Heuristics and Biases in Medical Judgment and Decision Making

1994 ◽  
pp. 45-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Judgment And Decision Making ◽  
Heuristics And Biases ◽  
Medical Judgment

Development of Judgment, Decision Making, and Rationality

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maggie Toplak ◽  
Jala Rizeq
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Systematic Errors ◽  
Judgment And Decision Making ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Heuristics And Biases ◽  
Research Traditions ◽  
Dual Process Models ◽  
Gradual Onset

There is a long tradition of studying children’s reasoning and thinking in cognitive development and education. The initial studies in the cognitive development of reasoning were motivated by Piagetian models, and developmental age was thought to bring the gradual onset of logical thinking. The introduction of heuristics and biases tasks in adults and dual process models have provided new perspectives for understanding the development of reasoning, judgment, and decision-making skills. These heuristics and biases tasks provided a way to operationalize the systematic errors that people make in their judgments. Dual process models have advanced our understanding of the basic processes implicated in both optimal and non-optimal responders on several types of paradigms, including heuristics and biases tasks and classic reasoning paradigms. Importantly, these skills and competencies are generally separable from the types of higher cognition assessed on measures of intelligence and executive function task performance. Given the history of the study of reasoning in cognitive development, there is a need to integrate our understanding across these somewhat separate literatures. This is especially true given the opposite predictions that seem to be suggested in these different research traditions. Specifically, there is a focus on increasing logical development in the classic cognitive developmental literature and alternatively, there has been a focus on systematic errors in judgment and decision-making in the study of reasoning in adults. This article provides an integration of the two aforementioned perspectives that are rooted in different empirical and historical traditions. These considerations are addressed by drawing upon their research traditions and by summarizing more recent developmental work that has investigated these paradigms.

Heuristics and Biases

2014 ◽  
pp. 2-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Baron
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Systems Theory ◽  
Judgment And Decision Making ◽  
Isolation Effect ◽  
Heuristics And Biases ◽  
Naive Theories ◽  
Two Systems ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
Normative Models ◽  
Descriptive Models

The field of judgment and decision-making is characterized by three types of “models”: normative, prescriptive, and descriptive. Normative models provide standards for evaluation of judgments and decisions. Descriptive models are psychological accounts of how people either conform or depart from these models systematically (i.e., have biases). Prescriptive models suggest ways of helping people come closer to the normative models. This chapter reviews the main categories of descriptive models, including the major categories heuristics, such as the ideas of isolation effect, attribute substitution, and two-systems theory. It also discusses alternative approaches such as naive theories. It also describes a general approach to prescription, the idea of actively open-minded thinking, which can reduce some of the biases.

scholarly journals Probabilistic Biases Meet the Bayesian Brain

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 506-512
Author(s):  
Nick Chater ◽  
Jian-Qiao Zhu ◽  
Jake Spicer ◽  
Joakim Sundh ◽  
Pablo León-Villagrá ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Simulation ◽  
Judgment And Decision Making ◽  
Heuristics And Biases ◽  
Bayesian Brain ◽  
Anchoring And Adjustment ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Bayesian Cognitive Science

In Bayesian cognitive science, the mind is seen as a spectacular probabilistic-inference machine. But judgment and decision-making (JDM) researchers have spent half a century uncovering how dramatically and systematically people depart from rational norms. In this article, we outline recent research that opens up the possibility of an unexpected reconciliation. The key hypothesis is that the brain neither represents nor calculates with probabilities but approximates probabilistic calculations by drawing samples from memory or mental simulation. Sampling models diverge from perfect probabilistic calculations in ways that capture many classic JDM findings, which offers the hope of an integrated explanation of classic heuristics and biases, including availability, representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment.

Medical Thinking: The Psychology of Medical Judgment and Decision Making

1988 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 152
Author(s):  
William E. Cooper ◽  
Steven Schwartz ◽  
Timothy Griffin
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Judgment And Decision Making ◽  
Medical Judgment

scholarly journals Heuristics and Political Elites’ Judgment and Decision-Making

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Vis
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Judgment And Decision Making ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Heuristics And Biases ◽  
Availability Heuristic ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Decisions Under Uncertainty ◽  
Fast And Frugal Heuristics

It is broadly assumed that political elites (e.g. party leaders) regularly rely on heuristics in their judgments or decision-making. In this article, I aim to bring together and discuss the scattered literature on this topic. To address the current conceptual unclarity, I discuss two traditions on heuristics: (1) the heuristics and biases (H&B) tradition pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky and (2) the fast and frugal heuristics (F&F) tradition pioneered by Gigerenzer et al. I propose to concentrate on two well-defined heuristics from the H&B tradition— availability and representativeness—to empirically assess when political elites rely on heuristics and thereby understand better their judgments and decisions. My review of existing studies supports the notion that political elites use the availability heuristic and possibly the representativeness one for making complex decisions under uncertainty. It also reveals that besides this, we still know relatively little about when political elites use which heuristic and with what effect(s). Therefore, I end by proposing an agenda for future research.

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