Three Dimensions of American Conservative Political Orientation Differentially Predict Negativity Bias and Satisfaction With Life

Numerous studies have linked political conservatism with negativity bias, whereas others have linked conservatism with indicators of positive adjustment. This research sought to reconcile this seeming contradiction by examining whether distinct dimensions of conservatism differentially predicted measures of negativity bias and positive adjustment. In two studies, we used an empirically derived and validated Attitude-Based Political Conservatism (ABPC) Scale that captures three correlated but distinct factors of American conservatism: Libertarian Independence, Moral Traditionalism, and Ethnic Separateness. In both studies ( N = 1,756), Libertarian Independence was linked with indicators of positive adjustment, whereas Moral Traditionalism and Ethnic Separateness were linked with indices of negativity bias. By identifying which dimensions of conservatism predict negativity bias and positive adjustment, this work illuminates the unique psychological foundations of distinct strands of conservatism in America.

Conservatism predicts aversion to consequential Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to revolutionize society by automating tasks as diverse as driving cars, diagnosing diseases, and providing legal advice. The degree to which AI can improve outcomes in these and other domains depends on how comfortable people are trusting AI for these tasks, which in turn depends on lay perceptions of AI. The present research examines how these critical lay perceptions may vary as a function of conservatism. Using five survey experiments, we find that political conservatism is associated with low comfort with and trust in AI—i.e., with AI aversion. This relationship between conservatism and AI aversion is explained by the link between conservatism and risk perception; more conservative individuals perceive AI as being riskier and are therefore more averse to its adoption. Finally, we test whether a moral reframing intervention can reduce AI aversion among conservatives.

Science rejection in Greece: Spirituality predicts vaccine scepticism and low faith in science in a Greek sample

Recent research has identified spirituality as an important contributor to vaccine scepticism and low faith in science, particularly in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) nations. In the present study, we further tested the generalizability of these findings in a religious South-Eastern European country – Greece, with more extensive measures of key constructs. We replicate previous work using measures of improved construct validity. Spirituality was found to be the strongest predictor of vaccine scepticism and low faith in science. In addition, low science literacy was also predictive of vaccine rejection. Climate change scepticism was not associated with spirituality but with political conservatism, which corroborates previous findings. These results provide further evidence for two previously made observations: science scepticism is heterogeneous, and spirituality is an important factor in shaping science rejection.

"Direct threats require decisive action": An investigation on how levels of political conservatism change in the face of economic, natural and social threats

<p>The extant literature has suggested that threatening time periods and situations can enhance people’s political conservatism levels. This thesis provides a systematic examination of the impact of societal threat on political conservatism, and whether distinct types of threat (economic, natural, and social) differentially impact political conservatism. In particular, the present research examines two main competing hypotheses. The conservative shift hypothesis (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b) postulates that people become more politically conservative during/after threatening periods. The cultural worldview enhancement hypothesis (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003) postulates that people tend to cling more strongly to what they believe when their death is made salient, be it a more conservative or liberal political belief – we assume that societal threat could also make mortality salient, enhancing a held political worldview. Additionally, the present research also examines in more depth how societal threat impacts political conservatism. The dual-process mediation hypothesis suggests that the impact of societal threat on political conservatism happens via variables in the dual-process motivational (DPM; Duckitt, 2001) model, being differentially mediated by world beliefs (dangerous and competitive) and socio-political attitudes (right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation). Finally and because the direct impact of threat on authoritarianism has been questioned (Feldman & Stenner, 1997), the activation of authoritarianism by social threat hypothesis suggests an interaction between social threat and previous levels of right-wing authoritarianism in predicting political conservatism and variables in the DPM model. Seven empirical studies were carried out to test these hypotheses using different methodological designs. The correlational findings of Study 1 showed that the DPM model was useful in predicting political conservatism. The mix-method findings of Study 2A showed that economic, natural, and social threats have distinct psychological meanings. Based on these initial findings, two mix-method studies were conducted to develop textual (Study 2B) and pictorial (Study 2C) experimental stimuli depicting economic, natural and social threat scenarios plus a control scenario. Three experiments were then conducted to test the complete set of hypotheses: Study 3A was completed online with textual stimuli, Study 3B was completed in a lab with textual stimuli, and Study 3C was completed in a lab with pictorial stimuli. Overall, the experimental findings provided more support for the conservative shift hypothesis with participants showing greater conservative political orientation after the threat manipulation (compared to the control condition) in Study 3C. However, this effect did not generalise to other measures of political conservatism (right-wing political orientation, conservative voting intention and preference for political discourses of conservative parties). Additionally, some distinctions between threat types were observed. The dual-process mediation hypothesis was partially supported in Studies 3A and 3C. The threat manipulation impacted political conservatism indirectly via an increase in competitive world beliefs and an increase in RWA in Study 3A, while it impacted political conservatism via an increase in dangerous world beliefs and increases in right-wing authoritarianism and/or social dominance orientation in Study 3C. No empirical support was observed for both the cultural worldview enhancement and the activation of authoritarianism by social threat hypotheses. Overall, the present research suggests that it is possible to experimentally modify people’s political conservatism using threat manipulation, that threat enhances (at least to some extent) political conservatism, and that this impact may be differentially mediated by variables in the DPM model. These conclusions are discussed in more depth along with limitations and future directions in the general discussion of the thesis.</p>

