British Partner

2021 ◽  
pp. 229-259
Author(s):  
Marco Wyss

Washington was largely a bystander during the transfer of power in Nigeria. Yet London and Lagos saw a postcolonial role for the United States in Nigeria as a provider of development aid, and the Americans increasingly identified Nigeria as a key state in Africa. After independence, this led to an Anglo-American ‘burden-sharing’ in Nigeria, wherein London was responsible for defence and military assistance and Washington became the main provider of development aid. But following the abrogation of the Anglo-Nigerian defence agreement, and in search of alternative sources of military assistance, the Nigerians began to approach Washington with requests for military assistance. The Americans, who wanted to focus on development aid, were hesitant. But eventually, increasing domestic instability, regional tensions, and what was perceived as a communist offensive in West Africa convinced Washington to militarize its aid policy in close consultation with the British.

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 1065-1087 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARCO WYSS

AbstractIn Nigeria, Britain asserted its post-colonial security role during and immediately after the transfer of power, and remained responsible for assisting the Nigerian armed forces. While the Americans recognized Nigeria's potential as an important partner in the Cold War, they preferred to focus on development aid. Washington was thus supposed to complement British assistance, while leaving the responsibility for the security sector to London. But with the escalation of the Cold War in Africa, the Nigerians’ efforts to reduce their dependency on the United Kingdom, and Nigeria's growing significance for the United States in African affairs, this Anglo-American burden-sharing was increasingly questioned in Washington. The United States thus eventually decided to militarize its aid policy towards Nigeria. In analysing the militarization of US aid policy towards Nigeria, this article will, first, assess the Anglo-American relationship in the early 1960s; secondly, position Nigeria in American Cold War policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa; thirdly, question the role of military assistance in Washington's policy towards Nigeria and Africa; and fourthly, discover the regional and local factors that influenced policy-makers in Washington and London.


1962 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Windle ◽  
T. R. Vallance

There are many means employed by the United States to maintain and advance its position throughout the world during the current period of bipolar conflict. The most conspicuous of these are subsumed under what is known as the Mutual Security Program. Nearly half of the approximately $4 billion budgeted during fiscal year 1962 for mutual security went into military assistance. Of this, about $125 million was devoted to the training of foreign military personnel. This Military Assistance Training Program, including the training of foreigners in the United States and that administered overseas by Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's), missions, overseas commands, and third countries, constitutes by far the largest effort the world has known on the part of one country to educate and train citizens of others. The number of foreigners given military assistance training in the United States each year—about 16,500 in 1960—exceeds the number trained here under the Fulbright, Smith-Mundt, and Agency for International Development (AID) programs combined.


Author(s):  
Bipin K. Tiwary ◽  
Anubhav Roy

Having fought its third war and staring at food shortages, independent India needed to get its act together both militarily and economically by the mid-1960s. With the United States revoking its military assistance and delaying its food aid despite New Delhi’s devaluation of the rupee, India’s newly elected Indira Gandhi government turned to deepen its ties with the Soviet Union in 1966 with the aim of balancing the United States internally through a rearmament campaign and externally through a formal alliance with Moscow. The US formation of a triumvirate with Pakistan and China in India’s neighbourhood only bolstered its intent. Yet India consciously limited the extent of both its balancing strategies and allowed adequate space to simultaneously adopt the contradictory sustenance of its complex interdependence with the United States economically. Did this contrasting choice of strategies constitute India’s recourse to hedging after 1966 until 1971, when it liberated Bangladesh by militarily defeating a US-aligned Pakistan? Utilising a historical-evaluative study of archival data and the contents of a few Bollywood films from the period, this paper seeks to address the question by empirically establishing the extents of India’s balancing of, and complex interdependence with, the United States.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Spero Simeon Zachary Paravantes

