Supporting strategic health purchasing: a case study of annual health budgets from general tax revenue and social health insurance in Abia state, Nigeria

Background Tracking general trends in strategic purchasing of health financing mechanisms will highlight where country demands may exist for technical support and where progress in being made that offer opportunities for regional learning. Health services in Abia State, Nigeria are funded from general tax-revenues (GTR), and a new state social health insurance scheme (SSHIS) is proposed to overcome the failings of the GTR and expand coverage of services. This study examined purchasing functions within the GTR and the proposed SSHIS to determine if the failings in GTR have been overcome, identify factors that shape health purchasing at sub-national levels, and provide lessons for other states in Nigeria pursuing a similar intervention. Methods Data was collected through document review and key informant interviews. Government documents were retrieved electronically from the websites of different organizations. Hard copies of paper-only files were retrieved from relevant government agencies and departments. Interviews were conducted with seven key personnel of the State Ministry of Health and State Health Insurance Agency. Thematic analysis of data was based on a strategic health purchasing progress tracking framework which delves into the governance arrangements and information architecture needed for purchasing to work well; and the core purchasing decisions of what to buy; who to buy from; and how to buy. Results There are differences in the purchasing arrangements of the two schemes. Purchaser-provider split does not exist for the GTR, unlike in the proposed SSHIS. There are no data systems for monitoring provider performance in the GTR-funded system, unlike in the SSHIS. Whereas GTR is based on a historical budgeting system, the SSHIS proposes to use a defined benefit package, which ensures value-for-money, as the basis for resource allocation. The GTR lacks private sector engagement, provider accreditation and contracting arrangements while the SSHIS will accredit and engage private providers through selective contracting. Likewise, provider payment is not linked to performance or adherence to established standards in the GTR, whereas provider payment will be linked to performance in the SSHIS. Conclusions The State Social Health Insurance has been designed to overcome many of the limitations of the budgetary allocation to health. This study provides insights into the enabling and constraining factors that can be used to develop interventions intended to strengthen the strategic health purchasing in the study area, and lessons for the other Nigeria states with similar characteristics and approaches.

How States Supported Older Adults and Persons With Disabilities During COVID-19 Through the Medicaid Program

COVID-19 has presented challenges for older adults who receive Medicaid home and community-based services. The federal government has allowed states to seek approval for certain flexibilities to better serve this population, including increasing provider payment rates, allowing family members to be caregivers, and permitting case management entities to provide direct services. This study uses cross-sectional data to identify factors associated with states’ adopting these Medicaid flexibilities using multivariate methods. The results indicate that the factors associated with state adoption varied depending on the flexibility. The findings suggest that states increased provider payment rates in response to prevalence of COVID-19 within their state. As cases increase, states may come under pressure to increase provider rates further which may not be feasible because of budget constraints. The results also suggest that demand for and supply of services may be a factor in whether states allowed family members to be paid caregivers. States with a higher proportion of individuals aged 85 years and older were more likely to permit caregivers to be paid which may suggest that these states may not have enough providers to care for the population. Lastly, the results suggest that provider supply was associated with whether a state allowed case management entities to provide direct care services. States with fewer home health agencies were more likely to allow this flexibility. Based on these results, states may be pursuing available Medicaid flexibilities to address provider and workforce shortages which existed prior to COVID-19 but have been exacerbated by the pandemic.

Timely Communication Through Telehealth: Added Value for a Caregiver During COVID-19

Objective: This caregiver case study applies the lens of relational coordination theory (RC) to examine the value of telehealth as a medium of care coordination for a pediatric patient with hypermobile Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome (hEDS) during the COVID-19 pandemic.Background: The COVID-19 pandemic has placed an unprecedented burden on the delivery of healthcare around the globe and has increased the reliance on telehealth services. Delivering telehealth requires a high level of communication and coordination within and across providers as well as between providers, patients and their families. However, it is less clear how telehealth impacts the coordination of care. In this paper, we provide insight into the quality of care coordination between providers and an informal caregiver following policy changes to the provider payment structure in Massachusetts.Methods: This paper employs a single-case, autoethnographic study design where one of the authors uses their experiential insights, as mother of the patient, to inform a wider cultural and political understanding of the shift to remote caregiving for a pediatric patient with hEDS. Data was collected using reflective journaling, interactive interviews, and participant observation and analyzed using content analysis.Results: Findings revealed four interrelating roles of the caregiver including, logistics support, boundary spanner, home health aide, and cultural translator. The adoption of telehealth was associated with improved timeliness and frequency of communication between the caregiver and providers. Findings about the impact of telehealth adoption on accuracy of communication were mixed. Mutual respect between the caregiver and providers remained unchanged during the study period.Conclusions: This paper highlights areas where payer policy may be modified to incentivize timely communication and improve coordination of care through telehealth services. Additional insight from the perspective of an informal caregiver of a patient with a rare chronic disease provides an understudied vantage to the care coordination process. We contribute to relational coordination theory by observing the ways that caregivers function as boundary spanners, and how this process was facilitated by the adoption of telehealth. Insights from this research will inform the development of telehealth workflows to engage caregivers in a way that adds value and strengthens relational coordination in the management of chronic disease.