"Direct threats require decisive action": An investigation on how levels of political conservatism change in the face of economic, natural and social threats

<p>The extant literature has suggested that threatening time periods and situations can enhance people’s political conservatism levels. This thesis provides a systematic examination of the impact of societal threat on political conservatism, and whether distinct types of threat (economic, natural, and social) differentially impact political conservatism. In particular, the present research examines two main competing hypotheses. The conservative shift hypothesis (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b) postulates that people become more politically conservative during/after threatening periods. The cultural worldview enhancement hypothesis (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003) postulates that people tend to cling more strongly to what they believe when their death is made salient, be it a more conservative or liberal political belief – we assume that societal threat could also make mortality salient, enhancing a held political worldview. Additionally, the present research also examines in more depth how societal threat impacts political conservatism. The dual-process mediation hypothesis suggests that the impact of societal threat on political conservatism happens via variables in the dual-process motivational (DPM; Duckitt, 2001) model, being differentially mediated by world beliefs (dangerous and competitive) and socio-political attitudes (right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation). Finally and because the direct impact of threat on authoritarianism has been questioned (Feldman & Stenner, 1997), the activation of authoritarianism by social threat hypothesis suggests an interaction between social threat and previous levels of right-wing authoritarianism in predicting political conservatism and variables in the DPM model. Seven empirical studies were carried out to test these hypotheses using different methodological designs. The correlational findings of Study 1 showed that the DPM model was useful in predicting political conservatism. The mix-method findings of Study 2A showed that economic, natural, and social threats have distinct psychological meanings. Based on these initial findings, two mix-method studies were conducted to develop textual (Study 2B) and pictorial (Study 2C) experimental stimuli depicting economic, natural and social threat scenarios plus a control scenario. Three experiments were then conducted to test the complete set of hypotheses: Study 3A was completed online with textual stimuli, Study 3B was completed in a lab with textual stimuli, and Study 3C was completed in a lab with pictorial stimuli. Overall, the experimental findings provided more support for the conservative shift hypothesis with participants showing greater conservative political orientation after the threat manipulation (compared to the control condition) in Study 3C. However, this effect did not generalise to other measures of political conservatism (right-wing political orientation, conservative voting intention and preference for political discourses of conservative parties). Additionally, some distinctions between threat types were observed. The dual-process mediation hypothesis was partially supported in Studies 3A and 3C. The threat manipulation impacted political conservatism indirectly via an increase in competitive world beliefs and an increase in RWA in Study 3A, while it impacted political conservatism via an increase in dangerous world beliefs and increases in right-wing authoritarianism and/or social dominance orientation in Study 3C. No empirical support was observed for both the cultural worldview enhancement and the activation of authoritarianism by social threat hypotheses. Overall, the present research suggests that it is possible to experimentally modify people’s political conservatism using threat manipulation, that threat enhances (at least to some extent) political conservatism, and that this impact may be differentially mediated by variables in the DPM model. These conclusions are discussed in more depth along with limitations and future directions in the general discussion of the thesis.</p>

