Price

2019 ◽  
pp. 170-186
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Probability Theorist ◽  
Rational Egoism

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of the Welsh dissenting minister, theologian, probability theorist, and philosopher, Richard Price (1723–91). Price’s deontological pluralism is described, and his distinction between practical and abstract virtue elucidated. Price’s volitionalism is compared with the views of Adam Smith. The question of whether Price believes partial virtue sufficient for virtue is discussed. Price’s view of supererogation, and his opposition to rational egoism are explained. Price’s identification of the truth about duty with God is elucidated, along with its implications for any conflict between morality and self-interest.

scholarly journals HOW SHOULD WE RECONCILE SELF-REGARDING AND PRO-SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS? A RENAISSANCE OF “DAS ADAM SMITH PROBLEM”

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-102
Author(s):  
Natalie Gold
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Intrinsic Motivations ◽  
Social Motivations ◽  
Motivation Crowding ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
Selfish Agents

Abstract“Das Adam Smith Problem” is the name given by eighteenth-century German scholars to the question of how to reconcile the role of self-interest in the Wealth of Nations with Smith’s advocacy of sympathy in Theory of Moral Sentiments. As the discipline of economics developed, it focused on the interaction of selfish agents, pursuing their private interests. However, behavioral economists have rediscovered the existence and importance of multiple motivations, and a new Das Adam Smith Problem has arisen, of how to accommodate self-regarding and pro-social motivations in a single system. This question is particularly important because of evidence of motivation crowding, where paying people can backfire, with payments achieving the opposite effects of those intended. Psychologists have proposed a mechanism for the crowding out of “intrinsic motivations” for doing a task, when payment is used to incentivize effort. However, they argue that pro-social motivations are different from these intrinsic motivations, implying that crowding out of pro-social motivations requires a different mechanism. In this essay I present an answer to the new Das Adam Smith problem, proposing a mechanism that can underpin the crowding out of both pro-social and intrinsic motivations, whereby motivations are prompted by frames and motivation crowding is underpinned by the crowding out of frames. I explore some of the implications of this mechanism for research and policy.

scholarly journals Corporate Responsibility: In the Dilemma between Fake and Trust?

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 143-147
Author(s):  
Simon Fietze ◽  
Wenzel Matiaske ◽  
Roland Menges
Keyword(s):  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Corporate Responsibility ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Invisible Hand ◽  
Social Orientation ◽  
The Public ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Market Organization ◽  
Corporate Social

The accusation of whitewashing accompanied the discussion about corporate social responsibility (CSR) since its inception the 1950s. That's not surprising. Ever since its beginnings in Scottish moral philosophy, economics did not expect the general good to be enhanced by the individual's social orientation, but rather by its self-interest, a concept less liable to disappointment, and the work of the invisible hand (Hirschman, 1977). The latter aims to promote a common goal that individuals have not intended. Following his famous text, Adam Smith (2007 [1786], p. 350) continues: ‘I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good.’ The ‘mistrust’ of the ‘goodwill’ of the capitalist lives on in various streams such as Marxism, (neo-)liberalism or sociological system theory, to name but a few schools of thought. Marxists do not expect societal progress any more than (neo-)liberals from benevolent capitalists who, demand more taxable profits, instead of social responsibility, in the framework of the market organization of companies. System theorists find that ethical demands are hardly transferable directly into the economy code of payment/non-payment. Although Adam Smith (2007 [1786], p. 350) shared the view that the claim of public good orientation is ‘indeed, not very common among merchants’, but that ‘very few words need to be employed in dissuading them from it.’

scholarly journals What’s the problem, Mr. Smith? Shedding more light (than Heat) on Adam Smith’s view of man *

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Emmanoel de Oliveira Boff
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Economic Thought ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
Theory Of Moral Sentiments

Abstract Why has the “Adam Smith Problem” recently been discussed in the literature? Although most historians of economic thought regard the problem solved, these discussions cast doubt on this apparent solution. This article suggests that the “Adam Smith Problem” may originate from the concept of the human being developed by Smith in the “Theory of Moral Sentiments”: in this book, human beings can be understood as composed of an empirical and a (quasi) transcendental side, in the form of the impartial spectator. It is argued that it is the tension between these two parts which creates supposed inconsistencies between aspects of the “Theory of Moral Sentiments” and the “Wealth of Nations” like, for example, the role of sympathy and self-interest in each of these books.

Adam Smith's Philosophy of Riches

Philosophy ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 44 (168) ◽  
pp. 101-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. G. West
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Religious Faith ◽  
Central Planning ◽  
Invisible Hand ◽  
Central Control ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Divine Origin ◽  
Late Nineteenth

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the name of Adam Smith was popularly associated with the sort of ‘laissez faire’ policy that is expounded with all the fervour of a religious faith. Smith, so the story ran, in his eagerness to combat the excessive mercantilist government intervention of his day, had resorted to supra-natural claims in his general onslaught against central control and planning by governments. Such intervention was ‘unnatural’ and conflicted with Deistic Design. Only through private actions could mankind reach satisfying and ‘natural’ fulfillment. Action through private self-interest was twice blessed; it. blessed him who profited and his fellows who were ‘profited from’. True there was a kind of central planning that was of supreme importance; but it had a divine origin and it worked not through governments but through individual free trade. Private actions in fact were directed by an Invisible Hand which brought society into a grand and spontaneous Natural Harmony.

