Autonomy-based criticisms of the patient preference predictor

The patient preference predictor (PPP) is a proposed computer-based algorithm that would predict the treatment preferences of decisionally incapacitated patients. Incorporation of a PPP into the decision-making process has the potential to improve implementation of the substituted judgement standard by providing more accurate predictions of patients’ treatment preferences than reliance on surrogates alone. Yet, critics argue that methods for making treatment decisions for incapacitated patients should be judged on a number of factors beyond simply providing them with the treatments they would have chosen for themselves. These factors include the extent to which the decision-making process recognises patients’ freedom to choose and relies on evidence the patient themselves would take into account when making treatment decisions. These critics conclude that use of a PPP should be rejected on the grounds that it is inconsistent with these factors, especially as they relate to proper respect for patient autonomy. In this paper, we review and evaluate these criticisms. We argue that they do not provide reason to reject use of a PPP, thus supporting efforts to develop a full-scale PPP and to evaluate it in practice.

Adults Who Lack Capacity to Consent and Deprivation of Liberty

The basic presumption of the Mental Capacity Act that an individual has capacity to make decisions regarding treatment is frequently challenged within intensive care practice where individuals are often incapacitated due to the nature of their condition or treatment for it. Because many conditions are life-threatening, treatment is frequently administered on the basis of an assumption that it provides an overall benefit to the person and that their interests are best served by preservation of life. There is now a statutory definition of best interests although factors in its determination can at times be opaque, which suggests a gradual move towards the US-based ‘substituted judgement’ test. An individual can be lawfully prevented from leaving the intensive care unit while receiving intensive care treatment provided that treatment is given in good faith and is materially the same as would be given to a person of sound mind with the same physical illness.

Die Vormundschaft nach estnischem Recht

The constitution of the Estonian Republic determines the basic elements of the status of people providing for general right to freedom and personality rights. The Civil Code regulates the concepts of full and limited legal capacity of natural persons. The capacity to contract presumes the natural ability to understand and control one’s own actions. Estonian law provides for limitations of the legal capacity, up to full incapacitation, for mentally disordered adults. A guardian must be appointed for such persons to represent them insofar as legal capacity is limited. The law provides for certain safeguards in order to protect such persons from excessive limitation; however, Estonian law still follows the “substituted judgement approach” rather than the “supported decision-making approach” solicitated in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In practice, the flexibility granted by legislation is not always used - e.g. authorities and courts often use full instead of partial incapacitation.

A kommunikáció és az önrendelkezés javításának lehetőségei az életvégi döntések meghozatalánál az intenzív osztályokon

The end-of-life decision making process normally based on patient autonomy or substituted judgement. If the patient can express his/her wishes, one must take note of his autonomy. If he/she is unable to self-determination, the importance of advanced directives or substituted judgement increases in the field of end-of-life care. The most important target of the efforts is to improve end-of-life care at intensive care units. Based on bioethical studies of the author and international literature this paper analizes the practice of end-of-life care and presents recommendations for lawmakers. The author proposes to divide patients with organ failure into three parts (end-of-life triage). The first part includes definitely salvageable, the second part definitely unsalvageable, and the third part possibly salvageable groups. This classification depends on the development of medical science and the local options of medical treatment. The quality of the decision-making process can be improved, but all participants must participate and medio-legal regulation must be improved. Orv. Hetil., 2016, 157(17), 669–674.

Decision Making in Health Care: limitations of the substituted judgement principle

The substituted judgement principle is often recommended as a means of promoting the self-determination of an incompetent individual when proxy decision makers are faced with having to make decisions about health care. This article represents a critical ethical analysis of this decision-making principle and describes practical impediments that serve to undermine its fundamental purpose. These impediments predominantly stem from the informality associated with the application of the substituted judgement principle. It is recommended that the principles upon which decisions are made about health care for another person should be transparent to all those involved in the process. Furthermore, the substituted judgement principle requires greater rigour in its practical application than currently tends to be the case. It may be that this principle should be subsumed as a component of advance directives in order that it fulfils its aim of serving to respect the self-determination of incompetent individuals.