scholarly journals Health care purchasing in Kenya: Experiences of health care providers with capitation and fee‐for‐service provider payment mechanisms

Author(s):  
Melvin Obadha ◽  
Jane Chuma ◽  
Jacob Kazungu ◽  
Edwine Barasa
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Kalmus ◽  
Martin Chalkley ◽  
Stefan Listl

Abstract Background: In many market settings individuals are encouraged to switch health care providers as a means of ensuring more competition. Switching may have a potentially undesirable side effect of increasing unnecessary treatment. Focusing on the most common source of medical radiation (dental X-rays), the purpose of this study was to assess whether, upon switching dentist, X-ray exposure increases depending on the type of provider payment. Methods: The analysis used longitudinal data from 2005 to 2016 covering a 5% random sample of the Scottish adult population covered by the National Health Service (NHS). Multiple fixed-effects panel regression analyses were employed to determine the correlation of provider remuneration with patients' likelihood of receiving an X-ray upon switching to a new dentist other things equal. A broad set of covariates including a patient’s copayment status was controlled for. Results: Upon switching to a dentist who was paid fee-for-service, patients had a by 9.6 %-points (95% CI: 7.4%-11.8%) higher probability of receiving an X-ray, compared to switching to a salaried dentist. Results were robust when accounting for patient exemption status, as well as unobserved patient and dentist characteristics. Conclusions: In comparison to staying with the same dentist, patients may be exposed to substantially more X-rays upon switching to a dentist who is paid fee-for-service. There may need to be better guidance and regulation to protect the health of those who have to switch provider due to moving and greater caution in advocating voluntary switching.


1996 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Littlejohns ◽  
Carol Dumelow ◽  
Sian Griffiths

Objectives: To help develop a means, based on the views of purchasers and providers of health care, of incorporating national research on clinical effectiveness into local professional advisory mechanisms in order to inform health care purchasing and contracting. Methods: Three geographically based multidisciplinary workshops attended by National Health Service (NHS) staff drawn from the principal purchaser and provider groups in one English region were organized around the discussion of three health care purchasing case studies: Coronary artery disease, diabetes and management of clinical depression in general practice. The proceedings were transcribed and analyzed using content analysis methods. Results: 95 people took part. There were major differences between the purchasers' and health care providers' views on the right balance between local and national information and advisory sources for purchasing. In general, providers wanted the provision of advice to purchasers to be local, in which their opinion was sought, either individually or collectively, acted on and the results fed back to them. In contrast, health authority purchasers considered that local professionals were only one source of professional advice, albeit an important one, to be utilized in coming to decisions. General practitioner fundholders as purchasers, however, preferred to rely on their own experiences and contacts with local providers in making purchasing decisions. Conclusions: Professional specialist advisory groups are necessary to inform the purchasing of health care, but should extend beyond advising on the placement of individual contracts. Involving health care providers in all short-term contracting is unlikely to be cost-effective given the time commitment required. The emphasis at purchaser/provider meetings should be on education: Providing an opportunity for purchasers and providers to develop closer relationships to discuss political imperatives and financial constraints; increasing communication and understanding of providers' and purchasers' roles; and providing an environment for professionals and purchasers to share their views on purchasing. As currently presented, elements of the national policies in the NHS advocating the use of both national evidence on clinical effectiveness and local professional advice are contradictory and should be clarified.


2018 ◽  
Vol 103 (3) ◽  
pp. 809-812 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boris Draznin ◽  
Peter A Kahn ◽  
Nicole Wagner ◽  
Irl B Hirsch ◽  
Mary Korytkowski ◽  
...  

Abstract Although diabetes research centers are well defined by National Institutes of Health, there is no clear definition for clinical Diabetes Centers of Excellence (DCOEs). There are multiple clinical diabetes centers across the United States, some established with philanthropic funding; however, it is not clear what defines a DCOE from a clinical perspective and what the future will be for these centers. In this Perspective we propose a framework to guide advancement for DCOEs. With the shift toward value-based purchasing and reimbursement and away from fee for service, defining the procedures for broader implementation of DCOEs as a way to improve population health and patient care experience (including quality and satisfaction) and reduce health care costs becomes critically important. It is prudent to implement new financial systems for compensating diabetes care that may not be provided by fiscally constrained private and academic medical centers. We envision that future clinical DCOEs would be composed of a well-defined infrastructure and six domains or pillars serving as the general guiding principles for developing expertise in diabetes care that can be readily demonstrated to stakeholders, including health care providers, patients, payers, and government agencies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 2238
Author(s):  
Katherine Pham

The increasing prevalence of complex, chronic conditions has profound implications on the growing demand and cost of health care. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation is testing data-driven approaches to care delivery and payment that are drawn from innovative practices of health care providers and other partners in the health care community. The shift from fee-for-service to value-based care and performance-based payment places increased priority on improved outcomes at lower costs. To advance comprehensive medication management, pharmacists need to understand the opportunities in the evolving value-based payment models and align medication optimization with the specific goals and incentives of these models.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Schwarz ◽  
Prajwol Nepal ◽  
Bibhav Acharya ◽  
Shiva Raj Adhikari ◽  
Anu Aryal ◽  
...  

