Loose Ends

The aim of this final chapter is to tie up some of the loose ends in the powers metaphysic. The first part of the chapter discusses what a powers theorist might say about the laws of nature. A hybrid powers-based account of the laws is offered that combines fundamental lawlessness with a best-systems account. Attention then shifts to macroscopic objects. The primary focus of the book has been on the fundamental powers; here the focus turns to the dispositions of middle-sized dry goods and the question of macroscopic persistence. In considering the former, something of a proto-analysis of macroscopic dispositionality is offered. The chapter ends with a discussion of systematic metaphysics.

A Dormitive Virtue?

Chapter 9 considers objections to the account of persistence offered in chapter 8. The bulk of the chapter is taken up with the question of explanatory significance: according to the objection from dormitive virtues, powers cannot properly be said to be explanatory. In response, it is argued that causal explanations must reflect the ontological facts, and therefore that explanations are ontology-relative. Consequently, on the assumption that the correct ontology is one that countenances fundamental causal powers, powers come out as explanatory. Powers-based explanations—in the right contexts—are thus vindicated. Further objections regarding the possibility of random creation and gunk are considered.

Introducing Powers

This chapter provides the first introduction to the powers ontology, starting with what powers are, and just as importantly, what they are not. After a brief outline of how powers and their operation are here understood, a large portion of the chapter is taken up with negative characterizations, in order to distinguish powers from other members of the dispositions family. In particular, they are distinguished from common-or-garden dispositions like fragility, solubility, and flammability. And though powers are similar to these dispositions in many respects, the powers of the powers metaphysic are more fundamental. In many cases, fragility, flammability, and so on will be reduced to, and analysed in terms of, fundamental powers. Lastly, powers are defined in contrast with causally inert categorical properties and Hume worlds.

Revolutionary Metaphysics

This first chapter serves as the introduction to the book, and presents its overarching argumentative structure. In the chapter it is argued that solving metaphysical problems via repeated applications of a fundamental ontology results in a systematic metaphysic, and that we are presently in the grips of a neo-Humean metaphysic. A distinct metaphysic is introduced as an alternative and a competitor, one that is based on an ontology of inherently causal properties known as ‘powers’. Adopting a metaphysic based on powers requires a massive upheaval in one’s metaphysical framework, but promises a variety of pay-offs. The chapter closes with a quick rundown of the ontological assumptions on which the book relies.

Persistence Explained

Chapter 8 offers an account of object persistence in terms of the exercising of causal powers. It is argued that there are a number of problems of persistence, and that the question of how persistence is explained (here called the problem of ‘pluck’) is frequently ignored. A solution to the problem of pluck is offered. The aim is that of providing a powers-based solution in terms of a neutral notion of object-stages that can be applied equally to three- and four-dimensional frameworks, and thus can be adopted by endurantists, perdurantists, and stage-theorists alike. Applications to further problems of persistence are discussed.

Powers-Based Causation

Chapter 6 offers an account of causation in terms of interacting powers. It is argued that powers-based causation takes as its relata large states of affairs whose operative elements are collections of powers. These collections—or constellations as they are called—involve sets of reciprocal powers that mutually produce further states, their manifestations. The model of causation in terms of constellation–manifestation pairs rejects an understating of powers as agent or patient, and relegates talk of triggers or stimuli to mere epistemic devices. It is further argued that powers-based causation makes causation necessary. The chapter closes by considering how powers-based causation handles those aspects of causation typically associated with our folk concept.

The Powers Ontology: Monism and Dualism

Chapter 5 argues for a monistic account of power properties that sees them as at once powerful and qualitative. The chapter is divided into three sections: the first two are negative, arguing against the two main competitor fundamental power ontologies—power monism (pandispositionalism) and dualism, respectively—and the third is positive, describing the version of mixed dualism on offer. In the first section it is argued that power monism fails to generate the sort of quality or character the world requires. This is tied to the many regresses that power monism has been charged with generating. The second section deals with power dualism, and raises a difficulty regarding the ability of non-power properties to be causally relevant without also being causally operative. The third section locates the form of mixed monism on offer among the space of extant mixed monisms.

Causal Oddities

Chapter 7 dives deeper into the examination of powers-based causation, with particular focus on those aspects of causation that are largely ignored by mainstream discussions and folk theories. Thinking about causation in terms of the interactions of powers brings to light the importance of these overlooked features. In particular, the chapter argues that causes can have as effects states that are (type-)identical with those that cause them, that the effects of causation do not have to be changes (and often are not; this concerns static manifestations), and that there is a kind of causation that is restricted to the history of individual particulars (known as ‘immanent causation’). Issues regarding the nature of stimuli are also considered, as well as the possibility of causes that are simultaneous with their effects.

Understanding Powers

Chapter 4 offers further development of the nature of powers, starting with the claim that all powers are intrinsic properties, and thus that none are extrinsic. It is argued that powers must be genuinely powerful, and that this demands they be novel and non-derivative. It is then argued that powers are multi-track; that is, capable of producing numerous, distinct types of manifestation. Lastly, the identity of power properties is discussed. An account in which powers contain an internal blueprint of potential interaction states that fixes their natures is developed out of a metaphysical coordination problem for power properties (fit).

The Neo-Humean Status Quo

Chapter 2 presents the status quo of contemporary systematic metaphysics, detailing the core elements of the dominant neo-Humean metaphysic. The neo-Humean metaphysic is the foil against which the powers metaphysic is developed. Working through the more familiar framework helps readers appreciate metaphysical commitments they might have whilst demonstrating how a metaphysic is developed from a fundamental ontology. Popular neo-Humean accounts of possibility, properties, laws of nature, and causation are presented. The penultimate section of the chapter runs through some of the common objections to those aspects of the neo-Humean metaphysic presented in the previous sections.