scholarly journals Cervical cancer incidence in the United States in the US-Mexico border region, 1998-2003

Cancer ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 113 (S10) ◽  
pp. 2964-2973 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven S. Coughlin ◽  
Thomas B. Richards ◽  
Kiumarss Nasseri ◽  
Nancy S. Weiss ◽  
Charles L. Wiggins ◽  
...  
Author(s):  
Donna M. Kabalen de Bichara

Hundreds of 19th-century newspapers and magazines published in the region of the US–Mexico border are housed in archival collections in Mexico and the United States, and they provide access to historical, cultural, and ideological perspectives involving two world spheres that are intimately connected. Archival collections in the following databases provide access to periodicals published in the United States as well as in Mexico: the Newspaper and Periodicals Collection at the National Autonomous University of Mexico; the Readex Collection of Hispanic American Newspapers, 1808–1980; the Nettie Lee Benson Library’s microfilmed collection of 19th-century independent newspapers; the digital collection of periodicals and magazines from the Capilla Alfonsina Biblioteca Universitaria and the Biblioteca Universitaria Raúl Rangel Frias, at the Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León; and the EBSCO Arte Público Hispanic Historical Collections, Series 1 and 2. These collections house digitized and microfilmed newspapers that include those published in the US states of California, Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas, as well as Mexican states such as Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas. The region includes areas that share not only a physical border but also a cultural memory based on the effects of historical collisions that have contributed to the formation of new meanings regarding these world spheres that can be understood as two intersecting semiotic systems that exist as a continuum. The intersection of these spaces represents the transnational aspect of periodical print culture of the late 19th century that communicates worldviews that are semiotically and ideologically heterogeneous. Indeed, cultural spaces that exist in the borderland (or that symbolic space that forms a border or frontier in a cultural sense), are semiotic realities that unfold in unpredictable and indeterminate ways as a result of historical processes. Periodical print culture produced in the border region provides access to diverse social, cultural, political, and religious perspectives. Furthermore, the history of print culture involves a process of communication of both social and cultural history. As objects of study, borderland newspapers ultimately provide the basis for understanding the circulation of ideas.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (S1) ◽  
pp. s47-s48
Author(s):  
Sana Khan ◽  
Katherine Ellingson ◽  
Gemma Parra ◽  
Juan Villanueva ◽  
Carlos Garrido

Background: The US–Mexico border represents a unique region of the country where antibiotics are more accessible and nonprescription treatment with antibiotics is deeply enculturated. Currently, both the United States and Mexico are experiencing widespread community transmission of SARS-CoV-2, which may have implications for antibiotic seeking and use. The objective of this study was to examine antibiotic seeking behavior as it relates to COVID-19 in the border region relative to the greater US and Mexico populations. Methods: An interdisciplinary team at The University of Arizona developed a survey to assess knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs about antibiotics along the US–Mexico border region (defined as 100 km from the border) and to compare findings from the border region to the broader US and Mexico populations. The team recruited survey participants through Amazon’s MTurk survey platform and through the distribution of recruitment flyers to community partners in Arizona and Mexico border regions from October 2020 to January 2021. Targeted recruitment was 750 through March 2021. We report here on findings from the first round of recruitment (n = 116). These participants were asked whether they had sought out antibiotics specifically as a treatment for COVID-19, as well as their general beliefs and behaviors on self-seeking antibiotics for illness. Results: As of January 24, 2021, we surveyed 116 participants: 82 (70.7%) from the United States and 34 (29.3%) from Mexico. Most participants (71.2%) were aged 25–44 years; 56.9% were male; and 50% reported Hispanic ethnicity. Of these, 13.8% lived within 100 km of the US–Mexico border. Overall, 21.6% of participants reported taking antibiotics to fight COVID-19–like illness. Of these participants, 28% obtained the antibiotics directly from a pharmacy, without a physician prescription, and 16% obtained them from an online vendor. Additionally, 33% of US respondents reported that they would be willing to travel to Mexico to obtain antibiotics if they were too difficult to obtain in the United States. Of these respondents, 55% said they would be willing to travel for >1 hour to obtain antibiotics. Conclusions: Preliminary data suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic will have widespread ramifications on antibiotic seeking behavior and could propagate antibiotic resistance. Targeted intervention strategies in the border region are necessary to mitigate the unique factors that contribute to antibiotic use in this area.Funding: NoDisclosures: None


