Modeling Imprecise and Bipolar Algebraic and Topological Relations using Morphological Dilations

In many domains of information processing, such as knowledge representation, preference modeling, argumentation, multi-criteria decision analysis, spatial reasoning, both vagueness, or imprecision, and bipolarity, encompassing positive and negative parts of information, are core features of the information to be modeled and processed. This led to the development of the concept of bipolar fuzzy sets, and of associated models and tools, such as fusion and aggregation, similarity and distances, mathematical morphology. Here we propose to extend these tools by defining algebraic and topological relations between bipolar fuzzy sets, including intersection, inclusion, adjacency and RCC relations widely used in mereotopology, based on bipolar connectives (in a logical sense) and on mathematical morphology operators. These definitions are shown to have the desired properties and to be consistent with existing definitions on sets and fuzzy sets, while providing an additional bipolar feature. The proposed relations can be used for instance for preference modeling or spatial reasoning. They apply more generally to any type of functions taking values in a poset or a complete lattice, such as L-fuzzy sets.

Are Scientific Models of Life Testable? A Lesson from Simpson’s Paradox

We address the need for a model by considering two competing theories regarding the origin of life: (i) the Metabolism First theory, and (ii) the RNA World theory. We discuss two interrelated points, namely: (i) Models are valuable tools for understanding both the processes and intricacies of origin-of-life issues, and (ii) Insights from models also help us to evaluate the core objection to origin-of-life theories, called “the inefficiency objection”, which is commonly raised by proponents of both the Metabolism First theory and the RNA World theory against each other. We use Simpson’s Paradox (SP) as a tool for challenging this objection. We will use models in various senses, ranging from taking them as representations of reality to treating them as theories/accounts that provide heuristics for probing reality. In this paper, we will frequently use models and theories interchangeably. Additionally, we investigate Conway’s Game of Life and contrast it with our SP-based approach to emergence-of-life issues. Finally, we discuss some of the consequences of our view. A scientific model is testable in three senses: (i) a logical sense, (ii) a nomological sense, and (iii) a current technological sense. The SP-based model is testable in the first two senses but it is not feasible to test it using current technology.

Medicine, Court and Logical Sense

In teaching the rudiments of the 1957 Bolam test as ‘reined’ in by the Bolitho principle, it is invariable for at least one student to ask “is it not obvious that explanations must make logical sense to the Court?” Which invariably raises the point in my mind, “The question should be: The Bolitho principle demands that Bolam oriented statements makes logical sense to whom? Is it to the Court? Is it to any independent observer?”

Are Scientific Models of Life Testable? A Lesson from Simpson’s Paradox

We address the need for a model by considering two competing theories regarding the origin of life: (i) the Metabolism First theory and (ii) the RNA World theory. We discuss two inter-related points. (I) Models are valuable tools in understanding both the processes and intricacies of the origin of life issues. (II) Insights from models also help us to evaluate the core objection to origin of life theories called “the inefficiency objection” commonly raised by proponents of both the Metabolism First theory and the RNA World theory against each other. We use Simpson’s paradox as a tool for challenging this objection. We will use models in various senses ranging from taking them as representations of reality to treating them as theories/accounts that provide heuristics for probing reality. In this paper, we will frequently use models and theories interchangeably. Additionally, we investigate Conway’s Game of Life and contrast it with our Simpson’s Paradox (SP)-based approach to emergence of life issues. Finally, we discuss some of the consequences of our view. A scientific model is testable in three senses: (i) a logical sense, (ii) a nomological sense, and (iii) a current technological sense. The SP-based model is testable in the logical sense. It is also testable nomologically. However, it is not currently feasible to test it.

Idea, Idea of the Idea and Certainty in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione and the Ethics

Despite an apparent contradiction between Spinoza’s claims in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione and the Ethics concerning the nature of knowledge and certainty, Matheron here argues for the consistency of Spinoza’s epistemological position. To have a true idea is at the same time to be certain of the truth of the idea even if, from a psychological point of view, certainty appears to be a secondary acquisition that arises after the initial moment of knowing. Those who doubt the certainty necessarily associated with true ideas do not ultimately acquire any new knowledge upon eliminating their doubts for, as Matheron shows, Spinoza’s use of the term prius or first, in both texts, has a chronological and logical sense. Knowledge of knowledge is therefore present at the moment of knowing whether one knows it or not. Moreover, science can proceed without being grounded in epistemology, even if the latter can eventually come to serve and clarify the former.

“Dark Ontology” in the Historical Context of the Denial of Consciousness

We discuss the “axioms of dark ontology” proposed by the US philosopher Levi Bryant. The axioms are analyzed in a context of the historical development of diverse philosophical viewpoints united by the concept of the denial of consciousness. The “deniers” declare the direct conscious experience to be an illusion. As for the philosophical provisions that will not fit into their very limited conceptual straitjacket, they proclaim those inimical to science and therefore subject to elimination from the epistemological discourse altogether. Analyzing the viewpoints of the denialist philosophers, we show their inner contradictions that primarily are related to their inability to apply their assertions about consciousness to their own methods, arguments, and conclusions. We review the historical development of the critique regarding the denialists’ views taken from sometimes very diverse philosophical corners. We show that Bryant’s assertions are not axioms in any logical sense, but rather a scientism manifesto created in response to a technocratic demand for dehumanization. We also show how Bryant’s rejection of the human-centered position of philosophy follows from deconstruction practices undertaken by the structuralists and poststructuralists. To advance his ideas, Bryant imitates Ludwig Wittgenstein’s forms of discourse. He also engages moralizing and sophistry. We show that Bryant’s failure to create a robust, coherent system demonstrates weaknesses in the poststructuralist ideas that his concepts stem from. We conclude that the process that the doctrine of the denial of consciousness becomes mainstream attests, in Heidegger’s terms, the final stage of European nihilism and the crisis of science and philosophy of knowledge.

