Open Strategy

This chapter examines the development of open strategy practices from the late 1990s. Open strategy involves greater transparency about strategy to internal and external audiences, and greater inclusion for internal and external stakeholders. The contemporary rise of open strategy is supported by three exogenous forces: the dissolving of organizational boundaries internally and externally, a newly democratic working culture, and new technologies, especially social media. Nevertheless, open strategy’s development still involves two kinds of arduous and fallible institutional work: ‘rule-making’ and ‘resource-organizing’. As examples of the first, Gary Hamel’s Strategos Consulting promoted new kinds of democratic strategy norms, while corporates such as IBM developed internal openness through its jams. Under the second, new consulting firms were created such as Global Business Network, while established corporations such as Barclays Bank, Nokia, and Shell had to organize new kinds of participative strategy process.

Strategy Consultants

This chapter examines strategy consultants as a major part of the Strategy profession. It examines their growth since the middle of the last century, and particularly the development of leading firms such as Bain & Co., the Boston Consulting Group, and McKinsey & Co. It demonstrates the structurally precarious and permeable predicament of strategy consulting firms, with many entries and exits. The challenging economics of strategy consulting are examined, with the problems of cyclical demand, low entry barriers, weak financial structures, and short pipeline highlighted. The chapter identifies three ways strategy consulting firms have managed their predicaments: cultivating professionalism, building relationships, and investing in knowledge. The chapter also examines the nature of strategy consulting work, particularly its combination of high demands and intellectual stimulus.

Opening Strategy

This chapter introduces the central arguments of Opening Strategy. In particular, it traces the development of three key strategic practices since the middle of the last century to today: strategic planning, strategic management, and open strategy. These practices have gradually made strategy an increasingly inclusive and transparent activity. These practices operate within Strategy as a professional field. The direction of practice change is influenced by exogenous forces upon this field, in particular organizational, cultural, and technological trends. The manner of practice change is influenced by the precarious and permeable nature of the Strategy field, granting important roles to the bottom-up initiatives of strategy consultants and corporate strategists. This chapter provides a basic theoretical orientation for the remainder of the book, extending the Strategy-as-Practice tradition in a macro direction and drawing on the work of Anthony Giddens and Alasdair MacIntyre. The chapter introduces the statistical, interview, archival, and published sources used throughout the book.

Changing Strategy—for the Better

This chapter summarizes how Strategy’s practices have become gradually more open and inclusive since the middle of the last century. In particular, it underlines how the development of first strategic planning, then strategic management, and then open strategy have resulted from the institutional work of innovators from such prominent corporations as General Electric and Red Hat, and from leading consulting firms, particularly BCG, Bain, McKinsey, Gemini, GBN, and Strategos. This work has been influenced both by the exogenous forces of organizational, cultural, and technological change, and by the structural weakness of the Strategy profession, particularly its precariousness and permeability. The chapter proposes lessons for future practice change in Strategy, and develops implications for Strategy professionals, for policy-makers, for researchers, and for teachers. The book concludes by arguing for the benefits of open strategy not just for organizations and their immediate stakeholders, but for society as a whole.

Strategic Planning

This chapter examines the development of strategic planning practices from around 1960. Strategic planning advanced on the prior practice of long-range planning by emphasizing choice, competition, and control. It also made an initial step towards more open forms of strategizing by widening the discourse of strategy among managerial elites. Strategic planning’s rise was supported by three exogenous forces: growing organizational complexity, a culture of rationality, and new analytical technologies. Nevertheless, strategic planning’s development still took two kinds of arduous and fallible institutional work: ‘rule-making’ and ‘resource-organizing’. Under the first, corporate strategists, such as Shell’s Pierre Wack, created and disseminated techniques, such as scenario analysis, while consultants, such as BCG and McKinsey, promoted portfolio analysis. Under the second, entrepreneurs, such as Bruce Henderson, had to create new consulting organizations, such as BCG, and corporate strategists, such as Jack McKitterick at General Electric, built the first corporate strategy units.

Making Strategy

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework for Opening Strategy. The book builds particularly on the practice theories of Anthony Giddens and Alasdair MacIntyre. Giddens identifies the mechanisms of practice change in the levering of structural conditions; MacIntyre locates the motivations for change in both instrumentalism and idealism. This chapter constructs from Giddens and MacIntyre a 4P model of Strategy-as-Practice, in which praxis, practices, practitioners, and profession are all important for change in Strategy’s macro practices. The Strategy profession is structurally exposed to organizational, cultural, and technological forces for practice change. Its structural characteristics of precariousness and permeability influence the way in which change comes about. Ultimately, however, it is strategy consultants and corporate strategists who enact new practices on the ground. Practice change is produced by the agency of individuals and small groups negotiating structural opportunities and constraints according to principles that are both instrumental and idealistic.

Corporate Strategists

This chapter examines corporate strategists—in-house strategy staffs—as a major part of the Strategy profession. It examines their growth since the beginning of the twentieth century, and especially since the 1960s. It demonstrates that corporate strategists remain a significant professional group, long after Mintzberg’s (1994) description of a ‘fall’ of strategic planning. The chapter identifies important continuities in the nature of corporate strategists’ work, including analysis and support for senior management, especially the chief executive officer. Further continuities for corporate strategists include the permeable and precarious nature of their profession. At the same time, the chapter identifies attractive features of the corporate strategy role, such as intellectual stimulus, broad perspectives, career progression, and closeness to top management decision-making.

Strategic Management

This chapter examines the development of strategic management practices from the late 1970s. Strategic management advanced on the prior practices of strategic planning by emphasizing change and implementation. It also opened up the strategy process by decentralizing responsibilities and including employees in implementation. Strategic management’s rise was supported by three exogenous forces: growing pressure on big organizations to change, a new managerial culture of responsibility and learning, and new communication and participation technologies. Nevertheless, strategic planning’s development still took two kinds of arduous and fallible institutional work: ‘rule-making’ and ‘resource-organizing’. Under the first, Shell for example developed a version of strategic management as involving managerial conversation and learning, while McKinsey promoted strategic management as involving decentralization. Under the second, new consulting firms such as Gemini were created and large corporate investments in management training were made, as at General Electric’s Crotonville facility.