2019 ◽  
Vol 147 (3) ◽  
pp. 887-896
Author(s):  
Rebecca Landy ◽  
Peter D. Sasieni ◽  
Christopher Mathews ◽  
Charles L. Wiggins ◽  
Michael Robertson ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Robert Warren ◽  
Donald Kerwin

The Trump administration has made the construction of an “impregnable” 2,000-mile wall across the length of the US-Mexico border a centerpiece of its executive orders on immigration and its broader immigration enforcement strategy. This initiative has been broadly criticized based on: Escalating cost projections: an internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) study recently set the cost at $21.6 billion over three and a half years; Its necessity given the many other enforcement tools — video surveillance, drones, ground sensors, and radar technologies — and Border Patrol personnel, that cover the US-Mexico border: former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and other experts have argued that a wall does not add enforcement value except in heavy crossing areas near towns, highways, or other “vanishing points” (Kerwin 2016); Its cost-effectiveness given diminished Border Patrol apprehensions (to roughly one-fourth the level of historic highs) and reduced illegal entries (to roughly one-tenth the 2005 level according to an internal DHS study) (Martinez 2016); Its efficacy as an enforcement tool: between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the current 654-mile pedestrian wall was breached 9,287 times (GAO 2017, 22); Its inability to meet the administration’s goal of securing “operational control” of the border, defined as “the prevention of all unlawful entries to the United States” (White House 2017); Its deleterious impact on bi-national border communities, the environment, and property rights (Heyman 2013); and Opportunity costs in the form of foregone investments in addressing the conditions that drive large-scale migration, as well as in more effective national security and immigration enforcement strategies. The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) has reported on the dramatic decline in the US undocumented population between 2008 and 2014 (Warren 2016). In addition, a growing percentage of border crossers in recent years have originated in the Northern Triangle states of Central America (CBP 2016). These migrants are fleeing pervasive violence, persecution, and poverty, and a large number do not seek to evade arrest, but present themselves to border officials and request political asylum. Many are de facto refugees, not illegal border crossers. This report speaks to another reason to question the necessity and value of a 2,000-mile wall: It does not reflect the reality of how the large majority of persons now become undocumented. It finds that two-thirds of those who arrived in 2014 did not illegally cross a border, but were admitted (after screening) on non-immigrant (temporary) visas, and then overstayed their period of admission or otherwise violated the terms of their visas. Moreover, this trend in increasing percentages of visa overstays will likely continue into the foreseeable future. The report presents information about the mode of arrival of the undocumented population that resided in the United States in 2014. To simplify the presentation, it divides the 2014 population into two groups: overstays and entries without inspection (EWIs). The term overstay, as used in this paper, refers to undocumented residents who entered the United States with valid temporary visas and subsequently established residence without authorization. The term EWI refers to undocumented residents who entered without proper immigration documents across the southern border. The estimates are based primarily on detailed estimates of the undocumented population in 2014 compiled by CMS and estimates of overstays for 2015 derived by DHS. Major findings include the following: In 2014, about 4.5 million US residents, or 42 percent of the total undocumented population, were overstays. Overstays accounted for about two-thirds (66 percent) of those who arrived (i.e., joined the undocumented population) in 2014. Overstays have exceeded EWIs every year since 2007, and 600,000 more overstays than EWIs have arrived since 2007. Mexico is the leading country for both overstays and EWIs; about one- third of undocumented arrivals from Mexico in 2014 were overstays. California has the largest number of overstays (890,000), followed by New York (520,000), Texas (475,000), and Florida (435,000). Two states had 47 percent of the 6.4 million EWIs in 2014: California (1.7 million) and Texas (1.3 million). The percentage of overstays varies widely by state: more than two-thirds of the undocumented who live in Hawaii, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania are overstays. By contrast, the undocumented population in Kansas, Arkansas, and New Mexico consists of fewer than 25 percent overstays.  


