The Metarepresentational Role of Mathematics in Scientific Explanations
Abstract Several philosophers have argued that to capture the generality of certain scientific explanations, we must count mathematical facts among their explanantia. I argue that we can better understand these explanations by adopting a more nuanced stance toward mathematical representations, recognizing the role of mathematical representation schemata in representing highly abstract features of physical systems. It is by picking out these abstract but non-mathematical features that explanations appealing to mathematics achieve a high degree of generality. The result is a rich conception of the role of mathematics in scientific explanations that does not require us to treat mathematical facts as explanantia.
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2017 ◽
Vol 16
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pp. 626-644
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1976 ◽
Vol 230
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pp. 1037-1041
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2021 ◽
pp. 114-119
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2018 ◽
Vol 46
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pp. 415-436
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