The Adam Smith Problem: A Reinterpretation

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Lundestad
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Self Interest

As long as the market is said to be based on the motive of self-interest, any argument in favor of expanding the market will have to be seen as an argument in favor of self-interest. Such an argument, however, clearly conflicts with the notion that this motive, when viewed from a practical-political point of view, must be deemed a vice and thus, at best is something to be tolerated. As long as the market is seen as presupposing the motive of self-interest, as the currently dominating interpretation of Adam Smith implies, it therefore appears virtually impossible to see how Smith – or anyone else for that manner – can possibly justify extending the market in practical-political terms.

Bribery, extortion and “morally ambiguous” leadership in organizations

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 1027-1046
Author(s):  
Michel Dion
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Prevention Strategies ◽  
Organizational Life ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Philosophical Basis ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Potential Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine how four styles of “morally ambiguous” leadership could have a philosophical basis, while relatively contributing to efficiently prevent bribery and extortion in the organizational life. Design/methodology/approach The paper identifies four styles of morally ambiguous leadership in taking philosophically based representations of “sociopolitical saviors” into account: “occasionally cruel saviors” (Niccolò Machiavelli); “occasionally compassionate saviors” (Adam Smith),; “socially conformist and compassionate” saviors (David Hume); and “revolutionary and implicitly compassionate” saviors (Hannah Arendt). Morally ambiguous leaders choose paradoxical ways to assume their moral responsibility. They use paradoxical strategies to prevent bribery and extortion in the organizational life. Findings The philosophical basis of those styles of morally ambiguous leadership unveils two basic antagonisms: the antagonism between cruelty and compassion; and the antagonism between social conformism and revolutionary spirit. The axis of power (Machiavelli) does not allow any connection between both antagonisms. The axis of self-interest (Smith) shows an intermediary positioning in both antagonisms (relatively compassionate, implicitly revolutionary). The axis of social conformism/compassion (Hume) and the axis of revolutionary spirit/compassion (Arendt) make leaders deepen their paradoxical positionings about moral issues. Research limitations/implications The four styles of morally ambiguous leadership have not been empirically assessed. Moreover, the analysis of Eastern and Western philosophies could allow decision-makers to identity other philosophically based and morally ambiguous positionings about moral issues. Other philosophies could also unveil further kinds of antagonisms that could be applied to prevention strategies against bribery and extortion schemes. Originality/value The paper presents a philosophically based analysis of morally ambiguous leadership and its potential impact on prevention strategies against bribery and extortion schemes.

Evolution and Moral Motivation in Economics

2019 ◽  
pp. 115-137
Author(s):  
Geoffrey M. Hodgson
Keyword(s):  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Economic Man ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Preference Functions ◽  
Recent Addition ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences ◽  
Descent Of Man

Adam Smith argued that humans were motivated by both self-interest and moral concerns. Economics has since moved towards a contrasting utilitarian view where behavior is understood in terms of unifying preference functions. Also most economists have presumed that these preferences are “self-regarding.” Two major treatises in economics were published in 1871, with self-seeking economic man at their center. In the same year Darwin published The Descent of Man, which emphasized sympathy and cooperation as well as self-interest, and argued that morality has evolved in humans by natural selection. This stance is supported by modern research. This article reconciles Darwin’s view that developed morality requires language and deliberation (and is thus unique to humans), with his other claim that moral feelings have a long-evolved and biologically inherited basis. It also questions whether the recent addition of “other-regarding” preferences is adequate, and whether morality and altruism are reducible to preferences or utility maximization.

The Rhetoric of the Market: Adam Smith on Recognition, Speech, and Exchange

2001 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 549-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Kalyvas ◽  
Ira Katznelson
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Division Of Labour ◽  
Modern Theory ◽  
Modern Analogue ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Social Esteem ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
Institutional Foundations ◽  
Normative Role

We probe the connections linking the market, speech, and sympathy in the work of Adam Smith, stressing how individuals strive for social esteem and ethical credit while competing in markets. We demonstrate how Smith approached speech and rhetoric as constituting attributes of markets, the modern analogue of previous institutional foundations for social order. Thus, markets are not simply, or exclusively, arenas for the instrumental quest by competitive and strategic individuals to secure their material preferences. They are a central mechanism for social integration derived not from strategic self-interest but from the inexorable struggle by human agents for moral approbation. Part One retranslates the master concept ofMoral Sentimentsinto a modern theory of recognition. Part Two considers how Smith, in hisRhetoric, established the mutual constitution of recognition and speech. Part Three carries this understanding to hisJurisprudence, the most integrative of his texts, which relocates these impulses inside the market itself.The pivotal second chapter of Adam Smith'sWealth of Nations, “Of the Principle which gives occasion to the Division of Labour, ” opens with the oft-cited claim that the foundation of modern political economy is the human “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.” This formulation plays both an analytical and normative role. It offers an anthropological microfoundation for Smith's understanding of how modern commercial societies function as social organizations, which, in turn, provide a venue for the expression and operation of these human proclivities.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document