While trying to understand and explain the origins and dynamics of Anglo-American foreign policy in the pre and early years of the Cold War, the role thatperception played in the design and implementation of foreign policy became acentral focus. From this point came the realization of a general lack of emphasisand research into the ways in which the British government managed to convincethe United States government to assume support for worldwide British strategicobjectives. How this support was achieved is the central theme of this dissertation.This work attempts to provide a new analysis of the role that the British played in the dramatic shift in American foreign policy from 1946 to 1950. Toachieve this shift (which also included support of British strategic interests in theEastern Mediterranean) this dissertation argues that the British used Greece, first asa way to draw the United States further into European affairs, and then as a way toanchor the United States in Europe, achieving a guarantee of security of theEastern Mediterranean and of Western Europe.To support these hypotheses, this work uses mainly the British andAmerican documents relating to Greece from 1946 to 1950 in an attempt to clearlyexplain how these nations made and implemented policy towards Greece duringthis crucial period in history. In so doing it also tries to explain how Americanforeign policy in general changed from its pre-war focus on non-intervention, to the American foreign policy to which the world has become accustomed since 1950. To answer these questions, I, like the occupying (and later intervening)powers did, must use Greece as an example. In this, I hope that I may be forgivensince unlike them, I intend not to make of it one. My objectives for doing so lie notin justifying policy, but rather in explaining it. This study would appear to havespecial relevance now, not only for the current financial crisis which has placedGreece once again in world headlines, but also for the legacy of the Second WorldWar and the post-war strife the country experienced which is still playing out todaywith examples like the Distomo massacre, German war reparations and on-goingsocial, academic and political strife over the legacy of the Greek Civil War.


Author(s):  
David A. Gerber

American Immigration: A Very Short Introduction traces three massive waves of immigration from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, and analyzes the nature of immigration as a purposeful, structured activity, attitudes supporting or hostile to immigration, policies and laws regulating immigration, and the nature of and prospects for assimilation. There have been some dramatic developments since 2011, including the crisis along the southwestern border and the intense conflict over illegal immigration. The population of the United States has diverse sources: territorial acquisition through conquest and colonialism, the slave trade, and voluntary immigration. Many Americans value the memory of immigrant ancestors, and are sentimentally inclined to immigrant strivings. Alongside this sits the perception that immigration destabilizes social order, cultural coherence, job markets, and political alignments. The nearly 250 years of American nationhood has been characterized by both support for openness to immigration and embrace of a cosmopolitan formulation of American identity and for restrictions and assertions of belief in a core Anglo-American national character.


Author(s):  
Hossein Taghdar ◽  
Zaid Ahmad ◽  
Abdolreza Alami

Egypt has experienced drastic changes in government recently. Studying these changes can lead to more understanding of the revolutions caused by the Arab Spring in other countries and can also explain the hegemonic conduct of the United States. This qualitative study was conducted through 1) reviewing scholarly published documents and other relevant official news resources that were published on the relationship between Egypt and the United States after the 2011 revolution, and 2) interviewing 12 key informants (ethnic, academic, and administrative elites). Qualitative content analysis was the main approach to data analysis. The results with a focus on both Obama’s administration and Trumps’ administration revealed that Egypt and the United States relations were affected due to Egypt’s anti-western agenda. Later, the United States’ main strategies in maintaining its hegemony in Egypt were discussed. Among these factors, 1) the United States’ aid policy, 2) the United States’ tolerance policy, 3) aborting FJP, 4) imposing the western culture, and 4) the United States’ support of street protests can be mentioned. Areas for further research are discussed at the end of the study.


1992 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. J. C. McKercher

One of the pervading interpretations of Anglo-American relations in the interwar period is that the advent of James Ramsay MacDonald's Labour government in June 1929 set in train the series of events that ended bitter relations between Britain and the United States, bitterness which had been caused by the naval question. There are several strands to this: first, that the American policy pursued by the Conservative second Baldwin government from November 1924 to June 1929, and especially after the failure of the Coolidge naval conference in the summer of 1927, was bankrupt; second, that MacDonald was more amenable to settling British differences with the Americans than were his Conservative predecessors and, that being so, softened the hardline towards the United States that had marked Conservative foreign and naval policy for more than two years; and, finally, that MacDonald's decision to travel to the United States on what proved to be a very successful visit in the autumn of 1929 to meet Herbert Hoover, the new president, to discuss outstanding issues personally, was a major diplomatic coup. Some of this received version is true. No one can doubt that MacDonald and his Labour ministry played a crucial role in helping to ameliorate the crisis that had been dogging good Anglo-American relations for more than two years before June 1929. The Labour Party constituted the government when the London naval conference of 1930 ended the period of Anglo-American naval rivalry. Moreover, for six months before that conference convened, Labour had conducted effective diplomacy in preparing for its deliberations.


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