Compensating Differentials in Marriage Markets and more New Implications for Labor Supply Based on a Marshallian Marriage Market Analysis

Author(s):  
Shoshana Grossbard
2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 1031-1033

Patricia Apps of University of Sydney reviews “The Marriage Motive: A Price Theory of Marriage: How Marriage Markets Affect Employment, Consumption, and Savings”, by Shoshana Grossbard. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Uses price theory to analyze how economic outcomes (such as employment, other time uses, consumption, and savings) are related to marriage markets. Discusses a theory of allocation of time in markets for labor and marriage—macromodel; a theory of allocation of time in markets for labor and marriage—multiple markets for work-in-household; how marriage markets affect allocation and valuation of time implications from a macro model; compensating differentials in marriage markets and more new implications for labor supply based on a Marshallian marriage market analysis; revisiting labor supply effects of sex ratio, income, and wage—effects of marriage-related laws; labor supply, household production, and common law marriage legislation; labor supply and marriage markets—a simple graphic analysis with household public goods; household production and racial intermarriage; a consumption theory with competitive markets for work-in-household; and savings, marriage, and work-in-household. Grossbard doesn't have a current affiliation.”


Author(s):  
Elizabeth M. Caucutt ◽  
Nezih Guner ◽  
John Knowles

Author(s):  
Shoshana Grossbard

This chapter reviews models of marriage, with special emphasis on how the sex ratio can help explain outcomes such as marriage formation, the intramarriage distribution of consumption goods, labor supply, savings, type of relationship, divorce, and intermarriage. Economic models of marriage pioneered by Gary Becker are reviewed in the first section and then extended in the next section to incorporate the labor market for the work-in-household approach of Grossbard. The following section discusses challenges in identifying exogenous variation in sex ratios and presents empirical evidence on the impact of sex ratios on labor supply, consumption, savings, and several other outcomes.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierré-Andre Chiappori ◽  
Monica Costa Dias ◽  
Costas Meghir

Author(s):  
Terra McKinnish

Marriage and labor market outcomes are deeply related, particularly for women. A large literature finds that the labor supply decisions of married women respond to their husbands’ employment status, wages, and job characteristics. There is also evidence that the effects of spouse characteristics on labor market outcomes operate not just through standard neoclassical cross-wage and income effects but also through household bargaining and gender norm effects, in which the relative incomes of husband and wife affect the distribution of marital surplus, marital satisfaction, and marital stability. Marriage market characteristics affect marital status and spouse characteristics, as well as the outside option, and therefore bargaining power, within marriage. Marriage market characteristics can therefore affect premarital investments, which ultimately affect labor market outcomes within marriage and also affect labor supply decisions within marriage conditional on these premarital investments.


2003 ◽  
Vol 24 (6) ◽  
pp. 787-810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Trent ◽  
Scott J. South

This analysis merges marital history data for respondents in the National Survey of Families and Households with census data describing the sex composition of their local marriage markets to examine the impact of the availability of spousal alternatives on subjective measures of marital relations. The authors find significant bivariate associations between the sex composition of the local marriage market and husbands' and wives' marital happiness, perceived likelihood of divorce, and anticipated change in happiness if divorced. However, the effects of the sex composition of the local marriage market on these measures of marital quality are not significant after adjusting for racial differences. Racial differences in these subjective measures of marital quality cannot be explained by racial differences in mate availability, socioeconomic status, and other dimensions of sociodemographic background.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monica Costa Dias ◽  
Pierre-André Chiappori ◽  
Costas Meghir

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Britta Augsburg ◽  
Juan Pablo Baquero ◽  
Sanghmitra Gautam ◽  
Paul Rodriguez-Lesmes

This paper analyses the marriage decisions of men and women, focusing on the added attractiveness of sanitation within the living arrangement, in rural India. We exploit district and time variation from the Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) which increased sanitation by 6.6 percent among households with marriage eligible children and generated an exogenous increase in the composition of households with sanitation. Using data from the Indian Human Development household survey (IHDS) and district level census, we show that exposure to TSC increased the probability of marriage for men and women, from poorer households, by 3.8 pp and 6.5 pp respectively. The reduced form estimates incorporate both general equilibrium effects and heterogeneous program effects – two important components of equilibrium marital behavior. To decompose the overall policy impact on marriage market equilibrium we formulate a simple matching model where men and women match on observed and unobserved characteristics. Through model simulations, we show that cohorts within TSC exposed markets experienced a shift in marital gains both across matches but also within a given match. Specifically, the resultant sorting patterns display a marked gender asymmetry with an increase in marital surplus among matches where men are wealthier than their spouse, and a decrease in surplus where the wife is wealthier. Moreover, the increased access to sanitation for TSC exposed women implied a decline in their expected control over resources within the marriage.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonah M Rexer

Abstract Marriage markets in rural Nigeria are characterised by bride price and polygamy. These customs may diminish marriage prospects for young men, causing them to join militant groups. Using an instrumental variables strategy, I find that marriage inequality increases civil conflict in the Boko Haram insurgency. To generate exogenous shocks to the marriage market, I exploit the fact that young women delay marriage in response to favourable pre-marital economic conditions, which increases marriage inequality primarily in polygamous villages. The same shocks that increase marriage inequality and extremist violence also lead women to marry fewer and richer husbands, generate higher average marriage expenditures, and increase insurgent abductions. The results shed light on the marriage market as an important driver of violent extremism.


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