Independent boards and the institutional investors that prefer them: Drivers of institutional investor heterogeneity in governance preferences

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (10) ◽  
pp. 1552-1563 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Schnatterly ◽  
Scott G. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Investor Heterogeneity

Less Pay and More Sensitivity? Institutional Investor Heterogeneity and CEO Pay

2010 ◽  
Vol 37 (6) ◽  
pp. 1719-1746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jae Yong Shin ◽  
Jeongil Seo
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Pension Fund ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Public Pension ◽  
Investor Heterogeneity ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Public Pension Fund

In this article, the authors develop and test a theory on the effect of institutional investor heterogeneity on CEO pay. Their theory predicts that institutional investors’ incentives and capabilities to monitor CEO pay are determined by the fiduciary responsibilities, conflicts of interest, and information asymmetry that institutional investors face. Their theory suggests, in contrast to previous literature, that public pension funds and mutual funds exert different effects on CEO pay at their portfolio firms because they do not have the same monitoring incentives and capabilities. Using a longitudinal sample of S&P 1500 firms for the years 1998 to 2002, the authors find that public pension fund ownership is more negatively—indeed, oppositely—associated with both the level of CEO pay and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity than mutual fund ownership. Their findings suggest that (a) researchers’ use of institutional investor classifications that do not distinguish public pension fund ownership and mutual fund ownership can be misleading and (b) while CEO pay critics have called for pay plans that are in line with the “less pay and more sensitivity” principle, this may be an ineffective goal to pursue.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and corporate investment: an exploratory research in the Brazilian publicly traded companies listed in Bovespa

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 545-557
Author(s):  
Nádia Sousa ◽  
Flávia Zóboli Dalmácio
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Capital Cost ◽  
Exploratory Research ◽  
Statistical Relation ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Governance Practices

This paper aims to study the influence of Corporate Governance practices in the institutional decision to invest. It was developed a Governance Index (iGov), a descending rank was prepared and a test was applied to check if the companies in the first 25% of this rank have the highest number of institutional investors among their biggest investors than the companies of the last 25%. For the validation of IGov it was tested if the companies with the best marks present highest Returns, lowest Capital Cost, highest Market Value, and highest Competiveness within the sector, lowest Beta, highest EVA® and lowest Share concentration. It has been proved that the best Corporate Governance practices do not have any statistical relation with the presence of more Institutional Investor.

Is institutional investor a supervisor or cooperator?

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuedong Li ◽  
Xianbing Liu ◽  
Qing Yan
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Test Methods ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Management Turnover ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Restatement ◽  
Strategic Cooperation ◽  
Financial Restatements ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether top management will assume their liabilities especially when financial restatement occurs, and,based on the “effective supervision theory” and “strategic cooperation theory,” to examine whether an institutional investor is a supervisor or a cooperator considering the management turnover caused by financial restatement in the companies. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of the A-share-listed companies from year 2010 to year 2014 and dividing financial restatement into fraudulent financial restatement and other financial restatement, the authors examine the relationship between financial restatement and abnormal management turnover, which usually is related to the management integrity or capacity. By using group test methods, the authors test the influence of the institutional investors’ shareholding on the relation between financial restatements and management turnover. Findings This paper finds that financial restatement can result in abnormal management turnover, especially the fraudulent financial restatement. The institutional investors usually are supervisors but when the shareholding of institutional investor is too high and the management turnover results from fraudulent financial restatement, the institutional investors may become cooperators with management in the companies. Besides, the institutional investors play the supervisory function more significantly in non-state-owned enterprises. Originality/value This paper expands literature of the institutional investors in the corporate governance area and provides a basis for future research in the area of the institutional investors’ governance effect. It divides financial restatements into fraudulent financial restatement and other financial restatement and examines the relationship between financial restatement and abnormal management turnover so as to provide evidence about whether the management will assume their responsibilities when there is financial restatement in the company. It also tests whether the institutional investors will play supervisor’s or cooperator’s function in state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises.

scholarly journals A Study on the Influence of Institutional Investor Heterogeneity on the Executive Pay Stickiness——Based on the Perspective of Industrial Factor Intensity

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 168
Author(s):  
Qitong Yu ◽  
Shaoyang Fang ◽  
Jianjun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Inhibitory Effect ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Investor Heterogeneity ◽  
Pressure Sensitive ◽  
Pressure Resistance ◽  
Term Performance

Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012-2016, this paper empirically studies the influence of heterogeneous institutional investors on executive compensation stickiness of listed companies by using the method of multiple regression. The results show that the pay stickiness is very common in the listed companies. The overall institutional investor’s shareholding is promoting the executive compensation stickiness. The empirical results show that the institutional investors are divided into the pressure resistance institutional investors and the pressure sensitive institutional investors, according to whether the institutional investors have the commercial relationship with the listed companies. The empirical results show that they are compared to the pressure. Sensitive institutions, pressure resistance institutional investors can significantly inhibit the stickiness of executive compensation. However, different types of institutional investors have different preferences for the types of listed companies, and the enthusiasm of participating in corporate governance is different, and the pressure resistance institutional investors pay more attention to labor out of social responsibility. The long-term performance of a force intensive enterprise has a significant inhibitory effect on the stickiness of the executive compensation, while the pressure sensitive institutional investors actively manage and supervise the production and operation of the technology intensive enterprises for the consideration of the investment income, which has a restraining effect on the pay stickiness of the technology intensive enterprises.

Compensation-related institutional investor activism – a literature review and integrated analysis of sustainability aspects

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Velte ◽  
Jörn Obermann
Keyword(s):  
Literature Review ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Integrated Analysis ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Management Compensation ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Agent Theory

Purpose This paper aims to analyse whether and how different types of institutional investors influence shareholder proposal initiations, say-on-pay (SOP) votes and management compensation from a sustainability perspective. Design/methodology/approach Based on the principal-agent theory, the authors conduct a structured literature review and evaluate 40 empirical-quantitative studies on that topic. Findings The traditional assumption of homogeneity within institutional investors, which is in line with the principal–agent theory, has to be questioned. Only special types of investors (e.g. with long-term and non-financial orientations and active institutions) run an intensive monitoring strategy, and thus initiate shareholder proposals, discipline managers by higher SOP dissents and prevent excessive management compensation. Research limitations/implications A detailed analysis of institutional investor types is needed in future empirical analyses. In view of the current debate on climate change policy, future research could analyse in more detail the impact of institutional investor types on proxy voting, SOP and (sustainable) management compensation. Practical implications With regard to the increased shareholder activism and regulations on SOP and management compensation since the 2007/2008 financial crisis, firms should be aware of the monitoring role of institutional investors and should analyse their specific ownership nature (time- and content-driven and as well as range of activity). Originality/value To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first literature review with a clear focus on institutional investor range and nature, shareholder proposal initiation, SOP and management compensation (reporting) from a sustainability viewpoint. The authors explain the main variables that have been included in research, stress the limitations of this work and offer useful recommendations for future research studies.

The Effect of Institutional Investors’ Voice on the Terms and Outcome of Freeze-out Tender Offers

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050002
Author(s):  
Beni Lauterbach ◽  
Yevgeny Mugerman
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
The Other ◽  
Tender Offers ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Going Private ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Freeze Out ◽  
Regulatory Intervention

We study the impact of institutional investors’ “voice” on 201 going private tender offers by controlling shareholders (“freeze-out” offers) in Israel. Israeli regulatory intervention in freeze-out tender offers is relatively mild; thus, institutional investors’ activism becomes crucial. We find that institutional voice has dual effects. On one hand, when there are pre-negotiations with institutional investors’ (their voice is heard), accepted offers’ premiums increase. On the other hand, when institutional investors express their voice, yet reject the offer, these rejections appear to hurt shareholders’ value. We also document significant institutional investor exit after rejected offers, especially after offers preceded by voice (pre-negotiations with institutional investors).

Institutional Investor Stewardship in the UK and Malaysia: Functionally Similar, Contextually Challenged

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-304
Author(s):  
Petrina Tjin Yi TAN
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Structural Factors ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Investment Companies ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact

AbstractInstitutional investors are acknowledged as an influential force in markets worldwide. As a result of increased focus on the impact from the investing and shareholding practices of institutional investors, stewardship codes were first introduced in the UK, followed by Malaysia. This article evaluates the theory and practice of institutional investor stewardship in Malaysia through functional and contextual lenses, as juxtaposed against the more established position of stewardship in the UK. Notwithstanding an analogous legal framework for shareholder rights and the textual similarities of the UK Stewardship Code and Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors, the dominance of government-linked investment companies and government-linked companies in Malaysia results in a distinct set of issues in relation to institutional investor stewardship. This article then argues that the stewardship codes are in themselves insufficient in increasing the quality and scope of institutional investor engagement as they fail to address the underlying agency conflicts between the institutional investors and ultimate beneficiaries or clients. In learning from the UK's experience, it is important that Malaysian policymakers pay attention to the overarching structural factors and incentives driving institutional investor engagement alongside the development and take-up of the stewardship code.

