A Look at the Tax for Paying “Excessive” Compensation

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-8
Keyword(s):  
Excessive Compensation

Finance: Function Matters, Not Size

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H Cochrane
Keyword(s):  
Policy Analysis ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Black Box ◽  
Optimal Size ◽  
Finance Industry ◽  
Analytical Structure ◽  
The World ◽  
Finance Function ◽  
Excessive Compensation

It's fun to pass judgment on waste, size, usefulness, complexity, and excessive compensation. But as economists, we have an analytical structure for thinking about these questions. “I don't understand it” doesn't mean “it's bad,” or “regulation will improve it.” That attitude pervades policy analysis in general and financial regulation in particular, and economists do the world a disservice if we echo it. I will not offer a competing black box [to explain the size of the finance industry]. I don't claim to estimate the socially optimal “size of finance” at, say, 8.267 percent of GDP. It's just the wrong question. Hayek and the failure of planning should teach us a little modesty: Pronouncing on socially optimal industry size is a waste of time. Is the finance industry functioning well? Are there identifiable market or government distortions? Will proposed regulations help or make matters worse? These are useful questions.

scholarly journals Excessive Compensation – How Much is Too Much?

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Pan
Keyword(s):  
Excessive Compensation

Director Attendance at Board Meetings and Executive Compensation Evidence From Malaysia

2021 ◽  
pp. 229-250
Author(s):  
Samir Baccouche ◽  
Azza Béjaoui ◽  
Khouloud Souissi
Keyword(s):  
Regression Model ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Multiple Regression ◽  
Multiple Regression Model ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Compensation Committees ◽  
Excessive Compensation

This chapter attempts to examine the effect of directors' attendance at meetings on the board's effectiveness in mitigating executive expropriation practices, especially excessive compensation. For this end, the authors employ a multiple regression model within a sample of Malaysian firms over the period 2008-2013. The results show that the attendance of directors at board meetings affects the executive compensation negatively. Board members who attended meetings frequently are more able to monitor managers' practices continuously and effectively. Hence, they can diminish the possibility of expropriation and decrease the excessive pay. The findings also show that increasing board meetings frequency and strengthening nominating and compensation committees' independence reinforce the board's monitoring effectiveness in reducing executive expropriation behavior.

scholarly journals Confident Uncertainty, Excessive Compensation, & the Obama Plan

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael B. Dorff
Keyword(s):  
Excessive Compensation

Is the Excessive Compensation Really Excessive? Based on the Heterogeneity of Accounting Information

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-49
Author(s):  
Jianhui Jian ◽  
Jun Zhu ◽  
Wenling Zhong ◽  
Fangzhou Liu
Keyword(s):  
Accounting Information ◽  
Excessive Compensation

How Much Compensation Can CEOs Permissibly Accept?

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Moriarty
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Excessive Compensation

ABSTRACT:Debates about the ethics of executive compensation are dominated by familiar themes. Many writers consider whether the amount of pay CEOs receive is too large—relative to firm performance, foreign CEO pay, or employee pay. Many others consider whether the process by which CEOs are paid is compromised by weak or self-serving boards of directors. This paper examines the issue from a new perspective. I focus on the duties executives themselves have with respect to their own compensation. I argue that CEOs’ fiduciary duties place a moral limit on how much compensation they can accept, and hence seek in negotiation, from their firms. Accepting excessive compensation leaves the beneficiaries of their duties (e.g., shareholders) worse off, and thus is inconsistent with observing those duties.

When Do Governance Mechanisms Matter Most?

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050003
Author(s):  
Derek Horstmeyer ◽  
Kara Wells
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Internal Governance ◽  
State Dependent ◽  
Economic State ◽  
External Governance ◽  
Excessive Compensation

We examine the interaction of internal and external firm-level governance mechanisms with industry-specific economic conditions to assess when they best serve current shareholders. We find that external governance (shareholder rights) is most valuable during industry upturns, with no differential benefit during downturns. For internal governance, we find that small boards are incrementally more valuable during upturns but that this result weakens/reverses during downturns, and there is inconclusive evidence regarding the state dependent value of institutional ownership. Contributions include showing: governance mechanisms have industry economic state dependent values; small boards may not always be optimal; and managers do not capture these inefficiencies through aggressive policy decisions, nor excessive compensation.

On-Line Hemodiafiltration with Pre- and Postdilution: Impact on the Acid-Base Status

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 321-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Ahrenholz ◽  
R.E. Winkler ◽  
W. Ramlow ◽  
M. Tiess ◽  
O. Thews
Keyword(s):  
Delivery System ◽  
High Flux ◽  
Line Formation ◽  
Acid Base ◽  
On Line ◽  
Acid Base Status ◽  
Acid Base Disturbance ◽  
Esrd Patients ◽  
Base Disturbance ◽  
Excessive Compensation

With on-line formation of the substitution fluid, high substitution rates in predilution (PRD) and postdilution (POD) can be obtained (Fresenius 4008 On-Line HDF, Gambro AK 100 Ultra). The substitution fluid is branched off from the dialysate produced by the dialysate delivery system of the HDF machine. Under these conditions it is desirable to consider the effect of the different treatment modes on the acid-base status. Using Fresenius 4008 On-Line HDF machines, ESRD-patients were treated alternately with high-flux hemodialysis (HD), postdilution HDF (POD-HDF) and predilution HDF (PRD-HDF), while all other treatment parameters were kept constant, in particular the bicarbonate dialysate concentration. Plasma-HCO3, - pH and -pCO2 were measured and compared with the results of a multicompartment bicarbonate model developed by Thews. Also plasma-pO2 and K+ were measured. The results showed no significant differences between HD, POD- and PRD-HDF. Acidosis was corrected effectively and no excessive compensation of the acid-base disturbance was observed.

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