De la o factură de electricitate la supremația dreptului european: astfel s-a născut doctrina Costa c. Enel

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2021) ◽  
pp. 19-45
Author(s):  
Amedeo ARENA ◽  

Whilst Costa vs. ENEL is the locus classicus for most accounts of the primacy of European law, the story of that lawsuit is still relatively unknown. What drove Flaminio Costa to sue his electricity provider over a bill of as little as ₤1.925 (about €22 in 2020)? Why did the Small-claims Court of Milan decide to involve both the Italian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in such a „petty” lawsuit? Why did those two courts hand down such different rulings? How did the lawsuit end when it came back from Luxembourg? Relying upon previously undisclosed court documents and interviews with some of the actors involved, this paper seeks to shed some light on the less-known aspects of the Costa v ENEL lawsuit, against the background of electricity nationalization in Italy at the height of the Cold War, and to assess the contribution of that lawsuit and of its „architect”, Gian Galeazzo Stendardi, to the approfondissement of the doctrine of primacy of European law.

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 1017-1037
Author(s):  
Amedeo Arena

Abstract Whilst Costa v. ENEL is the starting point for most accounts of the primacy of EU law, the story of that lawsuit is still relatively unknown. What drove Flaminio Costa to sue his electricity provider over a bill of as little as £1,925 (about €22 in 2019)? Why did the small-claims court of Milan decide to involve both the Italian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in such a ‘petty’ lawsuit? Why did those two courts hand down rulings going in opposite directions? How did the lawsuit end when it came back to the Milan small-claims court? Relying upon previously undisclosed court documents and interviews with some of the actors involved, this article seeks to shed some light on the less-known aspects of the Costa v. ENEL lawsuit, against the background of electricity nationalization in Italy at the height of the Cold War, and to assess the contribution of that lawsuit and of its ‘architect’, Gian Galeazzo Stendardi, to the development of the doctrine of primacy of European Union law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-68
Author(s):  
Orlando Scarcello

This paper will examine the recent preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice issued by the Italian Court of Cassation in the Randstad case, aimed at rearranging the internal constitutional separation between ordinary and administrative courts (article 111(8) of the Constitution). I will first provide some context on both the relations between Italian and EU courts (2.1) and on the confrontation between the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court in interpreting article 111 (2.2). I will then specifically examine the referring order to the Court of Justice of the EU (3), focusing on the role of general clauses of EU law as articles 4(3) and 19 TEU and 47 of the Charter in it. Finally, I will consider the instrumental use of EU law made by the Cassation to overcome an unpleasant constitutional arrangement. This aligns Randstad with previous cases such as Melki or A v. B and may foster constitutional conflict in the future. 


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dietrich Murswiek

The European Central Bank's (ECB) program of purchasing government bonds, the OMT program (Outright Monetary Transactions Program), which was announced on 6 September 2012, is illegal. With this program, the ECB transgresses its powers. This is the central message of the Federal Constitutional Court's decision from 14 January 2014. However, the decision is not final. The Federal Constitutional Court has suspended the trial and has referred the matter to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling. Only after the ECJ has examined the compatibility of the OMT program with European law will the Federal Constitutional Court pronounce its final judgment.


2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.


2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (05) ◽  
pp. 228-232
Author(s):  
Aygun Gunduz Guliyeva ◽  

There is a strong link between funding criteria from government sources and the advantage and selectivity associated with classifying an event as government assistance. However, the selectivity criterion is very important when considering whether there is a banned state aid. Finally, the European Court of Justice no longer applies the rule of law and exclusion to selectivity. Instead, the selectivity review consists of two parts: whether a precaution is selective and whether preference is necessary and proportionate. Key words: EU, tax, tax avoidance, state aid, tax planning, competition


2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANNE BOERGER-DE SMEDT

AbstractThis article analyses how the seeds for the development of European law from the 1960s onwards were sown in the foundational treaties. It argues that despite the fact that both European treaties embodied a conscious choice by the majority of the governments not to establish the European Communities on a constitutional basis, a small number of politicians and jurists managed nonetheless to insert the potential for the constitutional practice. Following a chronological account of each set of negotiations, the article untangles the complex ideas and decisions, which crafted both the legal shape of the treaties and the jurisdiction of the new European Court of Justice.


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