What sentimentalists should say about emotion

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlie Kurth
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Multilevel Structure

Abstract Recent work by emotion researchers indicates that emotions have a multilevel structure. Sophisticated sentimentalists should take note of this work – for it better enables them to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition. Contra May's rationalist criticisms, emotions are not only able to carry morally relevant information, but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning.

Commentaries and Rejoinder on

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Han Gong ◽  
Douglas L. Medin ◽  
Tal Eyal ◽  
Nira Liberman ◽  
Yaacov Trope ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Psychological Distance ◽  
Temporal Distance ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Cultural Systems ◽  
Moral Condemnation ◽  
Construal Levels

In the hope to resolve the two sets of opposing results concerning the effects of psychological distance and construal levels on moral judgment, Žeželj and Jokić (2014) conducted a series of four direct replications, which yielded divergent patterns of results. In our commentary, we first revisit the consistent findings that lower-level construals induced by How/Why manipulation lead to harsher moral condemnation than higher-level construals. We then speculate on the puzzling patterns of results regarding the role of temporal distance in shaping moral judgment. And we conclude by discussing the complexity of morality and propose that it may be important to incorporate cultural systems into the study of moral cognition.

Actions Speak Louder than Outcomes in Judgments of Prosocial Behavior

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Yudkin ◽  
Annayah Miranda Beatrice Prosser ◽  
Molly Crockett
Keyword(s):  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Action Value ◽  
Good Deeds

Recently proposed models of moral cognition suggest that people’s judgments of harmful acts are influenced by their consideration both of those acts’ consequences (“outcome value”), and of the feeling associated with their enactment (“action value”). Here we apply this framework to judgments of prosocial behavior, suggesting that people’s judgments of the praiseworthiness of good deeds are determined both by the benefit those deeds confer to others and by how good they would feel to perform. Three experiments confirm this prediction. After developing a new measure to assess the extent to which praiseworthiness is influenced by action and outcome values, we show how these factors make significant and independent contributions to praiseworthiness. We also find that people are consistently more sensitive to action than to outcome value in judging the praiseworthiness of good deeds, but not harmful deeds. This observation echoes the finding that people are often insensitive to outcomes in their giving behavior. Overall, this research tests and validates a novel framework for understanding moral judgment, with implications for the motivations that underlie human altruism.

The Limits of Emotion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Frontotemporal Dementia ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Emotional Processing ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Integral Role ◽  
The Brain

Empirical research apparently suggests that emotions play an integral role in moral judgment. The evidence for sentimentalism is diverse, but it is rather weak and has generally been overblown. There is no evidence that our moral concepts themselves are partly composed of or necessarily dependent on emotions. While the moral/conventional distinction may partly characterize the essence of moral judgment, moral norms needn’t be backed by affect in order to transcend convention. Priming people with incidental emotions like disgust doesn’t make them moralize actions. Finally, moral judgment can only be somewhat impaired by damage to areas of the brain that are generally associated with emotional processing (as in acquired sociopathy and frontotemporal dementia). While psychopaths exhibit both emotional and rational deficits, the latter alone can explain any minor defects in moral cognition.

Proximal and Distal Intent: Toward a New Folk Theory of Intentional Action

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 242-254
Author(s):  
Jason E. Plaks ◽  
Jeffrey S. Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Folk Theory

Inferences regarding actors’ intentions play an important role in social and moral cognition. Numerous studies have operationalized intentionality in a binary fashion (i.e., an act is either “intentional” or “unintentional”). The authors suggest, however, that when determining the degree to which an act was intentional, lay observers consider two independent dimensions: proximal intent (the actor's focus on the means) and distal intent (the actor's focus on the end). They describe how the proximal intent/distal intent (PIDI) approach allows researchers to understand observers’ intent-related judgments with greater precision. The authors review studies highlighting a range of variables that lead perceivers to prioritize either proximal intent or distal intent in their social and moral judgment. They describe how previous findings in the literature may be reinterpreted in light of the PIDI framework. Finally, they suggest ways in which the PIDI framework implies novel directions for future research on moral cognition.

scholarly journals The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Compelling Evidence ◽  
Ample Evidence ◽  
Cognitive Components

This chapter argues that our best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions are not integral to moral judgment. There is ample evidence that ordinary moral cognition often involves conscious and unconscious reasoning about an action’s outcomes and the agent’s role in bringing them about. Emotions can aid in moral reasoning by, for example, drawing one’s attention to such information. However, there is no compelling evidence for the decidedly sentimentalist claim that mere feelings are causally necessary or sufficient for making a moral judgment or for treating norms as distinctively moral. The chapter concludes that, even if moral cognition is largely driven by automatic intuitions, these should not be mistaken for emotions or their non-cognitive components. Non-cognitive elements in our psychology may be required for normal moral development and motivation but not necessarily for mature moral judgment.

Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Evolutionary Mechanisms ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Fertile Ground ◽  
In Virtue Of

The burgeoning science of ethics has produced a trend toward pessimism. Ordinary moral judgment and motivation, we’re told, are profoundly influenced by arbitrary factors and ultimately driven by unreasoned feelings or emotions—fertile ground for sweeping debunking arguments. This book counters the current orthodoxy on its own terms by carefully engaging with the empirical literature. The resulting view, optimistic rationalism, maintains that reason plays a pervasive role in our moral minds and that ordinary moral reasoning is not particularly flawed or in need of serious repair. The science does suggest that moral knowledge and virtue don’t come easily, as we are susceptible to some unsavory influences that lead to rationalizing bad behavior. Reason can be corrupted in ethics just as in other domains, but the science warrants cautious optimism, not a special skepticism about morality in particular. Rationality in ethics is possible not just despite, but in virtue of, the psychological and evolutionary mechanisms that shape moral cognition.

