Taming ‘the Tyranny of Priests’: Hume’s Advocacy of Religious Establishments

For Hume, how to cope with the possible eruption of religious and political frenzies is one of the most crucial issues. He criticises any types of false religion throughout his writings, while supporting religious establishments as a way to tame ‘the tyranny of priests’ or the priestcraft. This chapter traces the origins of Hume’s essay ‘Of Superstition and Enthusiasm’ and demonstrates that his criticism of the clergy and his arguments concerning religious establishments were much influenced by Mandeville and Shaftesbury’s discussions. Although Hume’s endorsement of religious establishment in his History of England has been cited as evidence for the view that he became more conservative with his advancing age, this chapter provides a more coherent and consistent understanding of his criticism of the clergy and practical solution for religious strife. This chapter also delineates how Hume’s ironical defence of Erastianism differs from the position of Voltaire and other thinkers, and how Adam Smith sophisticated Humean countermeasures against false religion, despite their alleged and seeming dissimilarities in religious policy.

‘What is Established’?: Hume’s Social Philosophy of Opinion

This chapter discusses the theoretical connection between Hume’s arguments on imagination in theTreatise and opinion in Essays, Moral and Political, through which Hume’s keen awareness of the fragility of civilisation and the changeability of our social systems is elucidated. Although commentators have tended to base their understandings of Hume as a conservative thinker on his repeated emphasis on the importance of custom and habit to consolidate our beliefs, Hume’s anti-rationalism and emphasis on custom do not necessarily lead him to defend ‘tradition’ as such indiscriminately. Rather, his point lies in revealing that what is normally considered ‘tradition’ in fact consists of nothing but public opinion concerning what is thought to be established. This chapter will also reveal that this viewpoint is consistent with Hume’s criticism of the myth of the ancient constitution and social contract theory. This point is vital for our understanding of the ‘historical’ Hume, because some of his contemporaries criticised his History not only for his alleged Toryism, but also for his inconsistency with these earlier standpoints.

‘The Empire of the Imagination’: The Association of Ideas in Hume’s Social Philosophy

This chapter deals with the philosophical foundations of Hume’s social and political philosophy. Hume scholars have discussed his theory of association of ideas as a purely philosophical one. As many eighteenth-century critics were acutely aware, however, this theory must been considered an aspect of Epicureanism; one which allegedly undermines the spiritual aspect of human reason and virtues by transforming them into the mere consequences of habit and custom. What differentiates Hume’s associationist theory from more materialistic versions lies in the former’s emphasis on the psychological (not physiological) explanation of the workings of imagination. This is closely related to his defence of moral causes and his criticism of natural causes in the essay ‘Of National Characters’, which was to influence William Godwin. Although Duncan Forbes claims that Hume lost interest in his associationist theory after the Treatise, Hume in fact maintained a strong interest in this theory throughout his writings because the workings of imagination were the keystone for Hume in his continual investigations of the cultural diversity of human institutions.

Introduction

The Introduction takes up the debate over whether it is preferable to conceive of ‘the Enlightenment’ or several ‘enlightenments’. Through a survey of recent scholarship on this topic this chapter provides a tentative working definition: the Enlightenment is not a single project or agenda, but rather a shared sensitivity to the ongoing project of ‘civilisation’ in Europe and European colonies (including America), and a series of questions and issues based on this historical awareness. It also explains why the term ‘Sceptical Enlightenment’ is adopted to delineate the essence of Hume’s social thought, and how it differs from Forbes’s ‘Sceptical Whiggism’. The concept of the ‘Sceptical Enlightenment’ is necessarily counterpoised to the over-simplistic dichotomy between the moderate and radical Enlightenment claimed by Jonathan Israel, and the ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ reading of Hume by various scholars.

How ‘To Refine the Democracy’: Hume’s Perfect Commonwealth as a Development of his Political Science

Along with his lifelong criticism against the priesthood, there is another goal that Hume keeps pursuing: to suppress dangerous political factions. To demonstrate the importance of this goal we must turn to one of Hume’s political writings that has been underestimated: the ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’. Many commentators still tend to consider this essay a mere satire on political reforms, and fail to ascertain the integral connections between it and his other political writings. This chapter analyses this essay through detailed examinations of his other works and his ‘economic’ essays of thePolitical Discourses. This essay should be considered a development of his earlier essay ‘That Politics may be reduced to a Science’ with the purpose of theorising the most stable and liberal constitution. Through careful comparisons with the similar proposals of Harrington, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, this chapter also makes it clear that his plan has much wider links, for example, with his views of elections, his interest in indirect democracy, and his criticism of utopianism.

