Civil Liberties in Muslim-Majority Countries: Statistical Evidence

This chapter presents statistical results from models testing support for Hypothesis 2 and its corollaries. The results show strong and robust support for the second part of the theoretical argument that the presence of religious parties in government leads to a decline in civil liberties only when religious organizations in that country are highly socioeconomically institutionalized. In the absence of highly institutionalized religious organizations, ceteris paribus, religious parties in government are able to moderate their positions on civil liberties with the result that civil liberties do not experience a significant decline in line with a religious agenda. The analysis accounts for various confounding factors, and the potential endogeneity of more moderate regime type to various factors.

The Fall of an Icon: The Decline in Civil Liberties in Turkey

This chapter continues the analysis of the Turkish case by testing whether the two conditions stated in Hypothesis 2—religious parties in government, and highly institutionalized religious organizations—predict a decline in civil liberties in Turkey. It identifies two distinct periods corresponding to the presence of highly institutionalized religious organizations in the (i) absence and (ii) presence of religious parties in government. According to the argument articulated in Hypothesis 2, civil liberties should only decline for religious reasons starting in 2003 when the religious AKP came to power in the context of highly institutionalized religious organizations and both conditions were satisfied in Turkey. The chapter uses additional evidence from the survey of 200 Turkish politicians, analytical narratives from Turkish political history, and quantitative data to test support for Hypothesis 2 and its corollaries in Turkey and finds strong support for them.

Resilience and Decline: Civil Liberties in Pakistan

This chapter continues the analysis of the Pakistani case by testing whether the two conditions stated in Hypothesis 2—religious parties in government, and highly institutionalized religious organizations—predict a decline in civil liberties in Pakistan. It identifies two distinct periods corresponding to the presence of religious parties in government in the (i) absence and (ii) presence of highly institutionalized religious organizations in Pakistan. According to the argument articulated in Hypothesis 2, civil liberties should only decline for religious reasons starting in 2009, when the religious Jamaat-e-Ulema-Fazlur party joined the ruling coalition and religious organizations finally achieved moderate levels of socioeconomic institutionalization. In this context, Hypothesis 2 predicts a moderate decline in de facto civil liberties. The chapter uses additional evidence from the survey of 150 Pakistani politicians, analytical narratives from Pakistani political history, and quantitative data to test support for Hypothesis 2 and its corollaries in Pakistan and finds strong support for them.

Religious Parties, Religious Organizations, and the Decline of Civil Liberties

Chapter 3 presents a theoretical argument that explains when and how religious parties and religious organizations coevolve and the consequences of their relationship for civil liberties in a country. First, the chapter argues that religious organizations undergo a significant increase in their socioeconomic institutionalization only when a country is experiencing an inflation crisis and there is a concentrated bloc of religious parties in the legislature. Next, it explains why religious parties are compelled to curb civil liberties when they are in government in the context of highly socioeconomically institutionalized religious organizations, and why the absence of institutionalized religious organizations allows religious parties to moderate their positions on civil liberties. Thus, the presence of religious parties leads to religiously derived declines in civil liberties only in the presence of highly institutionalized religious organizations. These arguments lead to two testable hypotheses that are subjected to empirical tests in the rest of the book.

Introduction

Many people believe that if religious parties come to power, they will inevitably proceed to curb the civil liberties of their citizens in order to realize their religious vision, particularly in Muslim-majority countries. Academic research on religious parties, on the other hand, claims that the need to compete in elections always incentivizes religious parties to moderate their behaviors and policies, including those on civil liberties. Neither of these assertions has been systematically tested across all Muslim countries. This book is the first to adjudicate this debate based on systematic data covering all Muslim-majority countries for a period of almost forty years. It highlights the role that religious lobbies play on this issue and identifies the specific conditions under which religious parties do moderate their religious positions and don’t curb civil liberties, and the conditions under which they do so.