Episodic Inputs to Moral Cognition: The Role of Memory and Imagination in Shaping the Moral Mind

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan Gaesser ◽  
Zoe Fowler
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Medial Temporal Lobe ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Semantic Knowledge ◽  
Judgment And Decision Making ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Affective Processes

Research in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy has proposed a multifaceted view of human cognition and morality, establishing that inputs from multiple cognitive and affective processes such as theory of mind, semantic knowledge, and language guide moral judgment and decision-making. However, the extant perspective of moral cognition has largely overlooked a critical role for episodic representation. The ability to remember or imagine a specific moment in the past or future, supported by the medial temporal lobe subsystem, plays a broadly influential role in how people think, feel, and behave. Yet existing research has only just begun to explore the influence of episodic representation on moral judgment and decision-making. Here, we evaluate the theoretical connections between episodic representation and moral judgment, review emerging empirical work revealing how episodic representation affects moral judgment and decision-making, and conclude by highlighting gaps in the literature and future directions to explore. We argue that a comprehensive model of moral cognition will require including contributions of the episodic memory system, further delineating its direct influence on morality as well as better understanding how this system engages and interacts with other mental processes to fundamentally shape human morality.

Normative Moral Neuroscience: The Third Tradition of Neuroethics

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY S. HOLTZMAN
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Ethical Implications ◽  
The Third

AbstractNeuroethics is typically conceived of as consisting of two traditions: the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of moral judgment. However, recent work has sought to draw philosophical and ethical implications from the neuroscience of moral judgment. Such work, which concernsnormative moral neuroscience(NMN), is sufficiently distinct and complex to deserve recognition as a third tradition of neuroethics. Recognizing it as such can reduce confusion among researchers, eliminating conflations among both critics and proponents of NMN.This article identifies and unpacks some of the most prominent goals, characteristic assumptions, and unique arguments in NMN and addresses some of the strongest objections NMN faces. The paper synthesizes these considerations into a set of heuristics, or loose discovery principles, that can help overcome obstacles in and attenuate resistance to NMN. These heuristics may simultaneously help identify those projects in NMN that are most likely to be fruitful and help fortify them.

scholarly journals Moral Judgment: An Overlooked Deficient Domain in Multiple Sclerosis?

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (11) ◽  
pp. 105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samar Ayache ◽  
Moussa Chalah
Keyword(s):  
Multiple Sclerosis ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Interpersonal Relationships ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Clinical Population ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Information Processing Speed ◽  
Cognitive Measures ◽  
The Central Nervous System

Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a chronic inflammatory and neurodegenerative disease of the central nervous system through which patients can suffer from sensory, motor, cerebellar, emotional, and cognitive symptoms. Although cognitive and behavioral dysfunctions are frequently encountered in MS patients, they have previously received little attention. Among the most frequently impaired cognitive domains are attention, information processing speed, and working memory, which have been extensively addressed in this population. However, less emphasis has been placed on other domains like moral judgment. The latter is a complex cognitive sphere that implies the individuals’ ability to judge others’ actions and relies on numerous affective and cognitive processes. Moral cognition is crucial for healthy and adequate interpersonal relationships, and its alteration might have drastic impacts on patients’ quality of life. This work aims to analyze the studies that have addressed moral cognition in MS. Only three works have previously addressed moral judgement in this clinical population compared to healthy controls, and none included neuroimaging or physiological measures. Although scarce, the available data suggest a complex pattern of moral judgments that deviate from normal response. This finding was accompanied by socio-emotional and cognitive deficits. Only preliminary data are available on moral cognition in MS, and its neurobiological foundations are still needing to be explored. Future studies would benefit from combining moral cognitive measures with comprehensive neuropsychological batteries and neuroimaging/neurophysiological modalities (e.g., functional magnetic resonance imaging, tractography, evoked potentials, electroencephalography) aiming to decipher the neural underpinning of moral judgement deficits and subsequently conceive potential interventions in MS patients.

Does It Matter How One Assesses Moral Reasoning? Differences (Biases) in the Recognition Versus Formulation Tasks

2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (7) ◽  
pp. 1440-1464
Author(s):  
James Weber
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Ethical Dilemmas ◽  
Business Students ◽  
Learning Task ◽  
Defining Issues Test ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Theoretical Foundations ◽  
Different Levels

Most business ethics scholars interested in understanding individual moral cognition or reasoning rely on the Defining Issues Test (DIT). They typically report that managers and business students exhibit a relatively high percentage of principled moral reasoning when resolving ethical dilemmas. This article applies neurocognitive processes and Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, and its more recent revision, as theoretical foundations to explore whether differences emerge when using a recognition of learning task, such as the DIT or similar instruments, versus a formulation of knowledge task, such as the Moral Judgment Interview or similar instruments, to assess individual moral reasoning. The data show that significantly different levels of moral reasoning are detected when using a recognition-based versus formulation-based moral reasoning instrument. As expected, the recognition-based approach (using a DIT-like instrument) reports an inflated, higher moral reasoning score for subjects compared with using a formulation-based instrument. Implications of these results for understanding an individual’s moral reasoning are discussed.

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