Specks of Dirt and Tons of Pain: Dosage Distinguishes Impurity From Harm

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (8) ◽  
pp. 1151-1160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Rottman ◽  
Liane Young
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Outcome Severity ◽  
Statistical Interactions ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
Moral Condemnation ◽  
Dosage Frequency ◽  
Low Dosage

Levels of moral condemnation often vary with outcome severity (e.g., extreme destruction is morally worse than moderate damage), but this is not always true. We investigated whether judgments of purity transgressions are more or less sensitive to variation in dosage than judgments of harm transgressions. In three studies, adults ( N = 426) made moral evaluations of harm and purity transgressions that systematically varied in dosage (frequency or magnitude). Pairs of low-dosage and high-dosage transgressions were presented such that the same sets of modifiers (e.g., “occasionally” vs. “regularly,” “small” vs. “large”) or amounts (e.g., “millimeter” vs. “centimeter”) were reused across moral domains. Statistical interactions between domain and dosage indicated robust distinctions between the perceived wrongness of high-dosage and low-dosage harms, whereas moral evaluations of impure acts were considerably less influenced by dosage. Our findings support the existence of a cognitive distinction between purity-based and harm-based morals and challenge current wisdom regarding relationships between intentions and outcomes in moral judgment.

Commentaries and Rejoinder on

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Han Gong ◽  
Douglas L. Medin ◽  
Tal Eyal ◽  
Nira Liberman ◽  
Yaacov Trope ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Psychological Distance ◽  
Temporal Distance ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Cultural Systems ◽  
Moral Condemnation ◽  
Construal Levels

In the hope to resolve the two sets of opposing results concerning the effects of psychological distance and construal levels on moral judgment, Žeželj and Jokić (2014) conducted a series of four direct replications, which yielded divergent patterns of results. In our commentary, we first revisit the consistent findings that lower-level construals induced by How/Why manipulation lead to harsher moral condemnation than higher-level construals. We then speculate on the puzzling patterns of results regarding the role of temporal distance in shaping moral judgment. And we conclude by discussing the complexity of morality and propose that it may be important to incorporate cultural systems into the study of moral cognition.

scholarly journals Disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with purity-based moral judgments

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fieke Maria Antoinet Wagemans ◽  
Mark John Brandt ◽  
Marcel Zeelenberg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Personality Characteristics ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Moral Foundations Theory ◽  
Disgust Sensitivity ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Total N ◽  
Moral Domain ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
Moral Condemnation

Individual differences in disgust sensitivity are associated with a range of judgments and attitudes related to the moral domain. Some perspectives suggest that the association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments will be equally strong across all moral domains (purity, authority, loyalty, care, fairness, and liberty). Other perspectives predict that disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with judgments of specific moral domains (e.g., primarily purity). However, no study has systematically tested if disgust sensitivity is associated with moral judgments of the purity domain specifically, more generally to moral judgments of the binding moral domains, or to moral judgments of all of the moral domains equally. Across five studies (total N = 1104), we find consistent evidence for the notion that disgust sensitivity relates more strongly to moral condemnation of purity-based transgression (meta-analytic r = .40) than to moral condemnation of transgressions of any of the other domains (range meta-analytic r’s: .07 ̶ .27). Our findings are in line with predictions from Moral Foundations Theory, which predicts that personality characteristics like disgust sensitivity make people more sensitive to a certain set of moral issues.

On Disease and Deontology: Multiple Tests of the Influence of Disease Threat on Moral Vigilance

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damian R. Murray ◽  
Nicholas Kerry ◽  
Will M. Gervais
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Disease Transmission ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Multiple Tests ◽  
Moral Domains

Threat has been linked to certain facets of moral cognition, but the specific implications of disease threat for moral judgment remain poorly understood. Across three studies, we investigated the role of perceived disease threat in shaping moral judgment and hypothesized that perceived disease threat would cause people to be more sensitive to moral violations (or more “morally vigilant”). All three studies found a positive relationship between dispositional worry about disease transmission and moral vigilance. Additional analyses suggested that this worry was more strongly related to vigilance toward binding moral foundations. Study 3 demonstrated that moral vigilance was higher in individuals for whom the threat of disease was experimentally made salient, relative to individuals in both a neutral and a nondisease threat condition. Taken together, these results suggest that perceived disease threat may influence people’s moral vigilance across moral domains.

