The Research on Harmonic Pollution Management

In view of the present situation of harmonic management in our country at present, put forward the new ideas of current harmonic flexible management. First on the behavior of harmonic pollution analyzed by harmonic pollution, behavior is a kind of external diseconomy activities, and to this kind of behavior is discussed, the method of internal external diseconomy activities of power harmonic pollution emission behavior of collection of sewage charges corresponding. Secondly, the harmonic pollution emissions trading, and the transaction is the social cost analysis, obtained by using the harmonic pollution emissions trading can make the ratio of sewage costs simply implement uniform standards to be low, the social effect can be more optimization. Implementation of the harmonic pollution discharge fee and harmonic pollution emissions trading can make power users to achieve profit optimization and take the initiative to improve power quality.

Doch keine Freizügigkeit für Arme? – Zur Notwendigkeit einer Abwägung unterschiedlicher konstitutioneller Interessen

In reply to Jörg Markt and Gerhard Schick in this volume, this paper argues for a different view on social assistance and migration. First, this article will present some methodological conditions for constitutional contracts. Lacking empirical testability, the method of constitutional economics particularly needs the revelation of constitutional interests before evaluating alternative rules. By testing the described alternative rules of migration in the face of potential constitutional interests, it will be shown that no rule discussed meets all targets. The reader has to be aware that Märkt/Schick decided to meet the target of free migration for welfare recipients and thereby missed some essential targets of social assistance. In this paper it is questioned, if the objective of free migration for welfare recipients is as important as it looks at first glance. It is argued that liberty as a constitutional interest can be restricted by rational constitutional voters. Behind the veil of uncertainty it might be necessary to limit the external diseconomy from free-riding welfare recipients in social assistance schemes or the external diseconomy from the poor in the utility-interdependence sense. If the reader comes to share this point of view, there is no need to harm the original constitutional interests related to social assistance.