Democratic Citizenship-in-the-Making: Dis/Engagement Profiles of Portuguese Youth

Coming to terms with the multidimensionsionality of civic and political engagement implies analyzing it in a comprehensive manner: not limited to conventional modes of expression, nor to dichotomic perspectives or observable acts of participation. Studies in this field tend to overlook cognitive and emotional dimensions as types of engagement which, alongside with behavior, constitute citizenship. In this article, we analyze data from the Portuguese sample of the CATCH-EyoU Project’s survey (1,007 young people aged between 14 and 30 years old). The main result is the identification of four distinct profiles according to behavioral, emotional and cognitive forms of engagement: Alienated, Passive, Disengaged and Engaged. These profiles are then examined to assess whether and how they differ in terms of: i) national and European identification, ii) relationships with alternative and traditional media, iii) democratic support, and iv) attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. The relationship between the different profiles and individual socio-demographic variables is also examined. We discuss how different dis/engagement profiles relate with socio-political dimensions and have different consequences both in terms of the political integration of young people and of the political challenges faced by democratic societies.

Populist Democrats? Unpacking the Relationship Between Populism and (Liberal) Democracy at the Citizen Level

It is widely feared that the onset of populism poses a threat to democracy, as citizens' support for democracy is essential for its legitimacy and stability. Yet, the relationship between populism and democracy at the citizen level remains poorly understood, particularly with respect to support for liberal democracy. Data measuring citizens' populist attitudes in conjunction with a comprehensive range of measures of democratic support has been lacking. Using unique data from the Netherlands, we study the relationship between individuals' populist attitudes and their attitudes towards democracy in three studies. We examine the association between populism and support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy (Study 1); populism and support for liberal democracy (Study 2); and populism and support for majoritarian conceptions of democracy (Study 3). We find that while populist citizens are dissatisfied with how democracy works, they are no less supportive of the principle of democracy. Contrary to most theorizing, we find that populist citizens are largely supportive of key institutions of liberal democracy, but reject mediated representation through political parties. At the same time, populists strongly support forms of unconstrained majoritarian rule. These findings suggest that the relationship between populism and support for (liberal) democracy is more complicated than commonly assumed.

Effective Government and Evaluations of Democracy

Ineffective governance is known to weaken support for governments and leaders. However, it is less clear whether these effects spill over to the regime and erode support for the democratic system. This article returns to this classic question, now using time-series, cross-sectional data to test whether the effectiveness of governments in sustaining economic growth, providing quality healthcare, and tackling violent crime affects popular attitudes to democracy. We find that satisfaction with democracy is driven by fluctuations in economic performance and violent crime (but not healthcare quality). Diffuse support for democracy, in contrast, remains relatively impervious to changes in government effectiveness. Violent crime is the only indicator of effectiveness which has an impact on democratic support, and does so indirectly, via its influence on democratic satisfaction. These findings confirm that democratic support—which, unlike democratic satisfaction, is thought to help sustain democracy—is mostly immune to crises of performance.

When Clientelism Backfires: Vote Buying, Democratic Attitudes, and Electoral Retaliation in Latin America

Attempting to buy votes is, in some cases, inefficient and damaging to a clientelistic party. To explain why, we propose the concept of electoral retaliation: sanctioning clientelistic parties by voting against them or intentionally invalidating the ballot. These forms of negative reciprocity are meant to uphold the democratic norms—equal participation, popular sovereignty, electoral fairness—that vote buying undermines. Electoral retaliation is, we theorize, the domain of “democrats.” Thus, we expect voters who highly value democratic norms to be most likely to retaliate against vote-buying parties. We test our theory’s observable implications with a research design that pairs case study and subnational evidence from Argentina with cross-national evidence from Latin America. Results are consistent with the notion that when clientelistic parties target democrats, it is likely to backfire on the machine. Our analyses examine multiple indicators of democratic support, explore causal mechanisms, conduct placebo tests, and seek to rule out various forms of selection bias.