scholarly journals Elevated moral condemnation of third-party violations in multiple sclerosis patients

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indrajeet Patil ◽  
Liane Young ◽  
Vladimiro Sinay ◽  
Ezequiel Gleichgerrcht
Keyword(s):  
Multiple Sclerosis ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Moral Condemnation ◽  
Severe Punishment ◽  
Multiple Sclerosis Patients ◽  
Judg Ments

Recent research has demonstrated impairments in social cognition associated with multiple sclerosis (MS). The present work asks whether these impairments are associated with atypical moral judgment. Specifically, we assessed whether MS patients are able to integrate information about intentions and outcomes for moral judgment (i.e., appropriateness and punishment judg- ments) in the case of third-party acts. We found a complex pattern of moral judgments in MS patients: although their moral judgments were comparable to controls’ for specific types of acts (e.g., accidental or intentional harms), they nevertheless judged behaviors to be less appropriate and endorsed more severe punishment across the board, and they were also more likely to report that others’ responses would be congruent with theirs. Further analyses suggested that elevated levels of externally oriented cognition in MS (due to co-occurring alexithymia) explain these effects. Additionally, we found that the distinction between appropriateness and punishment judgments, whereby harmful outcomes influence punishment judgments to a greater extent than appropriateness judgments, was preserved in MS despite the observed disruptions in the affective and motivational components of empathy. The current results inform the two-process model for intent-based moral judgments as well as possible strategies for improving the quality of life in MS patients.

scholarly journals Do You Feel the Same? The Effect of Outcome Severity on Moral Judgment and Interpersonal Goals of Perpetrators, Victims, and Bystanders

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Frisch ◽  
Markus Kneer ◽  
Joachim Israel Krueger ◽  
Johannes Ullrich
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Social Roles ◽  
Social Role ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Outcome Severity ◽  
The Social ◽  
Agency And Communion ◽  
Normative Expectations ◽  
Interpersonal Goals

When two actors have exactly the same mental states but one happens to harm another person (unlucky actor) and the other one does not (lucky actor), the latter elicits milder moral judgment among bystanders. We hypothesized that the social role from which transgressions are perceived would moderate this outcome effect. In three preregistered experiments (N = 950), we randomly assigned participants to imagine and respond to moral scenarios as actor (i.e., perpetrator), victim, or bystander. Results revealed highly similar outcome effects on moral judgment across social roles. However, as predicted, the social role moderated the strength of the outcome effect on interpersonal goals pertaining to agency and communion. Although in agreement about the blameworthiness of lucky and unlucky actors, victims’ agency and communion were more sensitive to the outcome severity than perpetrators’ agency and communion, with bystanders’ outcome sensitivity falling in between. Outcome severity affected agency and communion directly instead of being mediated by moral judgment. We discuss the possibility that outcome severity raises normative expectations regarding interaction in a transgression’s aftermath that are unrelated to moral considerations.

scholarly journals Reevaluating Moral Disgust: Sensitivity to Many Affective States Predicts Extremity in Many Evaluative Judgments

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin F. Landy ◽  
Jared Piazza
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Emotional States ◽  
Affective States ◽  
Disgust Sensitivity ◽  
Psychological Construct ◽  
Evaluative Judgments ◽  
Moral Disgust ◽  
Moral Condemnation ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
General Association

Disgust-sensitive individuals are particularly morally critical. Some theorists take this as evidence that disgust has a uniquely moral form: disgust contributes to moralization even of pathogen-free violations, and disgust’s contribution to moralization is unique from other emotional states. We argue that the relationship between disgust sensitivity (DS) and moral judgment is not special in two respects. First, trait sensitivity to many other affective states, beyond disgust, predicts moral evaluations. Second, DS also predicts nonnormative evaluative judgments. Four studies supported these hypotheses, using multiple measures of DS, and judgments of moral violations (Studies 1 and 4), conventional violations (Study 1), imprudent actions (Study 1), competence (Study 2), and aesthetic evaluations (Study 3). Our findings call into question the usefulness of “moral disgust” as a psychological construct by showing that the relationship between DS and moral condemnation is one instantiation of a more general association between affect and judgment.