2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (S2) ◽  
pp. 298-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dyanne G. Herrera ◽  
Emily L. Schiefelbein ◽  
Ruben Smith ◽  
Rosalba Rojas ◽  
Gita G. Mirchandani ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Nicholas Salas

As of 2014, Texas has the 6th highest incidence rate and the 5th highest mortality rate of cervical cancer in the nation. In addition, Texas ranks 3rd to last in the United States in human papilloma (HPV) vaccinations, which helps prevent one of the leading causes of cervical cancer. Cervical cancer incidence rates in Texas remain high, despite it becoming one the most successfully preventable treatable cancers in the United States due to a combination of screenings and HPV vaccinations. Furthermore, spatial distribution of cervical cancer is unknown among Texas counties. This study will follow the political ecology model to elaborate on the political, historical, social, and economic factors that may explain why HPV vaccinations are low and the incidence rate remains high despite the interventions available to people in Texas. This study will examine the geography of cervical cancer in Texas counties from 1995 - 2015 as well as its relationship with religious adherence, socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity, and uninsured rates. I will use a bivariate correlation to relate these factors with cancer incidence rates and ArcMap to create maps to illustrate the spatial distribution of these diseases. The data will be obtained from the Texas Cancer Registry, Texas County Health Rankings 2018, and the Association of Religion Data (CDC) Archives (ARDA). I expect that cervical cancer rates will decline after the introduction of the HPV vaccine in 2007, but areas with higher religious adherence will have higher rates of cervical cancer. In addition, I expect that uninsured rates, race/ethnicity, and socioeconomic factors could possibly impact cervical cancer incidence rates.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-40
Author(s):  
James Gerber

English abstract: US cities and towns on the border with Mexico tend to have below-average incomes, while Mexican border cities and towns tend to be above the average of Mexico. Social scientists have not explained these differences from national averages in a convincing way. Nor have they described the characteristics of border cities and towns in ways that differentiate them from cities and towns in the interiors of their respective nation. The key to both puzzles is the fact that the institutional environment in the US–Mexico border region is binational in origin. Mexican institutions create externalities in the United States and vice versa. Recognition of this fact is a first step in dealing with the international public goods and common pool resources of the border region.Spanish abstract: Ciudades y pueblos a ambos lados de la frontera México–EE. UU. comparten características que las hacen diferentes de las comunidades en el interior de sus respectivas naciones. Por ejemplo, las diferencias de ingresos transfronterizos son más pequeñas que las diferencias nacionales y cada lado está fuertemente influenciado por políticas y eventos que se originan en el otro lado. Hay tres razones principales para estos efectos: proximidad, redes y externalidades. Este ensayo utiliza la perspectiva de economía institucional para argumentar que el ambiente institucional de las ciudades y pueblos fronterizos es binacional. El reconocimiento de este hecho es un primer paso en la gestión de los bienes públicos internacionales y los recursos comunes de la región fronteriza.French abstract: Villes et villages des deux côtés de la frontière américano-mexicaine partagent des caractéristiques qui les différencient des communautés à l’intérieur de leurs nations respectives. Par exemple, les écarts de revenu de part et d’autre de la frontière sont plus réduits que les différences nationales, et chaque côté est fortement influencé par les politiques et les événements qui proviennent de l’autre côté. Trois raisons principales expliquent ces effets : la proximité, les réseaux et les externalités. Cet essai utilise la perspective de l’économie institutionnelle et soutient que l’environnement institutionnel des villes frontalières est binational. Cette reconnaissance est une première étape pour la gestion des biens publics internationaux et des ressources communes de la région frontalière.


