scholarly journals Convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in India

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-293
Author(s):  
Geeta Gouri

The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has been a churning of possible diverse antitrust abuses and, as competition law grapples to incorporate these new market structures, there is another churn that is slowly emerging as a major concern — that of convergence of competition policy and public interest. This is an area in antitrust literature which is yet to receive sufficient attention. The core of antitrust intervention — that competition benefits consumers — is undisputed and perhaps axiomatic but what is not axiomatic is that monopolistic market structures can also lead to enhancing public welfare. Emergent trends towards monopolistic markets suggest a rethink of competition policy and law and their convergence for public interest. The focus of this article is on the importance of convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in new and emergent markets. It raises questions: Is there convergence or divergence between policy and law and public interest? What is public interest? Do consumers represent public interest and, if so, which set of consumers? Are innovation and technological development, which are part of public interest, also in the ambit of competition policy or are they in the realm of competition law? This is another question which has become acute in recent times. In India and the BRICS group, where usage of internet on smart phones is high, the convergence between competition policy, law and public interest suggests antitrust intervention is guided by public interest.

Author(s):  
Eleanor M. Fox ◽  
Mor Bakhoum

This chapter explores the core and limits of competition law and policy in terms of the values of inclusive development and poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan Africa. A pro-outsider, pro-inclusive development antitrust policy would value a free and open marketplace without privilege or favor. This perspective is especially critical for African nations and market players without economic power and especially for those populations in societies ruled by a few privileged families or firms, or by autocrats. Pro-outsider competition policy may be implemented not only through competition law enforcement of manageable rules and standards but also through advocacy by the competition authority with partners such as the World Bank, and collaboration with neighbors. The elements of good policy form an interdependent virtuous circle.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 218
Author(s):  
Udin Silalahi ◽  
Dian Parluhutan

As outlined in the AEC Blueprint, all ASEAN member states (AMSs) will endeavour to introduce competition policy by 2015. At present 7 (seven) AMSs, namely: Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, Myanmar have the national competition laws to supervise anti-competitive conduct in the domestic market. But the question is what if happened unfair competition between ASEAN member states, due to the agreement or businesses activities by business actors that harm competition? ASEAN has an ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy (ARGCP) that developed by ASEAN Experts Group on Competition (AEGC) as framework for member states to develop its own competition law or policy and as a guideline in measuring that directly affect the behaviour of enterprises and the structure of industry and markets. Regional Guideline is just to help AMSs in increasing of awareness of important policy, not to sustain the competition among ASEAN member countries. Until now there is no ASEAN Competition Law and Institution to oversee competition among ASEAN member countries. In this era, ASEAN economic integration it is a certainty that anti-competitive among AMSs will happen.


2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 494-497
Author(s):  
Peter C. Carstensen

The relationship between law including competition policy and the goal of advancing innovation and entrepreneurship is complex. Bert Foer’s chapter identifies the many ways that competition law and policy directly and indirectly can affect positively or negatively the advancement of that goal. The comment seeks to highlight that range and complexity by using the categories from the traditional I-O Paradigm to show where and how antitrust law and policies it seeks to advance can be used to shape the conditions, structure, and conduct in markets to facilitate outcomes that will advance the public interest in innovation and entrepreneurship.


2006 ◽  
Vol 51 (02) ◽  
pp. 241-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. SIVALINGAM

The focus of this paper is on competition policy and law in the ASEAN countries. The paper begins with a descriptive evaluation of competition policy in the ASEAN countries. We then look at the effect of economic structure on the probability of early adoption of competition law among the ASEAN countries after which the competition laws of the ASEAN countries are evaluated in terms of objectives, jurisdictional exception, horizontal agreements, vertical agreements, definition and abuse of dominant position and mergers. We find that the competition laws of the four ASEAN countries that have implemented competition law are not completely harmonized.


2014 ◽  
Vol 66 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 321-337
Author(s):  
Ivana Rakic

The purpose of ex ante merger control is to secure and preserve the competitive market structures by controlling concentrations which might significantly impede effective competition. All concentrations exceeding a certain turnover threshold are subject to mandatory notification under national merger control rules and such transactions shall not be implemented prior to clearance decision. In assessing a concentration, the relevant competition authority must consider the likely effects of the concentration on competition, and if the concentration is expected to be anti-competitive, it must be prohibited. The aim of this article is to explain the difficulties to properly determine the institutional framework in which the competition authority approves or prohibits concentrations. Therefore, the author analyses some of the main principles on which merger control should be based and points out that merger control rules play very important role in achieving effective enforcement of optimal competition policy.


Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial for consumer welfare. Section 4 considers the expected functions of a system of competition law. Section 5 then introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-46
Author(s):  
Matthew Johnson

The issue of barriers to exit has been neglected by competition authorities and by competition policy research. This is somewhat surprising as it is a topic which goes to the heart of why competition policy exists; if barriers to exit prevent or delay inefficient firms from leaving the market, then the normal competitive process of driving up market efficiency is hampered. This in turn reduces the benefits to other, more efficient firms, and to customers in terms of lower prices, better quality, etc. This article explores the reasons why, despite the importance of barriers to exit in the economic framework that underpins competition policy, very few competition authority decisions discuss the issue. It considers the approach to barriers to exit in different types of competition investigation, such as merger assessment, Article 101 and 102 TFEU cases, and State aid. The article also considers the scope for cross-disciplinary research and collaboration, such as in the design of insolvency or bankruptcy laws.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-168
Author(s):  
Andreas Stephan

The Competition Laws of the European Union (‘EU’) have been a major influence on countless jurisdictions around the world, but their strength as a public enforcement regime have always contrasted with a perceived absence of private enforcement. Private parties cannot bring an action for damages or injunctive relief before EU courts. They can only make a complaint to the European Commission or National Competition Authority, to investigate an infringement of competition law, on their behalf. Therefore, a party’s ability to recover damages falls on the national tort and civil liability rules of each Member State. Although most European legal systems can broadly be described as belonging to the civil law tradition, there are significant differences in procedure and legal culture when it comes to recovering damages. It is also important to remember that the EU has continued to grow in the last fifteen years, with the accession of ten new Member States in 2004, and a further three between 2007 and 2013. These include states that have made a rapid transition from centrally planned economies and Communist-era legal systems.


Author(s):  
K. Smyrnova

The digital world is highly dynamic. The only way of survival is to keep innovating, in some extend even invent a way (legal or illegal) to secure its position. As this new phenomenon becomes increasingly sophisticated, the need for laws to govern it becomes more poignant. In consequence, the European Union has taken various actions towards realizing this aim of regulating the digital platform horizon. The evolutionary development of active & passive selling through new electronic or other innovative means which is currently erases national borders leads to the comprehensive involvement of different national competition regimes. The competition authority has kept close scrutinizing on those firms in dominant position in their relevant market. Not only this, as the digital market is mostly multiple sided, the interaction between market are also taking care. However, the competition laws should adapt in the proactively to prevent the anti-competitive measures. The competition authority needs to have the anticipation on the dynamic evolution of competition in digital market and act proactively. Thus the most crucial aspect is to balance the innovative progress & the necessity to control on competition. This article examines how the nature and logic of competition law changes as authorities expand the time horizon that they consider in their prospective analysis.


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