scholarly journals Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Di Xiao ◽  
Qianqian Yang ◽  
Qi Sun ◽  
Huimin Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Vertical Channel ◽  
Purchase Decisions ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Minimum Order ◽  
Channel Conflict ◽  
Reaction Coefficient ◽  
Minimum Order Quantity ◽  
Improvement Effect

We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier from other channels, and one retailer. The platform has a well-known brand that can influence consumers’ purchase decisions, and it provides good-quality products with high prices, while supplier from other channels provides cheaper products but possibly with low quality, and there may even be some serious quality problems, sometimes leading to serious problems such as “free-riding” behavior by the retailer and reducing the profits of the supply chain members. First, we study the decisions of platform and retailer under centralized decision (CD) scenario, decentralized decision (DD) scenario, cost sharing contract (CS) scenario, and minimum order quantity contract (QC) scenario. Second, we found that channel conflicts have a negative impact on supply chain members under DD scenario; however, CS and QC scenarios can make the optimal empowerment level of platform the same as CD scenario and encourage retailer to order more products from platform. Finally, the improvement effect in QC and CS scenarios is affected by the substitutability of the two products, the coefficient of empowerment cost, and the reaction coefficient of product price on goodwill. Furthermore, we found that under QC scenario, only within an appropriate range can the platform and the retailer achieve a win-win situation.

scholarly journals Contracts Adjustment under Bilateral Information Updating in a Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Xinhui Wang ◽  
Yingsheng Su ◽  
Zihan Zhou ◽  
Yiling Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Minimum Order ◽  
Information Updating ◽  
Minimum Order Quantity ◽  
Market Outlook

This paper investigates contracts adjustment between one manufacturer and one retailer under bilateral information updating. The manufacturer incurs uncertain production cost and the retailer faces uncertain demand, but they can acquire independent signals to update production cost and demand, respectively. They commit an initial agreement on an initial wholesale price, minimum order quantity, and information sharing as well as the transfer payment and decisions adjustment when information is updated. We find that due to the joint impact of production cost variation and market variation, the manufacturer may not decrease (increase) her wholesale price when the updated production cost is lower (higher) than expected. The retailer places an additional order even if the wholesale price rises when the market outlook is good, but places an order with the minimum order quantity even if the wholesale price falls when the market outlook is bad. Secondly, for a certain level of information accuracy of the production cost and market demand, the retailer is always better off with information updating, but the manufacturer may be worse off with information updating when facing a bad market outlook. Thirdly, when information accuracy of the production cost and market demand varies, the manufacturer only benefits from a high accuracy of production cost. Profits of the retailer and the supply chain are increasing (decreasing) with accuracy of production cost if the updated production cost is larger (smaller) than expected.

scholarly journals The Impact of Advance Selling Strategies on a Three-Echelon Supply Chain in the Presence of Social Influence

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Qianyu Niu ◽  
Feng Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Influence ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
New Product ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Minimum Order ◽  
Advance Selling ◽  
Minimum Order Quantity ◽  
Selling Strategies ◽  
The Impact

As the quality of new products is ex-ante uncertain, social influence plays an important role in the diffusion of a new product. An important question is how to expand public knowledge about consumer experience with a new product by using promotion strategies. This paper discusses the impact of advance selling strategies on a three-echelon supply chain when upstream enterprises launch a new product facing strategic consumers under social influence. This problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game, and a two-advance-selling-discount model is presented. Furthermore, we consider the impact of advance purchase behavior on the financing strategy when the retailer places an advance order. Several results are obtained: (i) the consumers’ utility in the second period is increasing in the number of predecessors. (ii) Upstream enterprises will provide deeper advance selling discounts when consumers become more patient or predecessors have a greater influence on imitators. Moreover, the total demand will increase when the consumer’s discount factor decreases or the impact intensity of predecessors increases. However, high innovation levels will drive enterprises to set high advance selling discounts. We also obtain the condition under which the total demand increases quickly as the innovation level changes. (iii) The two-advance-selling-discount model yields Pareto-improved results compared with the case where there is no advance purchase, though it cannot coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we extend the model to analyze the two-advance-selling-discount model with a minimum order quantity constraining the precommitted order quantity, and we show this can allow the enterprises to increase their profits. We also determine a condition under which the upstream enterprises should put a constraint on the minimum order quantity.

scholarly journals Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions in Retail Supply Chains with Customer Value

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1309
Author(s):  
Jiali Qu ◽  
Benyong Hu ◽  
Chao Meng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Customer Value ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Game Equilibrium

In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non-cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers.

