scholarly journals The Impact of Advance Selling Strategies on a Three-Echelon Supply Chain in the Presence of Social Influence

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Qianyu Niu ◽  
Feng Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Influence ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
New Product ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Minimum Order ◽  
Advance Selling ◽  
Minimum Order Quantity ◽  
Selling Strategies ◽  
The Impact

As the quality of new products is ex-ante uncertain, social influence plays an important role in the diffusion of a new product. An important question is how to expand public knowledge about consumer experience with a new product by using promotion strategies. This paper discusses the impact of advance selling strategies on a three-echelon supply chain when upstream enterprises launch a new product facing strategic consumers under social influence. This problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game, and a two-advance-selling-discount model is presented. Furthermore, we consider the impact of advance purchase behavior on the financing strategy when the retailer places an advance order. Several results are obtained: (i) the consumers’ utility in the second period is increasing in the number of predecessors. (ii) Upstream enterprises will provide deeper advance selling discounts when consumers become more patient or predecessors have a greater influence on imitators. Moreover, the total demand will increase when the consumer’s discount factor decreases or the impact intensity of predecessors increases. However, high innovation levels will drive enterprises to set high advance selling discounts. We also obtain the condition under which the total demand increases quickly as the innovation level changes. (iii) The two-advance-selling-discount model yields Pareto-improved results compared with the case where there is no advance purchase, though it cannot coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we extend the model to analyze the two-advance-selling-discount model with a minimum order quantity constraining the precommitted order quantity, and we show this can allow the enterprises to increase their profits. We also determine a condition under which the upstream enterprises should put a constraint on the minimum order quantity.

scholarly journals Contracts Adjustment under Bilateral Information Updating in a Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Xinhui Wang ◽  
Yingsheng Su ◽  
Zihan Zhou ◽  
Yiling Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Minimum Order ◽  
Information Updating ◽  
Minimum Order Quantity ◽  
Market Outlook

This paper investigates contracts adjustment between one manufacturer and one retailer under bilateral information updating. The manufacturer incurs uncertain production cost and the retailer faces uncertain demand, but they can acquire independent signals to update production cost and demand, respectively. They commit an initial agreement on an initial wholesale price, minimum order quantity, and information sharing as well as the transfer payment and decisions adjustment when information is updated. We find that due to the joint impact of production cost variation and market variation, the manufacturer may not decrease (increase) her wholesale price when the updated production cost is lower (higher) than expected. The retailer places an additional order even if the wholesale price rises when the market outlook is good, but places an order with the minimum order quantity even if the wholesale price falls when the market outlook is bad. Secondly, for a certain level of information accuracy of the production cost and market demand, the retailer is always better off with information updating, but the manufacturer may be worse off with information updating when facing a bad market outlook. Thirdly, when information accuracy of the production cost and market demand varies, the manufacturer only benefits from a high accuracy of production cost. Profits of the retailer and the supply chain are increasing (decreasing) with accuracy of production cost if the updated production cost is larger (smaller) than expected.

scholarly journals Inventory and Pricing Decisions Under Wholesale Price Contract with Social Preferences

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuren Liu ◽  
Huina Chen ◽  
Lili Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Price Setting ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

AbstractThis paper introduces the other-regarding preferences coefficients and studies the impact of social preferences on supply chain performance in the price-setting newsvendor setting. It is assumed that the stochastic demand is multiplicative. The manufacturer and retailer play a Stackelberg game. We analyze the impact of the decision-maker’s social preferences on the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price, the retailer’s optimal retail price and order quantity, the supply chain member’s profits and utilities, and the supply chain system’s profits and utilities under three different cases that only the retailer, only the manufacturer and both are with social preferences. We show that a manufacturer, as a leader, should find a spiteful retailer, while a retailer, as a follower, should find a manufacturer with generous liability, to improve the entire supply chain. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate these results.

scholarly journals The role of voucher sale in advance for a capital-constrained supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haijun Wang ◽  
Guanmei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
The Impact

This paper studies voucher sale as an operational method to raise working capital for a supply chain, which consists of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. The retailer takes advantage of an online platform to sell vouchers and to get access to borrowing from a bank. By formulating a Stackelberg game model, we show the retailer's possible order quantities in the cases without and with bank loan and analyze the impact of voucher sale on the retailer's optimal choice of order quantity and the supplier's optimal wholesale price. We find that a smaller voucher's price induces the retailer to be more likely to order with loan from a bank while a larger voucher's value induces an order quantity with the loan more difficult to be repaid. In addition, if voucher's price is large, the supplier decides a wholesale price which leads the retailer not to borrow from a bank; and if voucher's price is small, the supplier's optimal decision is obtained by anticipating the retailer to borrow from a bank. We also analyze the impact of voucher sale in the presence of trade credit financing on the firms' decisions. The results show that the voucher's price should be small so that the retailer can repay the supplier if voucher's value is large; otherwise, the retailer either does not borrow from the supplier or may not repay the supplier. Besides, the supplier decides a wholesale price so that the retailer does not borrow or can repay the supplier, except that the voucher's value is large and the voucher's price is medium.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Managing a 5G mobile phone supply chain under the impact of strategic consumers: A two-period game analysis and applications

