Fuzziness, Democracy, Control and Collective Decision-choice System: A Theory on Political Economy of Rent-Seeking and Profit-Harvesting

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kofi Kissi Dompere
1989 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 1063 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry Evensky ◽  
Charles Rowley ◽  
Robert Tollison ◽  
Gordon Tullock

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Boldrin ◽  
David K Levine

The case against patents can be summarized briefly: there is no empirical evidence that they serve to increase innovation and productivity, unless productivity is identified with the number of patents awarded—which, as evidence shows, has no correlation with measured productivity. Both theory and evidence suggest that while patents can have a partial equilibrium effect of improving incentives to invent, the general equilibrium effect on innovation can be negative. A properly designed patent system might serve to increase innovation at a certain time and place. Unfortunately, the political economy of government-operated patent systems indicates that such systems are susceptible to pressures that cause the ill effects of patents to grow over time. Our preferred policy solution is to abolish patents entirely and to find other legislative instruments, less open to lobbying and rent seeking, to foster innovation when there is clear evidence that laissez-faire undersupplies it. However, if that policy change seems too large to swallow, we discuss in the conclusion a set of partial reforms that could be implemented


Agribusiness ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-563 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara Landi ◽  
Gianluca Stefani

2020 ◽  
pp. 81-124
Author(s):  
Jonathan N. Markowitz

Chapter 5 focuses on how Russia, the most land-oriented Arctic littoral state, responded to the shock. This chapter analyzes how Russia’s political economy has influenced its foreign policy preferences. Specifically, this chapter illuminates how Russia’s economy and ruling elites came to depend on income from natural resources. This dependence drove Russia’s rulers to have a stronger interest in securing control over resource-rich territory, which, in turn, explains why they dramatically increased their Arctic military presence following the shock. The chapter chronicles Russia’s dual-track policy of simultaneously pursuing its claims through international institutions and gunboat diplomacy. These findings reveal that Russia invested more in increasing its Arctic military activity and force structure than any other Arctic state. This chapter affirms the book’s core theoretical prediction: the more economically dependent states are on natural resources, the stronger their interest in securing control over additional resources.


Author(s):  
Otto Lehto ◽  
John Meadowcroft

AbstractIn a number of works, James M. Buchanan set out a proposal for a ‘demogrant’—a form of universal basic income that applied the principles of generality and non discrimination to the tax and the transfer sides of the scheme and was to be implemented as a constitutional rule outside the realm of day-to-day politics. The demogrant has received surprisingly little scholarly attention, but this article locates it in Buchanan’s broader constitutional political economy project and shows it was a logical application of his theoretical framework to the problem of inefficient and unfair welfare systems when reform to the basic institutions of majoritarian democracy was not forthcoming. The demogrant aims to end the problems of majority cycling and rent seeking that plague contemporary welfare states and therefore offers a model of welfare without rent seeking—a constitutional welfare state. We compare Buchanan’s demogrant model to other universal basic income and negative income tax models and consider the most important criticisms. We conclude that rescuing the demogrant model from relative obscurity would be a fruitful future task of applied constitutional political economy and public choice.


2020 ◽  
pp. 030981681990013 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Welsh

Assuming the ‘neoliberalisation’ of academic life to be axiomatic, this article delves into the operations of its political economy with the aim of expanding critical vocabularies, analytical categories and research trajectories. In particular, it indicates where an immanent critique of neoliberal academia can be begun. While the capitalist transformations of academic life are justified by ideological claims eulogising ‘production’, ‘competition’ and ‘marketisation’, the neoliberal regime has proven decidedly ineffective at fulfilling these claims. An effective critique of neoliberal reform must, therefore, explore and interrogate the degree to which the practical effects of neoliberal reform diverge from its underpinning theoretical claims, and why this might be so. The principal question here pertains to rent and rent-seeking behaviour in the academic space, as a mode of activity inconsistent with the legitimating tenets of capitalist ideology. To the extent that rent-seeking activities can be identified in neoliberal academia – in distinction to ‘value-producing’ labour or ‘profit-making’ entrepreneurialism – a more potent critique of neoliberal reform will be forthcoming and an immanent critique of the neoliberal regime of capitalist accumulation in the academic space put into motion. By positioning the neoliberal regime within a broader shift towards accumulation by ‘appropriation’ in the world-system, a strategic reason can be identified for the proliferation of rent-seeking behaviours in academic life and beyond. The article argues that these rent-seeking behaviours have materialised in a range of gatekeeping techniques across the academic space, with which many inhabitants of that space have become complicit, resulting in the increasing dispossession of surplus through the practice of tolling realised in those techniques. The article develops a Marxian critique with additional insights from world-system theory, critical social theory and critical geography. Examples of gatekeeping technique considered throughout the article include master degree programmes, journal publication structures, conference fees and Graduate Record Examinations.


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