Abstract Background: Strategic purchasing mechanisms, including national health insurance, provide opportunities to improve quality and progress towards universal health coverage. Nepal’s health insurance program (HIP), begun in 2016, is a national insurance platform aiming to improve financial risk protection, and efficiency, quality, and access to health services. HIP also further engages private-sector providers through strategic purchasing, potentially improving quality, regulation, and accountability. Bayalpata Hospital is a public-private partnership (PPP) hospital run jointly by the Ministry of Health and Population and Nyaya Health Nepal and is one of the first PPP hospitals enrolled in HIP. We evaluated Bayalpata Hospital costs and HIP guidelines to understand how HIP rates compare to health delivery costs incurred.Methods: We employed a top-down costing methodology to analyze costs for fiscal year 2017-2018. We compared costs to HIP reimbursement rates during the same period, and projected overall coverage for costs assuming full HIP enrollment given the compulsory nature of HIP.Results: Our data suggest HIP, as one payment mechanism in Nepal’s mixed provider payment system, would cover 57% of hospital costs with full enrollment, with variation across services. Among inpatient services, 64% of costs would be covered, including 105% reimbursement for fee-for-service, 87% reimbursement for bundled packages, but only 23% - 40% for certain surgical services. For outpatient services, 59% would be covered, and for emergency services, 32% would be covered. Conclusions: HIP is an important strategic purchasing foundation; however, payments may be insufficient to match provider costs and cover a larger percentage of inpatient-based and fee-for-service delivery than outpatient services. These dynamics may inappropriately incentivize fee-for-service health care utilization, in particular for private-sector providers without access to other public-sector payment mechanisms, while potentially disincentivizing outpatient or community-based approaches to health care, which are less well reimbursed through HIP. HIP policy revisions, and further expansion of mixed provider payment mechanisms, may more effectively incentivize primary health care approaches, while also deepening private-sector engagement. The data and experience of Bayalpata Hospital and HIP offer practical insights for Nepali policymakers and those in similar settings globally employing strategic purchasing to improve progress towards UHC and quality health delivery.


Author(s):  
Jon B. Christianson ◽  
Douglas Conrad

The design of incentives and the evaluation of their impact are examined in the research literature at many different levels. This article provides a background and a conceptual framework relating to the effects of payment incentives on the behavior of health care providers. It then summarizes the empirical literature on the effect of financial incentives in health care. The article offers a conceptual model of the provider's choice of the quantity and quality of output as a means of organizing our thinking about the effects of specific provider payment incentives. This article addresses the effect of general provider payment incentives on the amount and type of care provided; the evidence that general payment incentives have indirectly affected quality of care; and the impact of payment incentive programs that attempt specifically to reward providers for improving quality of care, or for achieving specific benchmark levels of quality.


Author(s):  
Olivier Kalmus ◽  
Martin Chalkley ◽  
Stefan Listl

Abstract Background In many market settings individuals are encouraged to switch health care providers as a means of ensuring more competition. Switching may have a potentially undesirable side effect of increasing unnecessary treatment. Focusing on the most common source of medical radiation (dental X-rays), the purpose of this study was to assess whether, upon switching dentist, X-ray exposure increases depending on the type of provider payment. Methods The analysis used longitudinal data from 2005 to 2016 covering a 5% random sample of the Scottish adult population covered by the National Health Service (NHS). Multiple fixed-effects panel regression analyses were employed to determine the correlation of provider remuneration with patients’ likelihood of receiving an X-ray upon switching to a new dentist other things equal. A broad set of covariates including a patient’s copayment status was controlled for. Results Upon switching to a dentist who was paid fee-for-service, patients had a by 9.6%-points (95% CI 7.4–11.8%) higher probability of receiving an X-ray, compared to switching to a salaried dentist. Results were robust when accounting for patient exemption status, as well as unobserved patient and dentist characteristics. Conclusions In comparison to staying with the same dentist, patients may be exposed to substantially more X-rays upon switching to a dentist who is paid fee-for-service. There may need to be better guidance and regulation to protect the health of those who have to switch provider due to moving and greater caution in advocating voluntary switching.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-203
Author(s):  
Kendra Carlson

The Supreme Court of California held, in Delaney v. Baker, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610 (1999), that the heightened remedies available under the Elder Abuse Act (Act), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15657,15657.2 (West 1998), apply to health care providers who engage in reckless neglect of an elder adult. The court interpreted two sections of the Act: (1) section 15657, which provides for enhanced remedies for reckless neglect; and (2) section 15657.2, which limits recovery for actions based on “professional negligence.” The court held that reckless neglect is distinct from professional negligence and therefore the restrictions on remedies against health care providers for professional negligence are inapplicable.Kay Delaney sued Meadowood, a skilled nursing facility (SNF), after a resident, her mother, died. Evidence at trial indicated that Rose Wallien, the decedent, was left lying in her own urine and feces for extended periods of time and had stage I11 and IV pressure sores on her ankles, feet, and buttocks at the time of her death.


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