The Legitimacy of Investment Arbitration

International investment arbitration remains one of the most controversial areas of globalisation and international law. This book provides a fresh contribution to the debate by adopting a thoroughly empirical approach. Based on new datasets and a range of quantitative, qualitative and computational methods, the contributors interrogate claims and counter-claims about the regime's legitimacy. The result is a nuanced picture about many of the critiques lodged against the regime, whether they be bias in arbitral decision-making, close relationships between law firms and arbitrators, absence of arbitral diversity, and excessive compensation. The book comes at a time when several national and international initiatives are under way to reform international investment arbitration. The authors discuss and analyse how the regime can be reformed and ow a process of legitimation might occur.

Director Attendance at Board Meetings and Executive Compensation Evidence From Malaysia

This chapter attempts to examine the effect of directors' attendance at meetings on the board's effectiveness in mitigating executive expropriation practices, especially excessive compensation. For this end, the authors employ a multiple regression model within a sample of Malaysian firms over the period 2008-2013. The results show that the attendance of directors at board meetings affects the executive compensation negatively. Board members who attended meetings frequently are more able to monitor managers' practices continuously and effectively. Hence, they can diminish the possibility of expropriation and decrease the excessive pay. The findings also show that increasing board meetings frequency and strengthening nominating and compensation committees' independence reinforce the board's monitoring effectiveness in reducing executive expropriation behavior.

When Do Governance Mechanisms Matter Most?

We examine the interaction of internal and external firm-level governance mechanisms with industry-specific economic conditions to assess when they best serve current shareholders. We find that external governance (shareholder rights) is most valuable during industry upturns, with no differential benefit during downturns. For internal governance, we find that small boards are incrementally more valuable during upturns but that this result weakens/reverses during downturns, and there is inconclusive evidence regarding the state dependent value of institutional ownership. Contributions include showing: governance mechanisms have industry economic state dependent values; small boards may not always be optimal; and managers do not capture these inefficiencies through aggressive policy decisions, nor excessive compensation.

The Anchor Foundation: A Tax Case Study In The Use Of Foundations By Adversarial Groups

This case study reviews the Anchor Foundation, a private 501(c)(3) foundation associated with the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), a small radical organization. Anchor Foundation made a major sale of real estate that was donated to the Foundation. The case raises issues under the tax rules covering private foundations of "disqualified persons," fiduciary duty of care, excessive compensation, disclosure of contributors, political expenditures, and disclosures in the Form 990s.

Gaps in Executive and Worker Compensation as an Organizational and Management Challenge

This paper examines the gaps in chief executive officer (CEO) and worker compensation by exploring the vital data of 10 corporations as uncovered in a study by NerdWallet.com on the differences in hourly compensation between CEOs and average hourly workers or employees. The author examines the problem of excessive compensation for CEOs as a major organizational challenge that affects perceptions of fairness by stakeholders, especially employees or workers whose contributions to organizational performance and success are not being adequately rewarded, but instead transferred to CEOs and other executives as companies increase revenues and profits through the sweat and toil of ordinary workers. The author argues that executive compensation should be linked to organizational results and performance, and examines the standards and considerations for determining fair wage and compensation, and from examining vital data on CEO compensation and average worker compensation, explores the implications for organizational change, including consideration of quality work life (QWL) investments. Several recommendations are made for meeting the challenge of excessive CEO compensation to include the following: (1) developing new approaches or methods of compensation that take worker rewards into consideration; (2) limiting CEO or executive compensation relative to established multiple of the average worker’s wage; (3) intervention and petition from governmental and administrative agencies including workers’ rights organizations for change; and (4) more compassionate leadership and management by organizational CEO and executives with increased concern for workers’ well-being. Employee Retention, Employee Satisfaction, Excessive Compensation, Executive Compensation, Fair Wage, Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB), Quality Work Life (QWL), Stakeholders.