Enter Russia: Putin raises the stakes

This chapter details Russia's decision to send its air force to directly support Assad in late summer 2015 — what motivated this dramatic mobilisation and what impact it had on the conflict. Russia's involvement suddenly raised the stakes and the consequences for the Syrian civil war. The rebel resurgence of spring 2015 provoked real fears of Assad's collapse in Moscow and Tehran, resulting in the Vienna Process along with ceasefire and peace talks. However, while Russia's intervention likely prevented any prospect of sudden regime collapse, it did not change the fundamental structure of the civil war and thus was unlikely to lead to a decisive regime military victory. What it did was create a better negotiating position for pro-Assad forces — which may have been Putin's intention all along.

Conclusion: The war that everyone lost

This concluding chapter talks about how important regional consensus will be for any lasting peace to be established in Syria. The US' role, as the declining hegemon, is a particular focus of this analysis. President Obama has been attacked for not doing enough on Syria. It is unknown whether, had he intervened against Assad earlier, either directly or by heavily backing the armed rebels before radicals took over, the war would have finished sooner. However, given the regional dynamics described in this study, it seems unlikely that Russia and Iran would have ceased support for Assad and his regime. The chapter argues that a more selective engagement with certain regional priorities as the most powerful of several actors, rather than the regional hegemon, looks the most likely and effective course for Washington in years to come.

No red lines: the question of western military intervention

This chapter analyses the question of western intervention and why no state deployed its military to bring about regime change in Syria. It explores why the Syria conflict attracted so little direct military intervention in its early, formative years, especially by the US. The ‘nonstrike’ of late summer 2013 was something of a watershed in the Syrian civil war. Until that point, some form of military intervention led by the US, modelled on the actions in Libya in 2011, seemed a realistic prospect to many of the key actors and impacted their behaviour. But afterwards, most recognised that US military action against Assad was unlikely. While Obama did eventually authorise direct military action in Syria in September 2014, it was against ISIS, not Assad.

‘Arm the rebels!’ Backing the armed opposition

This chapter explores the other side of the anti-Assad states' support, given to the different fighting opposition groups within Syria, with a pronounced profile of Qatar's role. The failures of foreign governments with the political opposition were nothing compared to their disastrous approach to the armed rebels. In different ways the key regional anti-Assad powers of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey came to actively support the armed rebellion, supplying a range of arms, finance, and nonlethal assistance. But none of them had detailed knowledge of Syria, nor were they experienced in supporting armed insurgencies in foreign countries. Moreover, each had a separate agenda within their desire to topple Assad, prompting them to back rival groups, exacerbating divisions among the rebels and facilitating the rise of Jihadists.

Assad must stand aside? The international community’s ambivalent response

This chapter examines the positions of the main political actors over the course of May–August 2011. It charts how loose stances on Assad evolved into two camps for and against him, with Turkey's sudden turn on its former ally particularly profiled. With the violence escalating, patience with Assad quickly expired. Over two crucial months, July–August 2011, Assad's allies Qatar and Turkey abandoned him, and several western states, led by Barack Obama, called for him to stand aside. Similarly, in what would prove a key dividing line for the coming civil war, Russia and Iran stood by Assad. While moral considerations may have justified these policymakers' stances, a range of factors, including domestic concerns, personal opinion, ideology, and regional ambition, actually drove their actions.

Descent into chaos: stalemate and the rise of ISIS

This chapter looks at why the US and other states had chosen to intervene in eastern Syria after 2014, following the rise of ISIS. It explores the fragmentation of Syria and considers how other regional events shifted actors' calculations. The expansion of ISIS' holdings in the summer of 2014 dramatically shifted outside views of the civil war. While the US had declined to strike Assad in 2013, a year later it assembled an international coalition to destroy the newly declared ‘Caliphate’. The chapter studies how and why ISIS emerged, and who was responsible — with most of the players, particularly Assad, complicit in some way. It also examines the immediate context in which ISIS' sudden expansion came: the failure of the Geneva II peace conference.

Introduction

This introductory chapter discusses the complexity of the Syrian conflict and the multiple factors driving and shaping it. It argues that from the start, external factors have been essential in enabling and facilitating both regime and opposition actions. The war's character, scale and scope has been greatly impacted by these factors. The brutality of the Assad regime combined with the incompetence and disunity of the opposition led to a violent and intractable civil war. The role of international actors tends to be presented as secondary: they are sucked in once the war has begun, to pursue their own regional or global agendas. As a result, until the various external actors involved either have their goals sufficiently satisfied or cut their losses and leave the stage, the war is likely to continue in some form.

To the hilt: Assad’s allies dig in

This chapter investigates Assad's allies, particularly Iran, and their support for the regime. From the beginning of Syria's civil war, Assad's allies were more willing to ensure the regime's survival than those states that wished to hasten its fall. For the first four years, Iran was by far Assad's most important ally. Major General Qassem Suleimani led a major reorganisation of the regime's forces, brought in Hezbollah and other Shia militias, and directed key aspects of military strategy. Financial and military support prevented the regime from collapsing under pressure, while Iran and Hezbollah's role significantly contributed to sectarianising the conflict. Such deep involvement by Assad's allies greatly impacted the shape of the Syrian civil war.

A legitimate representative? Supporting and subverting Syria’s political opposition

This chapter discusses the anti-Assad states' support for political opposition groups. It outlines the evolution of the Syrian opposition and charts how the main external supporters contributed to its weakness, particularly Saudi Arabia. Underestimating the Assad regime's durability was a costly error by its international opponents, but as damaging was the overestimation of Syria's opposition and its ability to form a united and effective force. In 2011, the traditional opposition to Assad was weak and fragmented, divided along multiple fault lines; including between insiders and exiles, and between Islamists and secularists. However, foreign states' pursuit of their own agendas combined with a frequent lack of ability actually helped to keep the opposition fragmented and ineffective.

International institutions and the slide to war

This chapter looks at the early multilateral efforts to pressure Assad, such as economic sanctions and the peace plans of the Arab League and the United Nations, and the reasons for their failure. It particularly notes the role that Russia played in defending Assad. For a long time, Syria's oppositionists rejected the term ‘civil war’, arguing that what was happening was state oppression of peaceful protesters. However, at some point, Syria's uprising became a civil war. The evolution from uprising to civil war was not neat, with both protests and reciprocal violence occurring at the same time in different parts of Syria. The chapter seeks to answer why the international institutions charged with upholding international order proved unable to prevent it.