Competition and physician-induced demand in a healthcare market with regulated price: evidence from Ghana

Using panel data of administrative claims spanning 36 months (2017–2019) and an instrumental variable method, this study examines whether physician-induced demand for hypertension disease care exists in Ghana’s healthcare system where price is regulated, and there is no co-payment. We find that an increase in competition—measured as a high doctor-to-population ratio at the district level—leads to an increase in the number of physician visits, suggesting physician-induced demand exists, and that effects are greater for large hospitals and public health providers. This result is further supported by alternative measures and specifications showing that physicians’ revenue from medication and gross revenue increase as the physician density increases. These pattern suggest that physicians in high density areas, faced with a decrease in number of patients per physician, make up for the decline in income by inducing more patient visits.

Predicting diagnostic coding in hospitals: individual level effects of price incentives

The purpose of this paper is to test if implicit price incentives influence the diagnostic coding of hospital discharges. We estimate if the probability of being coded as a complicated patient was related to a specific price incentive. This paper tests empirically if upcoding can be linked to shifts in patient composition through proxy measures such as age composition, length of stay, readmission rates, mortality- and morbidity of patients. Data about inpatient episodes in Norway in all specialized hospitals in the years 1999–2012 were collected, N = 11 065 330. We examined incentives present in part of the hospital funding system. First, we analyse trends in the proxy measures of diagnostic upcoding: can hospital behavioural changes be seen over time with regards to age composition, readmission rates, length of stay, comorbidity and mortality? Secondly, we examine specific patient groups to see if variations in the price incentive are related to probability of being coded as complicated. In the first years (1999–2003) there was an observed increase in the share of episodes coded as complicated, while the level has become more stable in the years 2004–2012. The analysis showed some indications of upcoding. However, we found no evidence of widespread upcoding fuelled by implicit price incentive, as other issues such as patient characteristics seem to be more important than the price differences. This study adds to previous research by testing individual level predictions. The added value of such analysis is to have better case mix control. We observe the presence of price effects even at individual level.

The sensitivity of hospital coding to prices: evidence from Indonesia

This study examines a newly introduced DRG system in Indonesia. We use secondary data for 2015 and 2017 from Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN), a patient level dataset for Indonesia created in 2014 to record public and private hospitals’ claims to the national health insurance system to investigate whether there is an association between changes in tariffs paid and the severity of inpatient activity recorded in hospitals. We find a consistent small, positive and statistically significant correlation between changes in tariffs and changes in concentration of activity, indicating discretionary but limited coding behaviour by hospitals. The results indicate that reducing price differentials may mitigate discretionary coding, but that the benefits of this are limited and need to be compared to the potential risk of having to rebase all prices upwards.

Impact of implementation of the Dependency Act on the Spanish economy: an analysis after the 2008 financial crisis

The aim of this paper is to assess the industry-wide impact of Long-Term Care (LTC) spending on the Spanish economy. LTC spending includes beneficiaries’ copayment and the impact is quantified in terms of output, employment and value added. To this purpose, we use an input–output model of the Spanish economy that allows us to further describe how the value added generated is distributed throughout the economy according to the existing benefit-mix (in kind services, cash benefit for informal care and cash benefit for personal assistance). Additionally, the model provides results on how the return on LTC spending would improve by using only in-kind services instead of the benefit mix currently in place. The 2012 Spanish Input–Output Table at current prices was extracted from the WIOD Database’s 2016 Release. Consumption data for dependent, employed, and unemployed households were collected from the Spanish Household Budget Survey for 2012. The findings reveal that the total annual costs are 7,205.43 million €, with total costs from in-kind services being almost 71% higher than total costs from cash benefits. Each million euros invested in in-kind services and CBPA would create 41.91 jobs (68.41% direct, 9.16% indirect and 22.43% induced). However, each million euros spent on cash benefits would result in 16.88 jobs overall (53.02% direct, 24.53% indirect and 22.45% induced). The total number of jobs is 151,353 at the aggregate level, being 46,840 depending on cash-benefits and 104,513 on in-kind services.