‘Refinement’ and ‘Vicious Luxury’: Hume’s Nuanced Defence of Luxury

This chapter deals with the issue of luxury, which is another crucial topic for Hume as an Enlightenment thinker. The Humean defence of luxury is significantly different from the ways in which Mandeville, Rousseau, and Adam Smith deal with the issue. The widening gap between reality and appearances is one of the characteristics of Augustinian thought that is often considered to be allied with Epicureanism in its understanding of civilised societies. However, Hume is unique in his complete silence on the issue of hypocrisy in refined societies. Hume’s Epicureanism is, therefore, characterised as one devoid of this Augustinian element. By combining both elements of Epicureanism and Shaftesburian Stoicism he attempts to demonstrate how to refine social intercourse through the enjoyment of luxury. This chapter also sheds some new light on an aspect of Hume’s thought that, so far, has been relatively neglected: his distinction between ‘innocent’ and ‘vicious’ forms of luxury, as well as his acknowledgement of the possibility of the emergence of the latter in the modern commercial world.

Conclusion

Based on the above arguments, the Conclusion summarises the basic features of Hume’s Sceptical Enlightenment by comparing the overall characteristics of his social philosophy with those of Voltaire – who is supposedly categorised as another ‘Sceptical Enlightenment’ thinker. It is true that both philosophes have much in common, though the former’s ‘spirit of scepticism’ permeates even the positive advocacy of modern values such as politeness, refinement, and progress. Unlike the propagandist and militant stance of Voltaire, Hume’s sceptical (allegedly indifferent and detached) posture can be considered an important and unique contribution to the intellectual resources of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers. Despite of Hume’s emphasis on ‘common life’, his sceptical approach is also quite different from the one taken by the Scottish Common Sense philosophers such as James Beattie. This is exemplified in Hume’s popularity among some Postmodernists who aim to find another possible modernity in him.

Human Society ‘in Perpetual Flux’: Hume’s Pendulum Theory of Civilisation

Hume’s avowed endorsement of a cyclical view of civilisation has been considered one of his most significant differences from the French philosophes’ upholding of ‘Progress’ and ‘Reason’. Some have used his divergent position to paint the image of Hume as the alleged forefather of ‘Counter-Enlightenment’ thinkers. As a result, Hume’s endorsement of a cyclical view has not been considered compatible with his vindication of civilisation, causing a dilemma for commentators. Through close examinations of Hume’s texts and comparisons with those of his predecessors and contemporaries (such as William Temple, Fontenelle, and Turgot), this chapter makes it clear that Hume’s cyclical view of civilisation is not limited to the issue of fine arts, but extends to commerce and manufactures. Hume’s vindication of a cyclical view of human history is also closely related to his criticism of the notion of providence, which Josiah Tucker evokes for his defence of perpetual progress in the so-called ‘rich country-poor country debate’. Nevertheless, Hume’s support of a cyclical view of civilisation does not contradict, but rather buttresses, his robust commitment to the values of refinement, liberty, and humanity. Hume is peculiar in keeping a cool head with regards to the possibility of continued progress, while believing in and supporting modern values.

‘The Prince of Sceptics’ and ‘The Prince of Historians’: Hume’s Influence and Image in Early Nineteenth-Century Britain

This chapter deals with the reception of Hume in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century. The subject of the contemporary and early nineteenth century receptions of Hume’s writings has already been addressed by James Fieser’s series of Early Responses to Hume. The problematic issue of the relationship between Hume as a philosopher and historian, however, is insufficiently addressed. The lack of a sustained analysis of the relationship between Hume’s philosophy and politics might be the result of the continued influence exerted by John Stuart Mill’s evaluation that Hume’s philosophical scepticism leads him to political conservatism. Through detailed analysis of British pamphlets and periodicals (such as The Edinburgh Review, The Quarterly Review, and The Annual Register) published at the turn of the eighteenth century, this chapter argues that Mill’s evaluation was not widely accepted among the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century writers and reviewers. Some radicals (Mary Wollstonecraft, Jeremy Bentham, the young James Mackintosh) left positive comments regarding Hume’s supposed liberal and anti-religious attitude in his History. Interestingly, some Romantics such as Coleridge suspected that Hume, as ‘infidel’ writer, was responsible for the French Revolution along with the philosophes.