scholarly journals The effect of outcome severity on moral judgment and interpersonal goals of perpetrators, victims, and bystanders

Author(s):  
Lisa Katharina Frisch ◽  
Markus Kneer ◽  
Joachim Israel Krueger ◽  
Johannes Ullrich
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Frisch ◽  
Markus Kneer ◽  
Joachim Israel Krueger ◽  
Johannes Ullrich

When two actors have exactly the same mental states but one happens to harm another person (unlucky actor) and the other one does not (lucky actor), the latter elicits milder moral judgment among bystanders. We hypothesized that the social role from which transgressions are perceived would moderate this outcome effect. In three preregistered experiments (N = 950), we randomly assigned participants to imagine and respond to moral scenarios as actor (i.e., perpetrator), victim, or bystander. Results revealed highly similar outcome effects on moral judgment across social roles. However, as predicted, the social role moderated the strength of the outcome effect on interpersonal goals pertaining to agency and communion. Although in agreement about the blameworthiness of lucky and unlucky actors, victims’ agency and communion were more sensitive to the outcome severity than perpetrators’ agency and communion, with bystanders’ outcome sensitivity falling in between. Outcome severity affected agency and communion directly instead of being mediated by moral judgment. We discuss the possibility that outcome severity raises normative expectations regarding interaction in a transgression’s aftermath that are unrelated to moral considerations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (8) ◽  
pp. 1151-1160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Rottman ◽  
Liane Young

Levels of moral condemnation often vary with outcome severity (e.g., extreme destruction is morally worse than moderate damage), but this is not always true. We investigated whether judgments of purity transgressions are more or less sensitive to variation in dosage than judgments of harm transgressions. In three studies, adults ( N = 426) made moral evaluations of harm and purity transgressions that systematically varied in dosage (frequency or magnitude). Pairs of low-dosage and high-dosage transgressions were presented such that the same sets of modifiers (e.g., “occasionally” vs. “regularly,” “small” vs. “large”) or amounts (e.g., “millimeter” vs. “centimeter”) were reused across moral domains. Statistical interactions between domain and dosage indicated robust distinctions between the perceived wrongness of high-dosage and low-dosage harms, whereas moral evaluations of impure acts were considerably less influenced by dosage. Our findings support the existence of a cognitive distinction between purity-based and harm-based morals and challenge current wisdom regarding relationships between intentions and outcomes in moral judgment.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Flora Schwartz ◽  
Hakim Djeriouat ◽  
Bastien Trémolière

When judging a perpetrator who harmed someone accidentally, humans rely on distinct cognitive processes: one that focuses on the victim’s harm and condemns the perpetrator, and another one that examines the perpetrator’s intention and exculpates the perpetrator. The present study investigates how individuals (as third-parties) solve the cognitive tension generated by the judgment of accidental harm by simultaneously manipulating harm severity, the perpetrator’s intention, and by determining the effect of reasoning style. In two pre-registered experiments, participants recruited online completed a moral judgment task consisting of short narratives which depicted the interaction between a perpetrator and a victim in a daily life context. We assessed how participants perceived the perpetrator’s behavior as wrong, blameworthy, and punishment-deserving. In experiment 1 (N = 224), we manipulated the perpetrator’s intent to harm (accidental vs. intentional harm) and the severity of outcome for the victim (mild vs. severe harm). In experiment 2 (N = 210), we used accidental harm scenarios in which we manipulated the perpetrator’s intention towards the victim (positive vs. neutral) and outcome severity (mild vs. severe harm). We additionally assessed participants’ reasoning style in both experiments and explored its role in modulating moral judgment. As expected, participants’ judgment of wrongness and punishment were harsher following severe harm relative to mild harm (experiments 1 and 2), and following intentional as compared to accidental harm (experiment 1). Moreover, participants were more lenient with the perpetrator of accidental harm whose intention towards the victim was positive (experiment 2). Importantly, in both experiments, the perpetrator’s intent not only interacted with outcome severity but also polarized moral judgments in participants with a more deliberative reasoning style, especially following mild harm. These findings extend previous studies by showing that harm severity modulates moral judgment and interacts with intent and reasoning style to shape moral judgment of accidents.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlie Kurth

Abstract Recent work by emotion researchers indicates that emotions have a multilevel structure. Sophisticated sentimentalists should take note of this work – for it better enables them to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition. Contra May's rationalist criticisms, emotions are not only able to carry morally relevant information, but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Han Gong ◽  
Douglas L. Medin ◽  
Tal Eyal ◽  
Nira Liberman ◽  
Yaacov Trope ◽  
...  

In the hope to resolve the two sets of opposing results concerning the effects of psychological distance and construal levels on moral judgment, Žeželj and Jokić (2014) conducted a series of four direct replications, which yielded divergent patterns of results. In our commentary, we first revisit the consistent findings that lower-level construals induced by How/Why manipulation lead to harsher moral condemnation than higher-level construals. We then speculate on the puzzling patterns of results regarding the role of temporal distance in shaping moral judgment. And we conclude by discussing the complexity of morality and propose that it may be important to incorporate cultural systems into the study of moral cognition.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 223-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris L. Žeželj ◽  
Biljana R. Jokić

Eyal, Liberman, and Trope (2008) established that people judged moral transgressions more harshly and virtuous acts more positively when the acts were psychologically distant than close. In a series of conceptual and direct replications, Gong and Medin (2012) came to the opposite conclusion. Attempting to resolve these inconsistencies, we conducted four high-powered replication studies in which we varied temporal distance (Studies 1 and 3), social distance (Study 2) or construal level (Study 4), and registered their impact on moral judgment. We found no systematic effect of temporal distance, the effect of social distance consistent with Eyal et al., and the reversed effect of direct construal level manipulation, consistent with Gong and Medin. Possible explanations for the incompatible results are discussed.


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