scholarly journals Urban Transport Policies: The Dutch Struggle with Market Failures and Policy Failures

2007 ◽  
pp. 292-305
Author(s):  
Piet Rietveld
1999 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-68
Author(s):  
JØRGEN KARTHUM HANSEN ◽  
STEIN HANSEN

This study addresses the role of multilateral development banks and their effectiveness in bringing environmental considerations, issues and consequences into structural and sectoral adjustment programmes in developing countries. It addresses a series of complex generic issues showing that such programmes cannot be meaningfully studied in isolation from other aid cooperation and government development programmes. The study proposes and discusses alternative explanations on how the multilateral development banks may have influenced thinking in borrowing countries. By looking more closely at the Philippines the study provides an insight into the dynamics and diversity of such programme lending and how its design can affect resource management and the environment in benign or adverse ways. It shows what complementary remedial action can be taken when institutional barriers, policy failures and market failures threaten the environment. It provides an analysis of how awareness of such interlinkages has emerged since 1980 and manifested itself in aid cooperation in general and in economy-wide adjustment lending in particular since 1987, while gradually being absorbed in governmental development plans and programmes with varying degrees of domestic ownership. In particular, we find that there seems to have been shifts in the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank's environmental policies after the publication of the Brundtland Commission Report in 1987.


Author(s):  
Avinash Dixit

‘Market and policy failures’ begins with monopolies and oligopolies. What are the effects of monopoly power? Many actions of consumers or firms have beneficial or harmful side-effects such as pollution. These positive or negative externalities depend on whether a market puts the correct price on that action. For a market to function well, the transaction parties must know what they are buying or selling. But there are information asymmetries. The effects of these can be seen through the lens of externalities, and the market failures resulting from these externalities can be remedied by Coasian or Pigouvian methods. Moral hazards, adverse selection, collective goods, the political economy of policy, and the recent financial crisis are also discussed.


Author(s):  
Dan Biller ◽  
Ernesto Sanchez-Triana

The unique biodiversity of the Sundarbans is threatened by a number of factors, many of which are the direct or indirect result of market failures. Past governmental interventions aiming at protecting biodiversity have been ineffective, while other government efforts have directly or indirectly led to ecosystem degradation. In order to address these challenges, new governmental interventions are needed, particularly those that have the potential to mitigate market failures and address policy failures. This paper discusses how institutional and market failures, particularly the failure to capture the value of biodiversity as a 'public good', are the key drivers of biodiversity loss in the Sundarbans region of India. It argues that policy interventions to address these failures, as well as other measures that foster the development of markets that recognize the economic value of biodiversity, are a crucial tool for conserving and promoting the sustainable use of the Sundarbans' biodiversity. After describing the study area, a novel integrative development model, the potential for sustainable provision of private, public goods, and ecosystem services and the factors threatening them, the paper concludes with four policy suggestions that may assist in enabling biodiversity conservation and sustainable use in the Sundarbans.


2004 ◽  
pp. 94-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Shastitko

Various ways of state participation in the mechanisms of transaction management are considered in the article. Differences between compensation and elimination of the market failures are identified. Opportunities and risks of non-regulatory alternatives usage as a mean of market failure compensation are described. Based on classification of goods correlated to relative cost of their useful characteristics evaluation (search, experience, merit) questions of institutional alternatives in three areas (political, financial and commodity) are examined.


2018 ◽  
pp. 106-126
Author(s):  
O. V. Anchishkina

The paper deals with a special sector of public procurement — G2G, in which state organizations act as both customers and suppliers. The analysis shows the convergence between contractual and administrative relations and risks of transferring the negative factors, responsible for market failures, into the administrative system, as well as the changing nature of the state organization. Budget losses in the sector G2G are revealed and estimated. There are doubts, whether the current practice of substitution of market-based instruments for administrative requirements is able to maintain integrity of public procurement in the situation of growing strategic challenges. Measures are proposed for the adjustment and privatization of contractual relations.


2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.


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