Market Manipulation According to the Capital Market Law

The behavior (manipulation) for prompting selling or buying a capital market instrument or increasing or decreasing the value of capital market instrument artificially by deceiving the investors in the capital market sprincipally deteriorate the trust and stability of the capital market and damages the rights of the investors. Besides, such behavior upsets the transparency of the market and causes that the trust that should be in the market is breached. Such behavior called as manipulation in the capital markets are arranged under the name “market manipulation” in the article 107 of the Capital Market Law (SPKn) no: 6362. Because of the negative impacts on the market, having an arrangement as a crime separate from the fraud provisions included in the criminal code is principally a statement of a necessity. Market manipulation is subjected to a dual distinction as committed based on insider information and committed based on transaction. Article 107/1 regulates the market manipulation based on trade and Article 107/2 of SPKn the market manipulation based on information. Even though the same imprisonment is anticipated in the law for both market manipulation, for the market manipulation based on trade, a special remorse circumstance is included in the Article 107/3 and a special compliance with the laws reasons in the Article 108.

Social Capital From Professional Engineering Organizations and the Persistence of Women and Underrepresented Minority Undergraduates

Professional engineering organizations (PEOs) have the potential to provide women and underrepresented and minoritized (URM) students with social capital (i.e., resources gained from relationships) that aids their persistence in their engineering undergraduate programs and into the workforce. We hypothesize that women and URM students engineering students who participate in PEOs are more likely to persist in their engineering major and that PEOs contribute to their persistence by providing them access to insider information that supports their persistence. Each year for five years we administered surveys with closed- and open-ended items to examine the association between participating in PEOs and the persistence of a cohort of engineering majors from 11 diverse universities. We used logistic regression and thematic analysis to analyze the data. URM students who participated in PEOs and other engineering related activities were more likely to persist to the second year than URM students who did not (adjusted odds ratio = 2.18, CI: 1.09, 4.37). Students reported that PEOs contributed to their persistence by enabling them to network, reduce gender and race/ethnic isolation, and access professional resources. URM students should be encouraged to participate in PEOs beginning in their first year to increase their integration in their major, which we have found to increase their persistence.

Model-independent pricing with insider information: a skorokhod embedding approach

In this paper we consider the pricing and hedging of financial derivatives in a model-independent setting, for a trader with additional information, or beliefs, on the evolution of asset prices. In particular, we suppose that the trader wants to act in a way which is independent of any modelling assumptions, but that she observes market information in the form of the prices of vanilla call options on the asset. We also assume that both the payoff of the derivative, and the insider’s information or beliefs, which take the form of a set of impossible paths, are time-invariant. In this way we accommodate drawdown constraints, as well as information/beliefs on quadratic variation or on the levels hit by asset prices. Our setup allows us to adapt recent work of [12] to prove duality results and a monotonicity principle. This enables us to determine geometric properties of the optimal models. Moreover, for specific types of information, we provide simple conditions for the existence of consistent models for the informed agent. Finally, we provide an example where our framework allows us to compute the impact of the information on the agent’s pricing bounds.

Criminal Liability for Illegal Securities Transactions

The paper analyzes the most common typical forms of infringements and the main aspects of liability for illegal securities transactions provided for by the criminal legislation of the Russian Federation and foreign countries. The author refers to such typical infringements as counterfeit of securities; counterfeit securities usage (regardless of their issuers); issue (emission) of securities carried out in prohibited ways or in violation of the requirements established by law; introduction of illegally issued securities into circulation; violation of the established order of circulation (illegal circulation) of securities; illegal use of so-called insider information. In order to define these standard forms the author analyses the national criminal legislation, as well as the criminal legislation of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Germany, Holland, Georgia, Denmark, Spain, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Poland, Uzbekistan, Estonia.

Closed-Loop Equilibrium Reinsurance-Investment Strategy with Insider Information and Default Risk

This paper studies the closed-loop equilibrium reinsurance-investment problem with insider information and default risk. The financial market consists of one risky asset, one defaultable bond, and one risk-free asset. The surplus process is governed by a jump-diffusion process. Two kinds of dependencies between the insurance market and the financial market are considered. In addition, the insurer has some extra claims information available from the beginning of the trading interval. The objective of the insurer is to choose a time-consistent reinsurance-investment strategy so as to maximize the expected terminal wealth while minimizing the variance of the terminal wealth. Since this problem is time-inconsistent, using closed-loop control approach from the perspective of game theory, we establish the extended Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equations for the postdefault case and the predefault case, respectively. Closed-form solutions for the closed-loop equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy and the corresponding value function are obtained. Finally, we provide a series of numerical examples to illustrate the effects of insider information and other some important model parameters on the closed-loop equilibrium reinsurance and investment strategies. The result analyses reveal some interesting phenomena and provide useful guidances for reinsurance and investment in reality.

Enforcement of Chinese Insider Trading Law: An Empirical and Comparative Perspective

This Article conducts the first comprehensive and systematic empirical analysis of all relevant insider trading cases in China from the birth of Chinese securities markets in the early 1990s until mid-2017, shedding light on the way in which China’s insider trading law has been enforced by the regulator and criminal courts in practice. First, the Article generates descriptive statistics on features of insider trading cases, such as the total number of cases over the study period, the temporal distribution of the cases, the identity of the insider, and the nature of the insider information. Second, it measures the intensity of insider trading enforcement and compares the Chinese situation with six overseas jurisdictions, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Third, using multiple regression analyses, it identifies potential factors determining the administrative and criminal penalties for insider trading. The results of the empirical study indicate that China has significantly stepped up its efforts to crack down on insider trading in recent years, resulting in a sharp increase in insider trading cases, particularly criminal cases since 2008. While the Chinese insider trading law was essentially transplanted from overseas jurisdictions, its; enforcement has exhibited distinctive features in its local environment. Judging by the type, magnitude, and frequency of the sanctions imposed, the intensity of insider trading enforcement in China seems to be at a level comparable to relevant jurisdictions overseas. Administrative and criminal penalties against insider trading are found to be significantly influenced by some factors, notably the amount of illegal proceeds, the magnitude of social impact, the presence of mitigating circumstances, and whether the trader used others’ accounts to trade. The hope is that the empirical findings will help inform the policy debate over the regulation of insider trading in China and beyond.

Kartellrechtliche Leniency Programmes und Ad-hoc-Publizität nach MAR

Antitrust leniency programmes expect applicants to not disclose the fact of cooperating with the authorities. This may cause problems for companies if, as issuers on the capital market, they are obliged to publish insider information as soon as possible (Art. 17 MAR). Ultimately offering a solution to the initial problem based on the findings, the thesis provides a profound analysis of two areas of law which are relevant in practice and are deeply rooted in EU law. A thorough and critical examination is carried out considering numerous aspects of the obligation of disclosure as well as of the newly created German statutory leniency programme (§§ 81h ff. GWB), which implements the “ECN”-Directive and replaces the previous “Bonusregelung”.

Optimal Portfolios for Different Anticipating Integrals under Insider Information

We consider the non-adapted version of a simple problem of portfolio optimization in a financial market that results from the presence of insider information. We analyze it via anticipating stochastic calculus and compare the results obtained by means of the Russo-Vallois forward, the Ayed-Kuo, and the Hitsuda-Skorokhod integrals. We compute the optimal portfolio for each of these cases with the aim of establishing a comparison between these integrals in order to clarify their potential use in this type of problem. Our results give a partial indication that, while the forward integral yields a portfolio that is financially meaningful, the Ayed-Kuo and the Hitsuda-Skorokhod integrals do not provide an appropriate investment strategy for this problem.