More
This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of the Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1647–87). More’s attempt to combine substantive hedonism about self-interest or well-being (the view that self-interest consists only in pleasures) with the advocacy of virtue is explained. His notion of the ‘boniform faculty’, an intellectual power that enables us to see what is good and to take pleasure in it, is elucidated. Some problems are raised for his account of how to evaluate different kinds of pleasure, based as it is on the Aristotelian idea that the virtuous person is the only competent judge of pleasantness and painfulness.
2012 ◽
Vol 66
(2)
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pp. 311-328
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2003 ◽
Vol 3
(1)
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pp. 42-65
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2008 ◽
Vol 29
(11)
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pp. 1520-1542
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