Conclusion

I think that we will continue to thrive as a people. And I think that our future is going to be bright. Méningche bizning millet dawamliq güllep yashnaydu. Kelgülsimiz parlaq bolidu dep oylaymen —Ilham, Xinjiang Class Graduate, Hangzhou In February 2015 the inconceivable happened. Tursun, a twenty-three-year-old Uyghur man, was placed into custody at an undisclosed detention center in China after allegedly traveling to Afghanistan to engage in global jihad. He had previously studied in the Xinjiang Class; in fact, he was only one of six students from his school in rural Khotan to be accepted into the program. In a nationally televised interview, the young Uyghur man—shackled in his chair and wearing a prison jumpsuit—spoke fondly of his days in the boarding school. The dorms were spacious, the food was delicious, and the teachers were caring, he recalled. Although he took the college entrance examination twice, his scores were not high enough to attend his university of choice. Disillusioned with China’s education system and the likely impossibility of succeeding in Xinjiang without a university degree, Tursun sought another path. While working as a laborer in Xinjiang, he met a religious man who convinced Tursun to become his pupil, or ...

Introduction

We must make fighting separatism our top priority in a bid to safeguard Xinjiang’s social stability and closely guard against and severely crack down on the ‘three evil forces’. —Nur Bekri, Former Chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People’s Daily, March 6, 2011 Although still boasting the name of an impressive landmark, the International Grand Bazaar in Ürümchi, Xinjiang,...

The Disappointing Road Home

Chapter Four follows Xinjiang Class graduates’ return to Xinjiang. Contrary to the political goals of the program, few of its graduates return to the region with the intention of serving the Party. More often, institutional restraints that cripple mobility in China, unrelenting pressure from family members, and inconveniences adhering to Islamic practices in inner China compel these individuals to return. The return, however, only marks the beginning of a sometimes frustrating process of reintegration. The second part of this chapter describes how these young adults reacclimate to daily life in Xinjiang. Uyghurs Xinjiang Class graduates often feel marginalized upon returning, but re-establish a genuine sense of belonging after a period of readjustment. However, my female informants, who are often expected to conform to rigidly defined gender roles, tend to find this readjustment process more discouraging than men.

Asserting Uyghur Identity from China’s “Central Plains”

The second chapter assesses the effectiveness of the program in meeting its political goals and argues that Uyghur Xinjiang Class graduates embrace an ethno-national identity in contradistinction to a corporate Chinese identity. This identity, expressed through renewed efforts to practice Islam, the insistence on speaking Uyghur, and the reluctance to befriend Han Chinese classmates, persists after the Xinjiang Class. Paradoxically, these assertions of “Uyghurness” would not be possible if these students did not already embrace a state-defined “Chinese” identity.

Incubating Loyalty (or Resistance) in Chinese Boarding Schools

Chapter One introduces the major institutional hallmarks of the Xinjiang Class. It carefully interrogates the CCP’s current objectives for maintaining boarding schools for Uyghur students. It draws on documents drafted by China’s Ministry of Education, Xinjiang’s Education Department, and individual schools hosting a Xinjiang Class as well as individual testimony to paint a vivid picture of the daily life of Xinjiang Class students. The chapter contends that the primary objective of the Xinjiang Class is to create, from scratch, a cohort of Uyghurs who are loyal to the CCP

Ignoring CCP Calls to Return to Xinjiang

Chapter Three reveals the tendency for Xinjiang Class graduates to seek opportunities abroad or in inner China instead of returning to Xinjiang. Considering the pressures China’s Ministry of Education and Xinjiang’s provincial-level government place on these Uyghurs to return to Xinjiang after their formal education, this chapter interprets these students’ decisions to not return as a tacit expression of ethno-national identity, which takes the form of resistance to political culture.