Managing the adverse effect of supply chain risk on corporate reputation: The mediating role of corporate social responsibility practices

2021 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 251-261
Author(s):  
Nitya P. Singh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Corporate Reputation ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Supply Chain Risk Management ◽  
Supply Chain Risk ◽  
Corporate Social

Within the last decade, research has focussed on corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices as a strategic tool that enables firms to improve stakeholder perception, brand image and corporate reputation. However, one area that remains understudied is the role played by CSR practices in managing corporate reputation under conditions of supply chain risk. To answer this research question, we conduct a literature review and develop the corresponding hypothesis. We test our hypothesis using quantitative analysis of both primary and secondary data collected from organizations dispersed globally. The results highlight that under conditions of supply chain network disruption risk, CSR practices play an important role in enabling firms to manage the negative impact of such risk drivers on corporate reputation. The study further suggests that CSR practices positively impact supply chain risk management (SCRM) practices and are a necessary condition for SCRM practices to be effective in improving corporate reputation of organizations.

The Influence of Marketing Mix Variables on Purchasing Decisions and Its Impact on Post-Purchase Customer Satisfaction of Royal Garden Residence Bali Housing (Study at PT Properti Bali Benoa)

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-172
Author(s):  
Edi Sugiono ◽  
Andini Nurwulandari ◽  
Christiani Junita
Keyword(s):  
Customer Satisfaction ◽  
Marketing Mix ◽  
Purchase Decisions ◽  
Purchasing Decisions ◽  
Online Questionnaire ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Average Value ◽  
Decision Variables ◽  
Post Purchase ◽  
The City

A B S T R A C TThe research objective is to determine the effect of: marketing mix variables(product, price, location and promotion) on purchasing decision variables,marketing mix variables on customer satisfaction variables, purchasing decisionvariables on customer satisfaction variables at Royal Garden Residence Balihousing with purchase decisions as a mediating variable. . This research wasconducted in the city of Bali, with the object of research being the residentialconsumers of Royal Garden Residence Bali as the population in this study, with asample size of 150 respondents and using random sampling techniques. The datacollection method is in the form of an online questionnaire via google form andwhatsaap due to the situation in Indonesia which is currently being hit by theCovid-19 pandemic. The results of this study indicate that respondents have a goodperception of the variable marketing mix, purchase decisions and post-purchasesatisfaction Royal Garden Residence Bali. This is because the average value for allresearch variables is greater than 4 on the Likert scale. The results showed that themarketing mix variable both simultaneously and partially had a positive andsignificant effect on housing purchase decisions and the marketing mix variablehad a positive and significant effect both simultaneously and partially on consumersatisfaction after purchasing Royal Garden Residence Bali housing, and purchasingdecisions had a positive and significant effect. significant on consumer satisfactionafter purchasing the Royal Garden Residence Bali housing. Then the research alsoproves that there is an indirect influence of the marketing mix variable on consumersatisfaction after purchasing the Royal Garden Residence Bali housing through thepurchase decision. Promotion is the most dominant variable in increasingconsumer purchasing decisions for Royal Garden Residence Bali housing.

Pricing and service decision of dual-channel operations in an O2O closed-loop supply chain

2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (8) ◽  
pp. 1567-1588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lingcheng Kong ◽  
Zhiyang Liu ◽  
Yafei Pan ◽  
Jiaping Xie ◽  
Guang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Return Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Channel Conflict ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Dual Channel

Purpose The online direct selling mode has been widely accepted by enterprises in the O2O era. However, the dual-channel (online/offline, forward/backward) operations of the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) changed the relationship between manufacturers and retailers, thus resulting in channel conflict. The purpose of this paper is to take a dual-channel operations of CLSC as the research target, where a manufacturer sells a single product through a direct e-channel as well as a conventional retail channel; the retailer are responsible for collecting used products in the reverse supply chain and the manufacturer are responsible for remanufacturing. Design/methodology/approach The authors build a benchmark model of dual-channel price and service competition and take the return rate, which is considered to be related to the service level of the retailer, as the function of the service level to extend the model in the reverse SC. The authors then analyze the optimal pricing and service decision under centralization and decentralization, respectively. Finally, with the revenue-sharing factor, wholesale price and recycling price transfer payment coefficient as contract parameters, the paper also designs a revenue-sharing contract led by the manufacturer and explores in what situation the contract could realize the Pareto optimization of all players. Findings In the baseline model, the results show that optimal price and service level correlate positively in centralization; however, the relation relies on consumers’ price sensitivity in decentralization. In the extension model, the relationship between price and service level also relies on the relative value of increased service cost and remanufacturing saved cost. When the return rate correlates with the service level, a recycling transfer payment can elevate the service level and thus raise the return rate. Through analyzing the parameters in revenue-sharing contract, a point can be reached where lowering the wholesale price and raising the transfer payment coefficient will promote retailers to share revenue. Practical implications Many enterprises establish the dual-channel distribution system both online and offline, which need to understand how to resolve their channel conflict. The conflict is especially strong in CLSC with remanufacturing. The result helps the node enterprises realize the coordination of the dual-channel CLSC. Originality/value It takes into account the fact that there are two complementary relationships, such as online selling and offline delivery; used product recycling and remanufacturing. The authors optimize the strategy of product pricing and service level in order to solve channel conflict and double marginalization in the closed-loop dual-channel distribution network.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