EXPLAINING DEMOCRATIC DECONSOLIDATION: EVIDENCE FROM ASIAN DEMOCRACIES

Are Asian democracies deconsolidating, in line with world-wide trends? This article examines four consolidated democracies in Asia: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, plus Indonesia, whose own consolidation has been problematic. Using public opinion data, we evaluate two competing models�civic culture and political economy�to test whether there is a decline in democratic support. We report that the political economy model is more persuasive. Declines in democratic support are associated more consistently with democratic performance and education. Because education levels are tending to rise, and political socialization continues into adulthood, we conclude that there should be little fear that Asian democracies will deconsolidate.

The concept of Ordnungspolitik: rule-based economic policymaking from the perspective of the Freiburg School

Should economic policy be guided by rules? In this paper, we take the perspective of the Freiburg School and trace its argument for rule-based Ordnungspolitik back to the roots of the concept. In doing so, will not offer a comprehensive review of the literature, but argue closely along the works of Walter Eucken, whose contributions are central to understanding the founding generation of the Freiburg School. We argue that not having rules is costly and therefore that the main thrust of the Freiburg approach remains valid. Good empirical arguments can be found for pursuing a rule-based Ordnungspolitik in order to avoid the costs of discretionary policymaking. Furthermore, we argue that reliance on stable rules does not incapacitate democratic decision-making. Rules rely on democratic support, and rule-based Ordnungspolitik also leaves substantial material scope for discretionary democratic decision-making.

Movers and Stayers

Democrats once dominated the “Solid South.” By the turn of the 21st century, Republicans had taken control. We are in the midst of the dawning of new, more progressive era. Theories explaining Republican growth provide little guidance, but a new perspective—Movers and Stayers theory—explains this recent growth in Democratic support and the ways in which population growth has produced it. Migratory patterns play a significant role in southern politics. Young, well-educated in-migrants fostered Republican growth in the last century. Today, these increasingly progressive young, well-educated movers are growing the Democratic Party. Movers bring their politics to their new communities. Their progressivism fosters the same among long-term residents (stayers) in their new communities. But the declining communities they left show the effects of their exit. In our racialized partisan environment, white stayers respond to the threat of declining communities by shifting to the right and identifying with the Republican Party. Conversely, African Americans respond to community threat by maintaining their progressivism. Few Latinos live in declining communities; Latino stayers in fast growing communities become more Democratic. While movers of retirement age are more conservative than younger movers, they are more liberal than those who retire in place—not quite the demographic windfall Republicans in aging areas have hoped for. These dynamics are altering the southern political landscape, and differences between growing areas and declining areas are accelerating. Absent a wholesale reinvention of southern politics along the lines of class or (possibly) age, the current partisan trajectory does not bode well for Republicans. The COVID-19 pandemic will not change that.

Migration and Partisan Change

As Democratic Party attachment and support for Democratic candidates has begun to grow in the South, existing theories designed to explain Republican growth—whether based on race relations, economic growth, or cultural conservatism—fare poorly. The author advances a new theory—Movers and Stayers theory—to explain this recent growth in Democratic support. This chapter includes a broad outline of the theory—one focused on population growth’s role in the expansion of Democratic support—and an explanation of the dynamics that boost progressivism in high-growth areas and inhibit its development in declining communities. The theory highlights the role of the distinctive progressivism of movers on the political attitudes of stayers in their new homes, and stayers in the communities they have left. The theory explains why community decline results in different political responses from whites and people of color, and it highlights the waning significance of Key’s “black belt” hypothesis.

Guardians of Democracy or Passive Bystanders? A Conjoint Experiment on Elite Transgressions of Democratic Norms

Several studies indicate that citizens no longer unconditionally support central democratic principles. However, the underlying mechanisms underpinning this development remains largely unclear, especially outside of the US context. In particular, it remains unclear whether citizens are willing to defend democratic principles even when this entails abandoning favored policy positions or political ideology. It also remains unclear whether 'critical citizens' or those with high levels of democratic satisfaction are more eager to support democratic norms. We contribute to this emerging line of research with evidence from a conjoint experiment conducted in Finland. Our results show that citizens prioritize policy issues and ideological positions over key democratic norms, and may be willing to condone even blatant democratic violations if this brings them adjacent political benefits. We also find that the likelihood of supporting democratic principles is higher among citizens who are satisfied with the functioning of democracy rather than among those who are most critical of democratic institutions. These findings contribute to the literature on democratic support and political behavior in established democracies by showing that dangers of democratic deconsolidation appear even when there are few visible signs of political polarization among citizens.