The Fall of an Icon: Institutionalization of Religious Organizations in Turkey

This chapter introduces and analyses the case of Turkey. First, it identifies the theoretically appropriate religious groups and organizations that are active in Turkey, then discusses their institutional interests and policy preferences, particularly regarding civil liberties, and their lobbying capacity. Using data on religious parties’ parliamentary concentration and on inflation rates, the chapter identifies three theoretically distinct periods that correspond to different outcomes for religious organizations’ institutionalization. Based on Hypothesis 1, these conditions predict that religious parties finally found conditions conducive to strengthening Turkish religious organizations starting in 1996. Therefore, it is only after this period that Turkish religious organizations established a formidable institutional presence in the for-profit education, welfare, media, and business sectors. The chapter then uses evidence from an original survey of more than 200 Turkish politicians, analytical narratives from Turkish political history, and quantitative data to test support for Hypothesis 1 and its corollaries in Turkey and finds strong support for them.

Religious Parties and Religious Organizations: The Fruits of Partnership

This chapter discusses the strategic challenges that religious parties face as they look to survive and succeed politically in Muslim-majority countries. It identifies national, private, da ‘wa organizations and Sufi orders as the religious lobbies of interest in these countries. It discusses the institutional interests and policy preferences of these religious lobbies and how they strategize to achieve them. It introduces the concept of socioeconomic institutionalization of religious organizations, discusses why these organizations want to increase it, and how higher socioeconomic institutionalization translates into increased capacity and effectiveness in lobbying for religious organizations. Finally, it argues that given their mutual ideological and policy interests, religious parties and religious organizations are natural partners in politics. It also discusses why secular parties and nonreligious organizations are unreliable partners for religious organizations and religious parties respectively.

The Institutionalization of Religious Organizations in Muslim-Majority Countries: Statistical Evidence

This chapter begins the empirical analysis in this book. It first presents the logic and the details of the research design adopted to test the two hypotheses and their associated corollaries. The research design combines large-N analysis of a comprehensive set of 49 Muslim-majority countries from 1970 to 2016 with in-depth case studies of two insightful cases—Turkey and Pakistan. The cases are selected to leverage the advantages of temporal variation in all the theoretically important factors within each country using a within-subjects design. The rest of the chapter introduces a new measure of religious organizations’ socioeconomic institutionalization and the sample used in the analysis. It then presents the results from systematic tests of Hypothesis 1 and its corollaries, explaining when religious organizations experience an increase in their institutionalization. The tests provide strong and robust support for the first part of the argument.

Resilience and Decline: Religious Parties, Religious Organizations, and Institutionalization in Pakistan

This chapter introduces and analyses the case of Pakistan. First, it identifies the theoretically appropriate religious groups and organizations that are active in Pakistan, then discusses their institutional interests and policy preferences, particularly regarding civil liberties, and their lobbying capacity. Using data on religious parties’ parliamentary concentration and on inflation rates, the chapter identifies two theoretically distinct periods that correspond to different outcomes for religious organizations’ institutionalization. Based on Hypothesis 1, these conditions predict that religious parties would find conditions conducive to strengthening Pakistani religious organizations starting in 2008. Therefore, it is only after this period that Pakistani religious organizations would establish a moderate institutional presence in the for-profit education, welfare, media, and business sectors. The chapter then uses evidence from an original survey of about 150 Pakistani politicians, analytical narratives from Pakistani political history, and quantitative data to test support for Hypothesis 1 and its corollaries in Pakistan and finds strong support for them.

Conclusion: Summary and Implications for Future Research

This chapter first provides a summary of the book’s main arguments and findings and then discusses their scope. It presents evidence that these arguments may be useful in understanding the preferences, choices, and consequences of religious parties and religious organizations well beyond Muslim-majority countries. It then discusses some of the nuances and variations that future research must examine in order to further improve our understanding of the social and political implications of the rise of religious parties. This include addressing the role of militant groups, ideological differences, external donors, and unpacking the internal dynamics of coalitions and parties. Finally, it illustrates how the findings in this book regarding the behaviors of religious parties and religious lobbies can be used to address specific outstanding questions in institutions, comparative politics, and political economy, including judicial independence, the strength of populist movements, democratic backsliding, and environmental policies.