Determinants and perception of health insurance participation among healthcare providers in Nigeria: A mixed-methods study

Background To accelerate universal health coverage, Nigeria’s National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) decentralized the implementation of government health insurance to the individual states in 2014. Lagos is one of the states that passed a State Health Insurance Scheme into law, in order to expand the benefits of health insurance beyond the few residents enrolled in community-based health insurance programs, commercial private health insurance plans or the NHIS. Public and private healthcare providers are a critical component of the Lagos State Health Scheme (LSHS) rollout. This study explored the determinants and perception of provider participation in health insurance programs including the LSHS. Methods This study used a mixed-methods cross sectional design. Quantitative data were collected from 60 healthcare facilities representatively sampled from 6 Local Government Areas in Lagos state. For the qualitative data, providers were interviewed using structured questionnaires on selected characteristics of each health facility in addition to the managers’ opinions about the challenges and benefits of insurance participation, capacity pressure, resource availability and financial management consequences. Results A higher proportion of provider facilities participating in insurance relative to non-participating facilities were larger with mid to (very) high patient volume, workforce, and longer years of operation. In addition, a greater proportion of private facilities compared to public facilities participated in insurance. Furthermore, a higher proportion of secondary and tertiary facilities relative to primary facilities participated in insurance. Lastly, increase in patient volume and revenue were motivating factors for provider facilities to participate in insurance, while low tariffs, delay and denial of payments, and patients’ unrealistic expectations were mentioned as inhibiting factors. Conclusion For the Lagos state and other government insurance schemes in developing countries to be successful, effective contracting and quality assurance of healthcare providers are essential. The health facilities indicated that these would require adequate and regular provider payment, investments in infrastructure upgrades and educating the public about insurance benefit plans and service expectations.

Effects of provider incentives on dental X-raying in NHS Scotland: what happens if patients switch providers?

Background In many market settings individuals are encouraged to switch health care providers as a means of ensuring more competition. Switching may have a potentially undesirable side effect of increasing unnecessary treatment. Focusing on the most common source of medical radiation (dental X-rays), the purpose of this study was to assess whether, upon switching dentist, X-ray exposure increases depending on the type of provider payment. Methods The analysis used longitudinal data from 2005 to 2016 covering a 5% random sample of the Scottish adult population covered by the National Health Service (NHS). Multiple fixed-effects panel regression analyses were employed to determine the correlation of provider remuneration with patients’ likelihood of receiving an X-ray upon switching to a new dentist other things equal. A broad set of covariates including a patient’s copayment status was controlled for. Results Upon switching to a dentist who was paid fee-for-service, patients had a by 9.6%-points (95% CI 7.4–11.8%) higher probability of receiving an X-ray, compared to switching to a salaried dentist. Results were robust when accounting for patient exemption status, as well as unobserved patient and dentist characteristics. Conclusions In comparison to staying with the same dentist, patients may be exposed to substantially more X-rays upon switching to a dentist who is paid fee-for-service. There may need to be better guidance and regulation to protect the health of those who have to switch provider due to moving and greater caution in advocating voluntary switching.

Designing Payment Contracts for Healthcare Services to Induce Information Sharing: The Adoption and the Value of Health Information Exchanges (HIEs)

Recent initiatives to improve healthcare quality and reduce costs have centered around payment mechanisms and IT-enabled health information exchanges (HIEs). Such initiatives profoundly influence both providers’ choices in terms of healthcare effort levels and HIE adoption and patients’ choice of providers. Using a game-theoretical model of a healthcare setup, we examine the role of payment models in aligning providers’ and patients’ incentives for realizing socially optimal (i.e., first-best) choices. We show that the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) payment model does not necessarily induce the first-best solution. The pay-for-performance (P4P) model may induce the first-best solution under some conditions if provider switching by patients during a health episode is socially suboptimal, making provider coordination less of an issue. We identify an episode-based payment (EBP) model that can always induce the first-best solution. The proposed EBP model reduces to the P4P model if the P4P model induces the first-best solution. In other cases, the first-best inducing EBP model is multilateral in the sense that the payment to a provider depends not only on the provider’s own efforts and outcomes but also on those of other providers. Furthermore, the payment in this EBP model is sequence dependent in the sense that payment to a provider is contingent upon whether the patient visits a given provider first or second. We show that the proposed EBP model achieves the lowest healthcare cost, not necessarily at the expense of care quality or provider payment, relative to FFS and P4P. Although our proposed contract is complex, it sets an optimality baseline when evaluating simpler contracts and also characterizes aspects of payment that need to be captured for socially desirable actions. We further show that the value of HIEs depends critically on the payment model as well as on the social desirability of patient switching. Under all three payment models, the HIE value is higher when switching by at least some patients is desirable than when switching by any patient is undesirable. Moreover, the HIE value is highest under the FFS model and lowest under the P4P model. Hence, assessing the value of HIEs in isolation from the underlying payment mechanism and patient-switching behavior may result in under- or overestimation of the HIE value. Therefore, as payment models evolve over time, there is a real need to reevaluate the HIE value and the government subsidies that induce providers to adopt HIEs.