Are Conservatives More Rigid Than Liberals? A Meta-Analytic Test of the Rigidity-of-the-Right Hypothesis

The rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis (RRH), which posits that cognitive, motivational, and ideological rigidity resonate with political conservatism, is the dominant psychological account of political ideology. Here, we conduct an extensive review of the RRH, using multilevel meta-analysis to examine relations between varieties of rigidity and ideology alongside a bevy of potential moderators (s = 329, k = 708, N = 187,612). Associations between conservatism and rigidity were enormously heterogeneous, such that broad theoretical accounts of left-right asymmetries in rigidity have masked complex—yet conceptually fertile—patterns of relations. Most notably, correlations between economic conservatism and rigidity constructs were almost uniformly not significant, whereas social conservatism and rigidity were significantly positively correlated. Further, leftists and rightists exhibited modestly asymmetrical motivations yet closely symmetrical thinking styles and cognitive architecture. Dogmatism was a special case, with rightists being clearly more dogmatic. Complicating this picture, moderator analyses revealed that the RRH may not generalize to key environmental/psychometric modalities. Thus, our work represents a crucial launch point for advancing a more accurate—but admittedly more nuanced—model of political social cognition. We resolve that drilling into this complexity, thereby moving away from the question of if conservatives are essentially rigid, will amplify the explanatory power of political psychology.

Physical Strength as a Heuristic Cue of Political Conservatism

Social bargaining models posit physically formidable men tend to pursue strategies for acquiring resources and status through direct competition and promoting hierarchical social organization. Previous research indicates that formidable men espouse more conservative political viewpoints, as a means of advancing social policies favoring use of aggressive bargaining and hierarchy-maintenance strategies. If the mind is designed to utilize probabilistic cues of behavioral strategies, physical strength may function as a heuristic cue of political conservatism. Participants in three studies inferred conservatism of physically strong and weak men. Physically strong men were consistently perceived as more conservative (Studies 1 and 2). Inferences from strength cues were moderated neither by type of conservatism (i.e., fiscal versus social) nor presence of wealth cues. Inferences further extended to tradition-based and libertarian moral foundations domains (Study 3). We frame results using an affordance management framework, suggesting individuals utilize cues to formidability as heuristics to infer political attitudes.

Dual Pandemics of COVID-19 and Systemic Racism: The Roles of Perceptions of Inequities, Civic Values, and Conservatism in Mask-Wearing Behavior

Amid unprecedented political polarization, the US continues to grapple with the simultaneous crises of COVID-19 and structural racism. We examine potential predictors of COVID-19 mask-wearing at the intersection of these crises, with particular attention to the behavior of conservatives and young people, who have resisted compliance with efforts to contain the spread of COVID-19. Specifically, we investigate perceptions of racial/ethnic inequities in the healthcare system and civic values as predictors of COVID-19 mask-wearing frequency and potential moderators of the relationship between political orientation and COVID-19 mask-wearing frequency. Diverse college students at a university in southern California participated in our longitudinal survey, which was initiated prior to the COVID-19 pandemic (N = 431). We found that perceptions of inequities and civic values predicted mask-wearing, whereas political conservatism was negatively related to mask-wearing. Further, conservative participants were more likely to wear masks if they reported greater perceptions of inequities. Our results provide a foundation for future research that may inform targeted public health interventions aimed at encouraging responsible COVID-19 behavior and fostering dialogue on structural equities in a contentious political environment.

Personality and Ideology

Research since the 1990s reveals that openness to experience—a personality trait that captures interest in novelty, creativity, unconventionalism, and open-mindedness—correlates negatively with political conservatism. This chapter summarizes this vast literature by meta-analyzing 232 unique samples (N = 575,691) that examine the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and conservatism. The results reveal that the negative relationship between openness to experience and conservatism (r = −.145) is nearly twice as big as the next strongest correlation between personality and ideology (namely, conscientiousness and conservatism; r = .076). The associations between personality traits and conservatism were, however, substantively larger in Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) countries than in non-WEIRD countries. The chapter concludes by reviewing recent longitudinal work demonstrating that openness to experience and conservatism are non-causally related. Collectively, the chapter shows that openness to experience is by far the strongest (negative) correlate of conservatism but that there is little evidence that this association is causal.