Eleonora Ziemięcka, the First Polish Woman Philosopher: On the Essence and the Role of Philosophical Thinking

Eleonora Ziemięcka (1815-1869) is considered the first Polish woman philosopher. She represented Christian philosophy. She expressed her philosophical views most profoundly in a work Zarysy filozofii katolickiej w czterech poglądach zawarte [Outlines of Catholic Philosophy Included in Four Views]. She also spoke about the education of women, to which she devoted the work Myśli o wychowaniu kobiet [Thoughts on Education of Women]. In the text Myśli o filozofii [Thoughts on Philosophy], published in 1840, she presented her thoughts on the essence and role of philosophy. It is this issue that is discussed in this article.

First Woman Philosopher with a Doctorate: Elena Cornaro Piscopia

The study analyses the circumstances under which Elena Cornaro Piscopia became the first woman in the world to earn a Doctor degree in Philosophy, which she received from the University of Padua in 1678. The author presents the broader context of the outstanding accomplishment. She points out that, although universities did not allow women to enrol to study, Elena Cornaro managed to earn a doctorate thanks to several favourable circumstances. Of these, the author emphasises the tradition of intellectual centres at Renaissance courts in Italy, which were led by educated women-aristocrats; the development of the Venetian Republic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which affected the position of women, particularly those from aristocratic families; the openness of universities, namely the Universities of Padua and Bologna. Special attention is given to the family background, life, and studies of Elena Cornaro. The final part of the paper deals with other women philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Reception of "De Rerum Natura" in the Poetry of Madame Deshoulières

This paper explores Antoinette Du Ligier de la Garde Deshoulières’ philosophical poetry in context. The presentation of Epicureanism in various works, including Imitation de Lucrèce, her maximes, and idylls is analysed, considering both format and content choices and focusing on the ways in which both were used subversively. Her reception of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, as well as her social and political context inform this analysis. The challenges and limitations of producing work from the interstices of several conflicting identities are included to posit her case as an example of why women are under-represented in the history of philosophy.

Mary Astell on the Social Nature of the Cartesian Passions

Scholars have long recognised that Mary Astell builds her feminist critique of society on a foundation of Cartesian views about human nature and the passions. At the same time, the full extent of the influence of Descartes’ view of embodiment on the solution Astell proposes in her Serious Proposal to the Ladies is only beginning to come to light. In this paper, I contribute to this ongoing project by arguing that Astell builds on Descartes’ ideas by addressing a blind spot in his view, namely, that that the embodied self is socially situated, and that therefore, our social context plays a crucial formative role in the development of our passions. In doing so, I show Astell extends Cartesian philosophy beyond an egalitarian feminist critique of society, but also to a positive political theory offering a solution to the problems she identifies. Thusly, Astell shows the political potential of Cartesian philosophy as a framework for social critique and to seek solutions to the problems such a critique can bring out.

Damaris Masham, Ralph Cudworth and John Locke: Some Philosophical Continuities

In this paper, I focus on Damaris Masham, to re-consider the relationship of her philosophy to the two philosophers with whom she was most closely associated: John Locke, and her father, the Cambridge Platonist, Ralph Cudworth. After considering some of the problems of interpretation which have arisen in scholarly debates, I focus her Occasional Thoughts to highlight continuities with both Locke and Cudworth in her epistemology, moral philosophy and metaphysics. I argue these show that Damaris Masham’s philosophy does not fit the received categories of empiricist or rationalist of the dominant narrative. Her position requires us to reconsider not just the relationship of her philosophy to that of Cudworth and Locke, but also of the relationship of Cudworth and Locke. Ultimately, therefore, reintegrating women into the history of philosophy challenges us to rethink standard narratives of the history of philosophy.