Delving In

Chapter 7 continues the analysis of the effects of partisan electoral interventions by focusing on the local intervened election level—another method frequently utilized in order to estimate the effects of various factors on election results. Accordingly, it examines election surveys from two targets of overt electoral interventions where questions related to key aspects of the meddling were asked: the 1953 West German elections and the 1992 Israeli elections. An analysis of these surveys finds support for one of the main mechanisms specified in the book’s theoretical framework. It also finds evidence that the American interventions in both cases indeed played a key role in the election victory of the assisted side.

The (In)famous Election

Chapter 8 examines the case of the Russian partisan intervention in the 2016 U.S. elections in light of this book’s arguments and the currently available information. It first analyzes the causes of this intervention, finding preliminary support for the theoretical framework on why such meddling occurs. It then studies the effects of the Russian covert intervention on the election results, with the main focus on the hacking and document-leaking component, using multiple methods: estimating their effects using PEIG and aggregate data from the U.S. in 2016, two pre-election surveys with relevant questions, and Google search data on these leaks in the U.S. and the key “swing states.” It finds that the Russian intervention had a significant pro-Trump effect on the results and it was probably large enough to have led Hillary Clinton to lose at least 75 EC votes—sufficient to lead to her defeat in the electoral college.

Dragging Them over the Finish Line

Chapter 6 begins the analysis of the effects of partisan electoral interventions on election results through a statistical test, using PEIG, of the four main hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. Full support is found for the first three hypotheses. Partisan electoral interventions are found to increase the vote share of the preferred candidate/party by 3% on average—enough in many cases to determine the result. Overt interventions are found to be more effective than covert ones in both the statistical and the substantive sense. However, unlike in later elections, electoral interventions in founding elections usually harm the aided side, reducing its vote share by 6.7% on average. The chapter concludes by examining whether there are any significant differences in the effectiveness of the specific assistance that is provided by the foreign power and/or the overall magnitude of this aid.

Surveying the Landscape

Chapter 5 provides an overview of the universe of American and Soviet/Russian interventions from 1946 to 2000 based upon the new dataset of such interventions utilized in this manuscript (PEIG). This chapter describes in detail the main methods used by the great powers for this purpose. It also answers some general questions of interest such as, for example, the regional and temporal patterns of electoral interventions throughout this period, the frequencies of the use of each of the main intervention methods, and the top targets of such U.S. and Russian interventions. It concludes with a discussion of additional evidence already visible from an early look at PEIG for the arguments made here and for other perspectives.

Introduction

Chapter 1 describes the long historical record of partisan electoral interventions, an attempt by a foreign power to intentionally intervene in an election in another country to help or hinder one of the candidates or parties using various costly covert and overt methods, going back to early modern Europe. This description is followed by an introduction of the two key questions, a discussion of their importance, and a summary of the main arguments regarding the causes of such interventions and their effects on election results. The chapter concludes with a description of the scant research on this topic and the limitations of that research and provides a brief outline of the book.

Conclusions

Chapter 9 first briefly summarizes the findings from the preceding chapters regarding the causes of partisan electoral interventions and their effects on election results. It then discusses the wider contributions of this study to other subfields in international relations and comparative politics. It then assesses the policy implications of this research to cybersecurity. It first describes the need of policymakers in democratic countries to take immediate precautions in order to prevent the digitization (via cryptocurrencies) of another long-standing method of electoral intervention—covert campaign funding. It then discusses how the use of electronic voting methods of various kinds threatens to inadvertently bring back a pre-modern method of intervention—meddling in the vote tallies, and the best ways to prevent that “doomsday” scenario from occurring. The chapter concludes with future directions for research in this regard.

Staying on the Sidelines

Chapter 4 includes the second set of case studies designed mainly to test this book’s arguments about the causes of such interventions. These are cases in which the U.S. (at the highest decision-making levels) is now known to have seriously considered doing an electoral intervention but eventually decided against that option. Accordingly, after fleshing out the theoretical predictions in each case, this chapter includes three detailed case studies of the decision-making process that led the U.S. to decide to not intervene: the 1958 Venezuelan election, the 1967 Greek election, and the 1965 Philippine election. These cases provide strong support for the theoretical model as well.

Throwing Their Hat into the Ring

Chapter 3 includes the first set of three detailed case studies of the decision-making process that led the U.S. government to decide to intervene in three foreign elections and the choice of the exact methods of intervention utilized: the American electoral interventions in the 1953 West German elections for Konrad Adenauer and the CDU, in the 1958 Guatemalan elections for Jose Luis Cruz Salazar and the MDN, and in the 1946 Argentinean elections for Jose Pascual Tamborini and the Democratic Union. In addition to providing strong support for the theoretical framework, these three electoral intervention cases also supply some real-life examples of the various methods used for this purpose by interveners: covert funding of the assisted side, dissemination of “scandalous” information on the “undesired” side, pre-election public threats and promises, provision of various benefits to the target, and so forth.

Why They Meddle in Elections—And What Are the Effects on the Results

Chapter 2 lays out in detail the theoretical arguments on the causes and effects of partisan electoral interventions. It also notes the main theoretical assumptions underlying these theoretical arguments, some of which are non-obvious in many political science approaches. It then provides a description of the main methods for testing these theoretical arguments. It first describes how the main historical case studies were chosen and how the data for them was collected. It then concludes by briefly explaining how the definition of electoral interventions was operationalized and how the dataset of partisan electoral interventions (PEIG) utilized for the main statistical analyses was constructed.