Testing an Adaptationist Theory of Trait Covariation: Relative Bargaining Power as a Common Calibrator of an Interpersonal Syndrome

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 328-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron W. Lukaszewski

This article provides the first test of an adaptationist ‘common calibration’ theory to explain the origins of trait covariation, which holds that (i) personality traits are often facultatively calibrated in response to cues that ancestrally predicted the reproductive payoffs of different trait levels and (ii) distinct traits that are calibrated on the basis of common input cues will exhibit consistent patterns of covariation. This theory is applied to explain the covariation within a ‘personality syndrome’ encompassing various interpersonal trait dimensions (e.g. extraversion, emotionality and attachment styles). Specifically, it is hypothesized that these traits are inter–correlated because each is calibrated in response to relative bargaining power (RBP)—a joint function of one's ability to benefit others and harm others. Path analyses from a correlational study compellingly supported this theoretical model: Objective and self–perceived measures of RBP–enhancing phenotypic features (physical attractiveness and physical strength) influenced an internal regulatory variable indexing RBP (i.e. self–perceived RBP), which in turn had robust effects on each of the focal personality traits. Moreover, in support of the theory's core postulate, controlling for self–perceived RBP greatly reduced the covariation within the interpersonal syndrome. These novel findings illustrate the promise of an evolutionary psychological approach to elucidating trait covariation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Utilitas ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MOEHLER

It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting principle the stabilized Nash bargaining solution. The principle defends justice in the form ‘each according to her basic needs and above this level according to her relative bargaining power’. In response to the second problem, I argue that the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can serve as a principle of distributive justice in certain situations where moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning. In particular, I argue that rational individuals would choose the stabilized Nash bargaining solution in Rawls’ original position.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (04) ◽  
pp. 371-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cinzia Perlini ◽  
Marcella Bellani ◽  
Maria Gloria Rossetti ◽  
Niccolò Zovetti ◽  
Giulia Rossin ◽  
...  

AbstractSince its development and theorisation in the 60s, attachment theory has greatly influenced both clinical and developmental psychology suggesting the existence of complex dynamics based on the relationship between an infant and its caregiver, that affects personality traits and interpersonal relationships in adulthood. Many studies have been conducted to explore the association between attachment styles and psychosocial functioning and mental health. By contrast, only a few studies have investigated the neurobiological underpinnings of attachment style, showing mixed results. Therefore, in this review, we described current evidence from structural and functional imaging studies with the final aim to disentangle the neural correlates of attachment style in healthy individuals. Overall, different attachment styles have been correlated with volumetric alterations mainly in the cingulate cortex, amygdala, hippocampus and anterior temporal pole. Consistently, functional imaging studies suggested patterns of activations in fronto-striatal-limbic circuits during the processing of social and attachment-related stimuli. Further studies are needed to clarify the neurobiological signature of attachment style, possibly taking into consideration a wide range of demographic, psychosocial and clinical factors that may mediate the associations between the style of attachment and brain systems (e.g., gender, personality traits, psychosocial functioning, early-life experience).


1987 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 609-638 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Kobrin

The bargaining power model of HC–MNC (host country–multinational corporation) interaction conceives of economic nationalism in terms of rational self-interest and assumes both inherent conflict and convergent objectives. In extractive industries, there is strong evidence that outcomes are a function of relative bargaining power and that as power shifts to developing HCs over time, the bargain obsolesces. A cross-national study of the bargaining model, using data from 563 subsidiaries of U.S. manufacturing firms in forty-nine developing countries, indicates that while the bargaining framework is an accurate model of MNC–host country relationships, manufacturing is not characterized by the inherent, structurally based, and secular obsolescence that is found in the natural resource industries. Shifts in bargaining power to HCs may take place when technology is mature and global integration limited. In industries characterized by changing technologies and the spread of global integration, the bargain will obsolesce very slowly and the relative power of MNCs may even increase over time.


2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Dencker

Using longitudinal personnel data from a U.S. Fortune 500 manufacturing firm for the period of 1967 to 1993, I assess the effects of corporate restructuring and power differences between a firm and its managers on the nature and use of different incentives. I extend relative bargaining power theory to predict that a firm's ability to provide incentives in the ways it prefers—bonuses instead of increases to base salary or promotions—varies due to differences over time in monitoring and sanctions stemming from organizational change processes. Findings are consistent with the theory and show a negative effect of bonuses on salary increases and of bonuses on promotions, with tradeoffs greatest when the firm's oversight of rewards was highest and termination threats were most explicit. Further support for the theory is the finding that the strength of the negative effect of bonuses on promotions varied across managerial groups due to differences in managers' bargaining power: “fast-trackers” were much less likely to experience a tradeoff than were low performing managers, and women were less likely to experience a tradeoff than were men.


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