, usually but not necessarily a subbranch of logical inferentialism, follows Gentzen in proposing that it is the introduction-rules which give expressions their meaning and the elimination-rules should accord harmoniously with the meaning so given. It is proposed here that the logical expressions are those which can be given schematic rules that lie in a specific sort of harmony, general-elimination (ge) harmony, resulting from applying a certain operation, the ge-procedure, to produce ge-rules in accord with the meaning defined by the I-rules. Griffiths (2014) claims that identity cannot be given such rules, concluding that logical inferentialists are committed to ruling identity a nonlogical expression. It is shown that the schematic rules for identity given in Read (2004), slightly amended, are indeed ge-harmonious, so confirming that identity is a logical notion.