The Disjunction Effect: Does It Exist for Two-Step Gambles?

2001 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton Kühberger ◽  
Dagmara Komunska ◽  
Josef Perner
Keyword(s):  
2012 ◽  
Vol 184 (1) ◽  
pp. 166-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu Li ◽  
Cheng-Ming Jiang ◽  
John C. Dunn ◽  
Zuo-Jun Wang
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Zhou ◽  
Tong Zou ◽  
Lei Zhang ◽  
Jiao-Min Lin ◽  
Yang-Yang Zhang ◽  
...  

Incidental affect has an important impact on intertemporal choice (IC). This research aimed to test how positive incidental affect influences IC and its underlying mechanisms. We assumed that positive incidental affect may have a disjunction effect on IC that includes or excludes immediate time. Moreover, we examined the role of time perception for the effect of affect on IC. In Study 1, after undergoing affect priming by video clips, participants completed the IC task using a multiple staircase paradigm. Using Hierarchical Bayesian Modeling, we estimated the discount rate parameter by distinguishing “immediate” and “non-immediate” conditions of IC. The participants’ time perception was also measured. In Study 2, apart from the choice preference of IC, we additionally investigated the differences in the participants’ attention to delay and reward attributes before decision making. The results of the two studies indicated that positive incidental affect leads to longer time perception (Study 1) and prior and more attention to the delay attribute of IC (Study 2), which leads individuals to prefer immediate options in the IC (Studies 1 and 2). Moreover, there is a disjunction effect of affect; in other words, the incidental affect did not influence IC excluding immediate time (Studies 1 and 2). This study improves our understanding of the disjunctive effect and its mechanism of inducing a positive incidental affect on IC and thus provides a new perspective on how related decision making can be improved.


2008 ◽  
Vol 142 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Sun ◽  
Shu Li ◽  
Yan-Mei Li
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
pp. 102350
Author(s):  
Ignazio Ziano ◽  
Man Fai Kong ◽  
Hong Joo Kim ◽  
Chit Yu Liu ◽  
Sze Chai Wong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

1992 ◽  
Vol 3 (5) ◽  
pp. 305-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amos Tversky ◽  
Eldar Shafir

One of the basic axioms of the rational theory of decision under uncertainty is Savage's (1954) sure-thing principle (STP) It states that if prospect x is preferred to y knowing that Event A occurred, and if x is preferred to y knowing that A did not occur, then x should be preferred to y even when it is not known whether A occurred We present examples in which the decision maker has good reasons for accepting x if A occurs, and different reasons for accepting x if A does not occur Not knowing whether or not A occurs, however, the decision maker may lack a clear reason for accepting x and may opt for another option We suggest that, in the presence of uncertainty, people are often reluctant to think through the implications of each outcome and, as a result, may violate STP This interpretation is supported by the observation that STP is satisfied when people are made aware of their preferences given each outcome


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