2012 ◽  
Vol 127 (3) ◽  
pp. 611-615 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edgar P. Simard ◽  
Deepa Naishadham ◽  
Debbie Saslow ◽  
Ahmedin Jemal

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Warren ◽  
Donald Kerwin

The Trump administration has made the construction of an “impregnable” 2,000-mile wall across the length of the US-Mexico border a centerpiece of its executive orders on immigration and its broader immigration enforcement strategy. This initiative has been broadly criticized based on: • Escalating cost projections: an internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) study recently set the cost at $21.6 billion over three and a half years; • Its necessity given the many other enforcement tools — video surveillance, drones, ground sensors, and radar technologies — and Border Patrol personnel, that cover the US-Mexico border: former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and other experts have argued that a wall does not add enforcement value except in heavy crossing areas near towns, highways, or other “vanishing points” (Kerwin 2016); • Its cost-effectiveness given diminished Border Patrol apprehensions (to roughly one-fourth the level of historic highs) and reduced illegal entries (to roughly one-tenth the 2005 level according to an internal DHS study) (Martinez 2016); • Its efficacy as an enforcement tool: between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the current 654-mile pedestrian wall was breached 9,287 times (GAO 2017, 22); • Its inability to meet the administration's goal of securing “operational control” of the border, defined as “the prevention of all unlawful entries to the United States” (White House 2017); • Its deleterious impact on bi-national border communities, the environment, and property rights (Heyman 2013); and • Opportunity costs in the form of foregone investments in addressing the conditions that drive large-scale migration, as well as in more effective national security and immigration enforcement strategies. The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) has reported on the dramatic decline in the US undocumented population between 2008 and 2014 (Warren 2016). In addition, a growing percentage of border crossers in recent years have originated in the Northern Triangle states of Central America (CBP 2016). These migrants are fleeing pervasive violence, persecution, and poverty, and a large number do not seek to evade arrest, but present themselves to border officials and request political asylum. Many are de facto refugees, not illegal border crossers. This report speaks to another reason to question the necessity and value of a 2,000-mile wall: It does not reflect the reality of how the large majority of persons now become undocumented. It finds that two-thirds of those who arrived in 2014 did not illegally cross a border, but were admitted (after screening) on non-immigrant (temporary) visas, and then overstayed their period of admission or otherwise violated the terms of their visas. Moreover, this trend in increasing percentages of visa overstays will likely continue into the foreseeable future. The report presents information about the mode of arrival of the undocumented population that resided in the United States in 2014. To simplify the presentation, it divides the 2014 population into two groups: overstays and entries without inspection (EWIs). The term overstay, as used in this paper, refers to undocumented residents who entered the United States with valid temporary visas and subsequently established residence without authorization. The term EWI refers to undocumented residents who entered without proper immigration documents across the southern border. The estimates are based primarily on detailed estimates of the undocumented population in 2014 compiled by CMS and estimates of overstays for 2015 derived by DHS. Major findings include the following: • In 2014, about 4.5 million US residents, or 42 percent of the total undocumented population, were overstays. • Overstays accounted for about two-thirds (66 percent) of those who arrived (i.e., joined the undocumented population) in 2014. • Overstays have exceeded EWIs every year since 2007, and 600,000 more overstays than EWIs have arrived since 2007. • Mexico is the leading country for both overstays and EWIs; about one-third of undocumented arrivals from Mexico in 2014 were overstays. • California has the largest number of overstays (890,000), followed by New York (520,000), Texas (475,000), and Florida (435,000). • Two states had 47 percent of the 6.4 million EWIs in 2014: California (1.7 million) and Texas (1.3 million). • The percentage of overstays varies widely by state: more than two-thirds of the undocumented who live in Hawaii, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania are overstays. By contrast, the undocumented population in Kansas, Arkansas, and New Mexico consists of fewer than 25 percent overstays.


2021 ◽  
pp. 003802612110488
Author(s):  
Miguel A. Avalos

Research on the US–Mexico border has been overwhelmingly framed in spatial terms focusing primarily on the movements of immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. This current framing and focus obfuscate the United States-Mexico border regime’s temporal dimensions and its impact on communities outside its purported purview. Through autoethnography and my own experiences as a transborder commuter, I develop and propose the concept of temporal sequestration to better understand a pernicious form of border violence that is often omitted in presentist accounts of waiting. Furthermore, I argue that waiting is best understood as a multidimensional practice, one that is relational, learned, and suffused with affect.


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