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qin Zhang ◽  
Zijian He ◽  
Junhai Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Mobile Phone ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Great Influence ◽  
Purchasing Behavior ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Strategic Consumers ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Impact

Consumers' strategic purchasing behavior has a great influence on the pricing and sales of new products. In order to study the impact of strategic consumers on the sales of 5G mobile phones, we establish a two-period pricing model. The supply chain contains two manufacturers, a communications operator and a mobile phone retailer. Cases where two manufacturers have the same or different pricing rights are researched by using the Stackelberg game and the Nash game model. Our research results are as follows:(1) We obtain the optimal 5G communication fees in two periods and find out how they change with the proportion of consumers changing. (2) We figure out the profits of the supply chain in two periods and analyze them. We find that the communication operator earns more than the others most of the time. (3) We investigate how the proportion of strategic consumer impact on supply chain profits and conclude that the optimal price and demand in a period will decrease as the proportion of consumers who only purchase products in the other period increases.

scholarly journals Green Product Pricing and Order Strategies in a Supply Chain under Demand Forecasting

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 713 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiling Fang ◽  
Xinhui Wang ◽  
Jinjiang Yan
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Demand Forecasting ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Profit Margin ◽  
Demand Forecast ◽  
Minimum Order ◽  
Dynamic Contract ◽  
Minimum Order Quantity ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Market Status

In this paper, we investigate price and order strategies for innovative green products using demand forecasting and sharing. We formulate the problem using a Stackelberg game and propose a dynamic contract that specifies an initial wholesale price, a minimum order quantity, a demand sharing agreement, and a decisions adjustment agreement. We arrived at the following main findings and implications. First, the manufacturer offers a higher or lower wholesale price than the initial one depending on the variation in the market status. Also, the retailer’s ordering decisions will increase with the wholesale price, which contradicts the common assumption that ordering decisions decrease with the wholesale price. Interestingly, if the market improves, the manufacturer obtains a higher profit margin than the retailer; if the market worsens, the manufacturer suffers more loss of profit margin than the retailer. Second, when the cost of information sharing is smaller than an upper bound, demand forecasting and sharing are always beneficial to the manufacturer. However, the value of demand forecasting and sharing for the retailer is significantly affected by the market status variation. Third, high information accuracy will not necessarily increase the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer, even if the market status is better than expected. Finally, numerical examples show the parameters’ effects. We have several main managerial insights. When the shared demand information is received from the retailer, the manufacturer can determine wholesale price strategies according to the retailer’s demand forecast. Moreover, if the manufacturer wants to ensure profitability, they should not choose retailers with a higher capability of demand forecasting.

Online advance selling or not: Pricing strategy of new product entry in a supply chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (8) ◽  
pp. 1446-1461
Author(s):  
Yawen Zhang ◽  
Bo Li ◽  
Xue Chen ◽  
Shuang Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
New Product ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Advance Selling ◽  
Product Entry

scholarly journals Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhang Zhijian ◽  
Peng Wang ◽  
Miyu Wan ◽  
Junhua Guo ◽  
Jian Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern

The purpose of this study was to examine the joint effect of overconfidence and fairness concern on supply chain decisions and design contracts to achieve a win-win situation within the supply chain. For this study, a centralized supply chain model was established without considering the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concern. Furthermore, the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concerns were introduced into the decentralized supply chain, while the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer was built. Furthermore, an innovative supply chain contract, i.e., buyback contract, with promotional cost sharing was designed to achieve supply chain coordination along with overconfidence and fairness concern. Finally, a numerical analysis was also conducted to analyze the effect of overconfidence, fairness concern, and the validity of the contract. The principal findings of the study include the positive correlation between retailers’ overconfidence and optimal order quantity, sales effort, expected utility, and profit. Although the order quantity and sales efforts were not affected by the fairness concern of the retailer, the contract achieved coordination with a win-win outcome when the level of overconfidence and fairness concern was moderate.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand of Indirect Channel

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Gao ◽  
Xiong Wang ◽  
Qiuling Yang ◽  
Qin Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.

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