Coordination of Multiechelon Supply Chains Using the Guaranteed Service Framework

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tor Schoenmeyr ◽  
Stephen C. Graves
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Quantity Discounts ◽  
Minimum Order ◽  
Base Stock Policy ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Guaranteed Service ◽  
Stock Policy ◽  
Different Parts

Problem definition: We use the guaranteed service (GS) framework to investigate how to coordinate a multiechelon supply chain when two self-interested parties control different parts of the supply chain. For purposes of supply chain planning, we assume that each stage in a supply chain operates with a local base-stock policy and can provide guaranteed service to its customers, as long as the customer demand falls within certain bounds. Academic/practical relevance: The GS framework for supply chain inventory optimization has been deployed successfully in multiple industrial contexts with centralized control. In this paper, we show how to apply this framework to achieve coordination in a decentralized setting in which two parties control different parts of the supply chain. Methodology: The primary methodology is the analysis of a multiechelon supply chain under the assumptions of the GS model. Results: We find that the GS framework is naturally well suited for this decentralized decision making, and we propose a specific contract structure that facilitates such relationships. This contract is incentive compatible and has several other desirable properties. Under assumptions of complete and incomplete information, a reasonable negotiation process should lead the parties to contract terms that coordinate the supply chain. The contract is simpler than contracts proposed for coordination in the stochastic service (SS) framework. We also highlight the role of markup on the holding costs and some of the difficulties that this might cause in coordinating a decentralized supply chain. Managerial implications: The value from the paper is to show that a simple contract coordinates the chain when both parties plan with a GS model and framework; hence, we provide more evidence for the utility of this model. Furthermore, the simple coordinating contract matches reasonably well with practice; we observe that the most common contract terms include a per-unit wholesale price (possibly with a minimum order quantity and/or quantity discounts), along with a service time from order placement until delivery or until ready to ship. We also observe that firms need to pay a higher price if they want better service. What may differ from practice is the contract provision of a demand bound; our contract specifies that the supplier will provide GS as long as the buyer’s order are within the agreed on demand bound. This provision is essential so that each party can apply the GS framework for planning their supply chain. Of course, contracts have many other provisions for handling exceptions. Nevertheless, our research provides some validation for the GS model and the contracting practices we observe in practice.

Operational decisions and game analysis in the agricultural supply chain: invest or not?

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinyi Zhang ◽  
Wen Cao ◽  
Zhichao Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Price Sensitivity ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Sales Volume ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Preservation Technology ◽  
Agricultural Supply

PurposeWith the rapid growth of the economy, people have increasingly higher living standards, and although people simply pursued material wealth in the past, they now pay more attention to material quality and safety and environmental protection. This paper discusses the lack of motivation for investing in fresh-keeping technology for agricultural products by individual members of an agricultural supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer by means of mathematical models and data simulations and discuss the optimal price-invest strategies under different sales models.Design/methodology/approachFirst, based on the model of no investment by both sides (NN), this paper considers three models: supplier only (MN), retailer only (NR) and cooperative investment (MR). Then, the authors analyze the influence of consumer price sensitivity and freshness sensitivity on the investment motivation of agricultural products under four models. Subsequently, the paper makes a sensitivity analysis of the optimal strategies under several models, and makes a game analysis of the suppliers and retailers of agricultural products. Finally, we conduct an empirical analysis through specific values.FindingsThe results show that (a) when the two sides cooperate, the amount of investment is largest, the freshness of the agricultural products is highest, and the sales volume is greatest; however, when both sides do not invest, the freshness of agricultural products and sales volume are lowest. (b) The price and freshness sensitivity of the consumer have an impact on investment decisions. Greater freshness sensitivity corresponds to a higher investment, higher agricultural product price, greater sales volume, and greater supply chain member income and overall income; however, greater price sensitivity corresponds to a lower investment, lower agricultural product price, lower sales volume, fewer supply chain members and lower overall income. (c) The investment game between the supplier and retailer is not only related to the sensitivity to price and freshness but also to the coordination coefficients of interest. At the same time, the market position of agricultural products should be considered when making decisions. The market share of agricultural products will affect the final game equilibrium and then affect the final benefit of the supply chain and individual members.Practical implicationsThese results provide managerial insights for enterprises preparing to invest in agricultural products preservation technology.Originality/valueAt present, the main problem is that member enterprises of agricultural supply chains operate based on their own benefits and are resistant to investing alone to improve the freshness of agricultural products. Instead, they would prefer that other members invest so that they may reap the benefits at no cost. Therefore, the enterprises in each node of the agricultural product supply chain are not motivated enough to invest, and competition and game states are observed among them, and such behavior is definitely not conducive to improving the freshness of agricultural products. However, the current research on agricultural products is more about price, quality and greenness, etc., and there are few studies on agricultural investment. Through the establishment of the model, this paper is expected to provide theoretical suggestions for the supply chain enterprises that plan to invest in agricultural products preservation technology.

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