Moral Judgments of COVID-19 Social Distancing Violations: The Roles of Perceived Harm and Impurity

2021 ◽  
pp. 014616722110254
Author(s):  
Daniel L. Rosenfeld ◽  
A. Janet Tomiyama
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Total N ◽  
Social Distancing ◽  
Competing Hypotheses ◽  
Moral Condemnation ◽  
Perceived Harm

Can perceptions of impurity uniquely explain moral judgment? Or is moral judgment reducible to perceptions of harm? Whereas some perspectives posit that purity violations may drive moral judgment distinctly from harm violations, other perspectives contend that perceived harm is an essential precursor of moral condemnation. We tested these competing hypotheses through five preregistered experiments (total N = 2,944) investigating U.S. adults’ perceptions of social distancing violations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Perceived harm was more strongly related to moral judgment than was perceived impurity. Nevertheless, over and above perceived harm, perceived impurity reliably explained unique variance in moral judgment. Effects of perceived harm and impurity were significant among both liberal and conservative participants but were larger among liberals. Results suggest that appraisals of both harm and impurity provide valuable insights into moral cognition. We discuss implications of these findings for dyadic morality, moral foundations, act versus character judgments, and political ideology.

scholarly journals Judging accidental harm: The interplay between harm severity and intention towards the victim

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Flora Schwartz ◽  
Hakim Djeriouat ◽  
Bastien Trémolière
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Daily Life ◽  
Judgment Task ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Outcome Severity ◽  
Life Context ◽  
Reasoning Style ◽  
Deliberative Reasoning

When judging a perpetrator who harmed someone accidentally, humans rely on distinct cognitive processes: one that focuses on the victim’s harm and condemns the perpetrator, and another one that examines the perpetrator’s intention and exculpates the perpetrator. The present study investigates how individuals (as third-parties) solve the cognitive tension generated by the judgment of accidental harm by simultaneously manipulating harm severity, the perpetrator’s intention, and by determining the effect of reasoning style. In two pre-registered experiments, participants recruited online completed a moral judgment task consisting of short narratives which depicted the interaction between a perpetrator and a victim in a daily life context. We assessed how participants perceived the perpetrator’s behavior as wrong, blameworthy, and punishment-deserving. In experiment 1 (N = 224), we manipulated the perpetrator’s intent to harm (accidental vs. intentional harm) and the severity of outcome for the victim (mild vs. severe harm). In experiment 2 (N = 210), we used accidental harm scenarios in which we manipulated the perpetrator’s intention towards the victim (positive vs. neutral) and outcome severity (mild vs. severe harm). We additionally assessed participants’ reasoning style in both experiments and explored its role in modulating moral judgment. As expected, participants’ judgment of wrongness and punishment were harsher following severe harm relative to mild harm (experiments 1 and 2), and following intentional as compared to accidental harm (experiment 1). Moreover, participants were more lenient with the perpetrator of accidental harm whose intention towards the victim was positive (experiment 2). Importantly, in both experiments, the perpetrator’s intent not only interacted with outcome severity but also polarized moral judgments in participants with a more deliberative reasoning style, especially following mild harm. These findings extend previous studies by showing that harm severity modulates moral judgment and interacts with intent and reasoning style to shape moral judgment of accidents.

Disgust and Deontology: Trait Sensitivity to Contamination Promotes a Preference for Order, Hierarchy, and Rule-Based Moral Judgment

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Robinson ◽  
Xiaowen Xu ◽  
Jason E. Plaks
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Individual Difference ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Disgust Sensitivity ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Right Wing Authoritarianism ◽  
Individual Difference Variables ◽  
Specific Emotion ◽  
Moral Condemnation

Models of moral judgment have linked generalized emotionality with deontological moral judgment. The evidence, however, is mixed. Other research has linked the specific emotion of disgust with generalized moral condemnation. Here too, the evidence is mixed. We suggest that a synthesis of these two literatures points to one specific emotion (disgust) that reliably predicts one specific type of moral judgment (deontological). In all three studies, we found that trait disgust sensitivity predicted more extreme deontological judgment. In Study 3, with deontological endorsement and consequentialist endorsement operationalized as independent constructs, we found that disgust was positively associated with deontological endorsement but was unrelated to consequentialist endorsement. Across studies, the disgust–deontology link was mediated by individual difference variables related to preference for order (right-wing authoritarianism and intolerance for ambiguity). These data suggest a more precise model of emotion and moral judgment that identifies specific emotions, specific types of moral judgment, and specific motivational pathways.

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