Bureaucracy, Propaganda and the Conscription Crisis

This chapter discusses the propaganda organisations established in Ireland during the First World War. Tasked with organising military recruiting in Ireland, these bodies included the Central Council for the Organisation of Recruitment in Ireland (CCORI), the Department of Recruiting in Ireland (DRI), and the Irish Recruiting Council (IRC), which were in existence at various stages across the war, from May 1915 until its termination. It addresses how these bodies were set up, organised, and, ultimately, how successful they were. It places these organisations into the unique Irish context, as propaganda activities operated in the context of Irish Home Rule in 1914-15, during the Easter Rising in 1916, and the Conscription Crisis in 1918. It also places their activities within the wider British context, particularly drawing comparisons with the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee (PRC).

‘Gone for a soldier’: Irish Recruitment to the British Armed Forces, 1903–1914

There was a long tradition of Catholic, as well as Protestant, Irish service within the British armed forces. By 1913, 9% of British regular soldiers were Irish, a figure just slightly below the Irish share of the United Kingdom population. Militia, Yeomanry and Officer Training Corps units, which all attracted part-time amateur soldiers, were also well-recruited, though the wholesale disbandment of militia units in 1908 broke this link between some Irish counties and the British army. This recruitment occurred in spite of determined, if localised and unco-ordinated, attempts made by advanced Nationalists to prevent Irishmen enlisting in the British armed forces. Most recruits were from urban areas and were unskilled workers or unemployed at their time of enlistment. Recruitment rates were disproportionately high in Dublin and Cork, and notably low in industrial Belfast.

For Empire, Ulster or Ireland?

On the outbreak of the First World War the War Office had hoped to organise recruiting on a traditional, non-sectarian pattern. However, in Ulster, it soon became clear that large numbers of recruits would not be obtained unless special arrangements were made with the Ulster Volunteer Force and, to a lesser extent, Irish National Volunteers. As a result, recruiting in Ulster was firmly politicised, with UVF recruiting meetings held province wide in September 1914 and formed INV recruiting occurring in Belfast, Derry and Enniskillen from November 1914. The recruiting rate amongst Belfast Regiments of the UVF was initially very high, making Belfast recruiting figures some of the highest in the United Kingdom in September 1914. However, recruiting rates in rural Ulster were comparable to those in the rest of rural Ireland. The momentum behind this political recruiting started to flag by the Spring of 1915 and from then until mid-1918 there were few examples of properly concerted recruiting activities. The conscription crisis saw Joseph Devlin, MP, who had firmly encouraged Irish National Volunteers to enlist in the British army in 1914-15, condemning British government policy.

‘The only privilege we have’: Wartime Officer Appointment

There was a well-established tradition of the Anglo-Irish gentry serving as officers in the British army and this continued into the war. The British army, pre-war, was very class conscious with officers requiring a private income. The costs associated diminished in wartime but officers were still generally from upper and middle-class backgrounds. As with other recruitment in Ireland, officer recruitment was politicised. Officer Training Corps units pre-war were, almost exclusively, at Protestant schools and universities, which meant that few Catholics presenting themselves for commissions could claim previous military training. The War Office quickly commissioned large numbers of Ulster Volunteer officers, who had enlisted with their men in September 1914. Nationalists felt that they were less favoured by the War Office though the National MPs who sought commissions did not do so before 1915. Lieutenant General Sir Lawrence Parsons established a cadet company in the 16th (Irish) Division but this did not assuage Nationalist concerns. An Officer Selection Board was established in Dublin in the Summer of 1915 and, throughout the remainder of the war, it had some success in attracting Catholic recruits for officer training.

Conclusion

Previous works, notably by David Fitzpatrick, have stressed the concept of a ‘collective sacrifice’ in Ireland during the First World War. However, it is clear that, in Ireland, there was a marked disparity of sacrifice. Disparities are clear between Ulster and the South and West of Ireland, urban and rural Ireland and between Ireland and Great Britain. Much of the recruitment in Ireland was heavily politicised, especially in the opening months of the war, relying on the Irish National Volunteers and Ulster Volunteer Force. While in GB ‘Pals’ units mobilised skilled working class and middle class recruits, remarkably few of these were formed in Ireland. British Dominion Forces contained many of those who could be considered Irish; however, very few, if any, of these men were recruited in Ireland itself. British recruiting propaganda remained amateurish until the Summer of 1918.

Introduction

Overall approximately 152,000 Irishmen and a few thousand Irish women enlisted in the British armed forces during the First World War, joining 58,000 Irish men who were already serving or were army reservists. This was an impressive number but compared poorly with rates in Great Britain. For many years there was a perception that it was only ‘Loyal’ Ulster which provided recruits. However, it is clear, from the important works of Patrick Callan and David Fitzpatrick, that recruitment was nationwide. The support of John Redmond, leader of the Irish Party, was essential in mobilising Catholic, Nationalist support for the British war effort.

A Divided Kingdom: Comparisons of British and Irish Recruiting

This chapter analyses recruiting differences within Ireland and between Britain and Ireland.In recent years, historians have focused on similarities, notably concerning the issue of agricultural recruitment, which was poor across the board. The greater Irish dependence upon agriculture explained much of the gulf between Ireland, Ulster and Britain. Another apparent similarity was the trajectory of enlistment over time, with a 1914 peak followed by substantial decline. Moreover, the geographic, class mould of pre-war recruiting was supposedly broken in both Britain and Ireland. All three arguments are reassessed. Was Ireland transformed, in a sudden, terrible war, into being at one with Britain’s commitment to the war effort, or would the burden of history ensure that her destiny was instead one of disunity?

‘They could only look for a moderate success’: Recruiting in the South and West of Ireland

This chapter is a narrative of wartime recruiting in the South and West, particularly during the war’s first months. While recruiting surged, civic mobilisation of support was ambivalent. The overwhelming majority of Irish opinion was clearly pro-war, but nationalist politicians appeared more intent on consolidating the Irish National Volunteers than recruiting into the army. Conscription, marked by endemic opposition and recurring scares, remained a key issue. In 1914, the fear of being called up rivalled the power of collective sacrifice. The narrative will then address 1915’s campaigns to revive recruiting, the formation of Pals units and efforts to recruit munitions workers. It will assess the impact of the Easter Rising, the moribund state of recruiting in 1916-17 and its revival in 1918, primarily into the RAF.