The myth of binary choice: electoral timing

As a direct result of the state of minority government, both main parties in 1970s Britain, contrary to popular perceptions, conducted extensive planning for an election being called across a range of different dates. This chapter reveals the evolving strategic dialogues through internal papers, including Callaghan ordering the preparation of contingency plans from 1977 onwards, in the event of an unexpected major legislative defeat and forced election. At the same time, it examines the wide-ranging efforts by the Conservatives to anticipate and plan for possible election dates. The chapter also addresses, in depth, the subject of electoral timing, which has generally been confined to brief discussions within overarching political histories or concise references in works on election campaigns.

The myth of weakness: legislative management

This chapter reconsiders the challenges of legislative management and parliamentary defeats faced by the leadership and Whips of both Government and Opposition. It is shown how often-forgotten conflicts in Parliament were fundamental in shaping the 1970s Minority Governments, including a confrontation over the Queen’s Speech in 1974 and the dispute over the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Bill in 1976. Investigation of both parties’ approaches to potential institutional reforms highlight the multifaceted nature of their strategic discourses: the prospect of proxy or electronic voting in the Commons; the use of pre-legislative referenda to pass Devolution Bills; the handling of potential rebels through such means as the judicious use of confidence votes; and the methods employed to deal with defeats inflicted on Labour by the House of Lords. More radical strategies considered include the paradox of Governments deliberately seeking to engineer their own defeat on legislation in Parliament.

The myth of coalition: the Lib–Lab Pact

This chapter reconsiders the Pact between Labour and the Liberals from 1977 to 1978, showing previously hidden agendas. Declassified records that were originally not supposed to be retained provide especially interesting insights into internal debates regarding the Pact, including that of a special Strategy Cabinet at Chequers in the summer of 1977, as well as Callaghan and Steel’s meetings discussing strategy and the challenges of minority government. A particular focus of this chapter is the often overlooked renewal of the Pact after 3 months, showing alternative options considered by Labour, such as a monthly deal with the Liberals or different formal arrangements with other parties. While it has often been assumed that the Opposition were staunchly against coalitions and pacts, the Conservatives’ response to the Pact was more complex, as was their exploration of potential interparty deals.

The birth of myths: alternatives to government formation

This chapter identifies and analyses previously neglected strategic dilemmas confronted at the outset of the formation of Minority Governments by Wilson in 1974 and Callaghan in 1976. Challenging pre-existing myths and assumptions, it shows that their establishment or continuation as Minority Governments were not necessarily inevitable. It is argued that alternative courses of action were considered by policymakers, including the prospects of an early election or a possible Labour coalition with the SDLP in 1976. The Conservative Opposition also played an important role in the formation of these different minority governments, from calls for institutional reform to contemplating a prospective Government of National Unity.

Myths about leaders: personalities and strategy-making

This chapter aims to demonstrate that both Labour and the Conservatives were far more strategically proactive when approaching Minority Government in the 1970s than has been assumed in popular and scholarly accounts. The analysis of the strategy-making processes in both main parties provides new insights by drawing on a combination of recently released papers of bodies including Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet meetings, the No. 10 Policy Unit, the Conservative Research Department (CRD), and correspondence between party leaders and their respective advisers. The examination of the often-overlooked impact of Minority Governments on the formation of strategy ranges from the transformation of established institutions to such innovations as Conservative leader Edward Heath’s ‘Party Strategy Group’, created primarily as a response to the Wilson Minority Government in 1974.

Myths, methods and minorities

This chapter sets out the methodological framework, demonstrating through the study that there is a distinctive British tradition of minority government: parties in a hung parliament usually preferring minority to coalition governance, grounded in majoritarian rule and relying on examples from British history when formulating strategy, but open to pragmatic innovations in order to stay in power. Popular and scholarly myths surrounding the 1970s British Minority Governments show how some of the conclusions of existing historical and political science studies, documentaries, and television news, have helped to form and perpetuate these false assumptions. It is argued that this book’s interface with and challenges to existing international minority government theory provide the basis for a new perspective on British political history and minority governance globally.

Dissolving myths: the day the Government fell

This chapter challenges three myths regarding the Callaghan Government’s defeat in a no confidence vote on 28 March 1979: that the calling of the vote was a forgone conclusion; that the result of this vote was inevitable; and that the Government’s defeat in a no confidence vote was detrimental to its subsequent performance in the 1979 General Election. Internal strategic dialogues show how proactive both sides were, ranging from such examples as extensive discussions in Callaghan’s meeting with Government Whips to Conservative strategy memoranda regarding possible support for building an oil pipeline to secure UUP votes. Analysis of both Labour and Conservative approaches demonstrates how their experience of minority governance over the previous five years was important in conditioning their strategy when approaching the no confidence vote.

Myths and secret plans: future minority governments/coalitions

This chapter reveals Labour’s, and especially the Conservatives’, embryonic secret plans for future minority or coalition governments during the 1970s, devised in response to the possible absence of an overall majority in a general election. Both main parties considered or rejected wide-ranging proposals, from pre-electoral pacts to reforms aimed at facilitating minority or coalition government. Some of the new sources explored include Callaghan’s personal reflections on post-electoral strategy following a meeting with Steel in 1978, and papers from his political advisers, setting out starting points for prospective post-electoral coalition negotiations. Discussion of declassified Opposition research papers shows even more radical possibilities under consideration, whether the prospect of the Conservatives making a coalition deal with the UUP, SNP, or even a Grand Coalition with Labour.

The myth of exclusivity: informal interparty cooperation

This chapter reveals the important day-to-day legislative battles usually neglected in favour of headline-grabbing Bills, documenting Labour’s engagement with other types of informal cooperation during the Lib-Lab Pact of 1977 to 1978, and tracing the Conservatives’ efforts to deal with other parties. At times during the Pact when Liberal cooperation seemed unforthcoming, internal Government debates highlight Labour’s consideration of ad hoc deals with the Ulster Unionists and SNP to pass critical legislation. The Opposition approach to informal interparty cooperation shows less visible facets of their relations with the Liberals, and their efforts to gain support from smaller parties including the UUP.

Rewriting political mythology in 2017

The rereading of Minority Governments in 1970s Britain, through declassified papers and a wide range of publicly available sources, provides an invaluable perspective on subsequent British political history and, in particular, on the Conservative Minority Government formed, with DUP support, in June 2017. This chapter offers lessons from history on the potential challenges and opportunities confronting Theresa May’s Minority Government and the Labour Opposition led by Jeremy Corbyn. This study concludes by highlighting the significant longer-term implications for future political decision-making in Britain and other countries, as well as the potential impact on future scholarship and international minority government theory.