Rent Seeking and Political Economy of Geographical Indication Foods

Agribusiness ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-563 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara Landi ◽  
Gianluca Stefani
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Geographical Indication

The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking

1989 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 1063 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry Evensky ◽  
Charles Rowley ◽  
Robert Tollison ◽  
Gordon Tullock
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The Political

scholarly journals The Case Against Patents

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Boldrin ◽  
David K Levine
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
General Equilibrium ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Policy Change ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Partial Equilibrium ◽  
The Political ◽  
General Equilibrium Effect ◽  
Equilibrium Effect ◽  
Over Time

The case against patents can be summarized briefly: there is no empirical evidence that they serve to increase innovation and productivity, unless productivity is identified with the number of patents awarded—which, as evidence shows, has no correlation with measured productivity. Both theory and evidence suggest that while patents can have a partial equilibrium effect of improving incentives to invent, the general equilibrium effect on innovation can be negative. A properly designed patent system might serve to increase innovation at a certain time and place. Unfortunately, the political economy of government-operated patent systems indicates that such systems are susceptible to pressures that cause the ill effects of patents to grow over time. Our preferred policy solution is to abolish patents entirely and to find other legislative instruments, less open to lobbying and rent seeking, to foster innovation when there is clear evidence that laissez-faire undersupplies it. However, if that policy change seems too large to swallow, we discuss in the conclusion a set of partial reforms that could be implemented

Russia, the Rent-Seeking Revisionist

2020 ◽  
pp. 81-124
Author(s):  
Jonathan N. Markowitz
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Theoretical Prediction ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Force Structure ◽  
Military Presence ◽  
Arctic State ◽  
Ruling Elites ◽  
Military Activity

Chapter 5 focuses on how Russia, the most land-oriented Arctic littoral state, responded to the shock. This chapter analyzes how Russia’s political economy has influenced its foreign policy preferences. Specifically, this chapter illuminates how Russia’s economy and ruling elites came to depend on income from natural resources. This dependence drove Russia’s rulers to have a stronger interest in securing control over resource-rich territory, which, in turn, explains why they dramatically increased their Arctic military presence following the shock. The chapter chronicles Russia’s dual-track policy of simultaneously pursuing its claims through international institutions and gunboat diplomacy. These findings reveal that Russia invested more in increasing its Arctic military activity and force structure than any other Arctic state. This chapter affirms the book’s core theoretical prediction: the more economically dependent states are on natural resources, the stronger their interest in securing control over additional resources.

scholarly journals Welfare without rent seeking? Buchanan’s demogrant proposal and the possibility of a constitutional welfare state

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Otto Lehto ◽  
John Meadowcroft
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Welfare State ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Welfare States ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Basic Income ◽  
Majoritarian Democracy ◽  
Welfare Systems ◽  
Future Task ◽  
Negative Income Tax

AbstractIn a number of works, James M. Buchanan set out a proposal for a ‘demogrant’—a form of universal basic income that applied the principles of generality and non discrimination to the tax and the transfer sides of the scheme and was to be implemented as a constitutional rule outside the realm of day-to-day politics. The demogrant has received surprisingly little scholarly attention, but this article locates it in Buchanan’s broader constitutional political economy project and shows it was a logical application of his theoretical framework to the problem of inefficient and unfair welfare systems when reform to the basic institutions of majoritarian democracy was not forthcoming. The demogrant aims to end the problems of majority cycling and rent seeking that plague contemporary welfare states and therefore offers a model of welfare without rent seeking—a constitutional welfare state. We compare Buchanan’s demogrant model to other universal basic income and negative income tax models and consider the most important criticisms. We conclude that rescuing the demogrant model from relative obscurity would be a fruitful future task of applied constitutional political economy and public choice.

The political economy of pervasive rent-seeking

Thesis Eleven ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-126
Author(s):  
Raphael de Kadt ◽  
Charles Simkins
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The Political

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Choice Models ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Comprehensive Overview ◽  
The Public ◽  
Choice Literature ◽  
Selection Of

The two volume Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the Public Choice literature. Volume 1 covers rational choice models of elections, interest groups, rent seeking, and public choice contributions to normative political economy. It begins with introductory chapters on rational choice politics, the founding of public choice, and the evaluation and selection of constitutions. The chapters were all written for this handbook by scholars who are well known for their contributions to research in the areas discussed.

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