International law argumentation in the national courts of the Scandinavian countries: doctrinal approaches

INTRODUCTION. In modern legal science the problem of the effect and implementation of international law in national legal systems is one of the most popular areas of research. This article is devoted to the consideration and critical analysis of doctrinal assessments of the application by courts of general jurisdiction of the Scandinavian countries of the international legal norms , as well as their possible approaches to resolving conflicts between the norms of international and national law.MATERIALS AND METHODS. The method of comparative law has been used in present essay as a special logical mechanism that permits us to construct a system of rules relating to conflict of laws. Especially these rules are the tertium comparationis in a case of conflict between international and domestic law in municipal courts, as it is going through the formula of induction (analogy): if A is B, and B is C, so A is C.RESEARCH RESULTS. Traditionally international law suggests two ways of solving the problem in a case of the conflict of laws: monistic and dualistic doctrines. But these doctrines are not realizable in a pure form because of their inner contradiction. The main cause of this contradiction is the impossi bility to join interests of the subjects of international law with each other. Taking the doctrine of Interessenjurisprudenz as a ground of our further reasoning we have found the third point, we were searching for: just – the mechanism of elaborating the special remedies by which the conflict of interpretations has to be solved. The main remedy is the overcoming (in a logical sense) the law of excluded the third in the form of analogy. So, we can formulate a construction of the rules relating to conflict of laws in international public law by the analogy with the international private law. The nature of these rules is coincided with the such norms as _esuetu iuris cive necessitates and general principles of law. Especially that permits us to avoid the conflict of interpretation of the two legal orders, that can be caused by the “double standards” and “soft power” doctrines.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. The above mentioned analysis permits us to formulate some general principles to established the system of rules relating to conflict of laws. The main cause of them will be following logical premise: the conflict of laws is based on the conflict of interests. That can be evidently by the interpretation rules in a conflict. Interpretation has the aim to harmonized conflicting orders on the ground of the general principles of law relating to municipal and international law. Conflict of laws can be solved through the general principles of law, especially in the case of fundamental contradiction. Conflict of laws can be formulated by the analogy. Conflict of laws can’t be interpreted in teleological way.

Falso quando?

An altar, found at Brenna (Como) and donated to the Civic Archaeological Collections of Milan in 1875, was never taken into account by scholars because it is unintelligible. The alleged text is sharply and skilfully engraved on at least 13 lines, but is composed of only partially alphabetic signs, devoid of any logical sense. Blaming the stonecutter of incompetence is too simplistic: the text was either proposed to him with scribbled and illegible notes, or had the function of occupying a physical space with no communication purposes, in order to give authoritativeness to the monument, whose owners were already known in other ways. In both cases, it was a forgery, either not corresponding to the original intention, or visibly added as a complementary filler.

Blockchain Implications for the Monetization of Identity Governed by Individuals

Blockchain technology has been discussed and analyzed throughout numerous practitioner and scholarly applications, but the majority of said analysis has tended to focus on the financial services space. From a blockchain and broader cryptoasset space this seems to make logical sense, but overlooks other potential applications. Specifically, as intellectual assets and intangible property assume greater importance in virtually aspect of the economy, the potential for blockchain and cryptoassets does appear to be increasing. Written in a tone and manner of interest to both practitioner and academic audience, this analysis examines how the Brave browser attempts to rebalance the proverbial scale between who controls the valuable information that continues to dominate the business landscape. In addition this research presents a potential framework for how organizations and individuals can monetize what potentially may be the most value resource going forward – digital information - and do so in a manner that is both equitable as well as leveraging the emerging technology of blockchain.

‘A Perfect Contradiction is Mysterious for the Clever and for Fools Alike’: Did Hegel Contradict Aristotle?

Aristotle argued that there are no true statements of the form <Fx and not-Fx>. In his lectures on history of philosophy Hegel does not challenge this view and in his Science of Logic expresses admiration for Aristotle's rebuttal of Zeno of Elea's attempt to find such contradictions in his paradoxes of motion. Yet more than once in his logics Hegel insists that everything is contradictory. I approach this problem from two directions. First, Widerspruch often means, and is understood by Hegel to mean, ‘opposition’ rather than ‘contradiction’ in the strict logical sense. Thus Catullus's simultaneous love and hatred of Clodia is a contradiction, but not an Aristotelian, or formal logical, contradiction. I defuse Hegel's occasional suggestions of Aristotelian contradictions in motion and time. Second, I exploit Hegel's tacit rejection of Aristotle's official bivalence account of truth and falsity, in favour of the view that truth is approached by successive improvements in our inevitably imperfect attempts to attain it. In this respect Hegel's procedure is similar to that of Aristotle himself, who characteristically constructs his own view of metaphysics, physics, ethics, etc., from the imperfect, but not flatly false, opinions of his predecessors. ‘The truth is the whole’, that is, the whole sequence of our attempts to reach it.