Behavioral biases on institutional investors: a literature review

Kybernetes ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (10) ◽  
pp. 1668-1684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Selim Aren ◽  
Sibel Dinç Aydemir ◽  
Yasin Şehitoğlu
Keyword(s):  
Literature Review ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Home Bias ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Disposition Effect ◽  
Herding Behavior ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Behavioral Biases

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to evaluate published institutional investor research focused on home bias, disposition effect, and herding behavior in recognized journals and to ascertain some substantial gaps with regard to them. Design/methodology/approach Recently published studies between 2005 and 2014, which intend to examine behavioral biases on institutional investors, have been reviewed through juxtaposing them under the three fundamental titles and figuring them according to the explanation why these biases occurs. Findings The research examining home bias has identified the presence of this effect on institutional investors and explained it with information or culture. Yet, the existence of disposition effect has not been found in the extant research. These studies have estimated disposition effect through overconfidence and experience. Also, extant studies have provided evidence of herding behavior, attributing this behavior to pursuing same published information and protecting their reputation and career. Originality/value Currently, no study, which reviews and evaluates the empirical research body on behavioral biases displayed institutional investors, exists. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper which highlights the empirical evidence on these bias and summarizes the explanations in these studies for these biases exhibited by institutional investors. This could contribute to the researchers focusing on behavioral biases on institutional investors by providing them with a meaningful figuralization regarding their evidence and explanation.

Are smart beta funds really smart? Evidence from rational and quasi-rational investor sentiment data

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-118
Author(s):  
Rahul Verma ◽  
Gökçe Soydemir ◽  
Tzu-Man Huang
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Leading Indicators ◽  
Individual Investor ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Economic Fundamentals ◽  
Investor Sentiments ◽  
Smart Beta

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relative effects of rational and quasi-rational sentiments of individual and institutional investors on a set of smart beta fund returns. The magnitudes of the impacts of institutional investor sentiments are greater than those of individual investor sentiments. In addition, both rational and quasi-rational sentiments of individual and institutional investors have significant impacts on smart beta fund returns. The magnitudes of the impacts of quasi-rational sentiments are greater than those of the rational sentiments for both types of investors (quasi-rational sentiments of institutional investors have the maximum impact). These results are consistent with the arguments that professional investors consider the sentiments of individual investors as contrarian leading indicators which are mainly driven by noise while conform the sentiments of institutional investors which are driven by more rational factors. A majority of smart beta funds in the sample outperform the S&P500 returns in the short term but fail to consistently beat the market. The authors find evidence that smart beta funds with consistently high returns are relatively less (more) driven by individual (institutional) investor sentiments. Overall, the authors argue that smart beta funds appear to follow quasi-rational sentiments of both individual and institutional investors that are not rooted in economic fundamentals. Design/methodology/approach The results of the impulse functions generated from a multivariate model suggest that the smart beta fund returns are negatively (positively) impacted by individual (institutional) investor sentiments. Findings The magnitudes of the impacts of institutional investor sentiments are greater than those of individual investor sentiments. In addition, both rational and quasi-rational sentiments of individual and institutional investors have significant impacts on smart beta fund returns. The magnitudes of the impacts of quasi-rational sentiments are greater than those of the rational sentiments for both types of investors (quasi-rational sentiments of institutional investors have the maximum impact). Originality/value These results are consistent with the arguments that professional investors consider the sentiments of individual investors as contrarian leading indicators which are mainly driven by noise while conform the sentiments of institutional investors which are driven by more rational factors. A majority of smart beta funds in the sample outperform the S&P500 returns in the short term but fail to consistently beat the market. The authors find evidence that smart beta funds with consistently high returns are relatively less (more) driven by individual (institutional) investor sentiments. Overall, the authors argue that smart beta funds appear to follow quasi-rational sentiments of both individual and institutional investors that are not rooted in economic fundamentals.

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