Donald Trump and the Future of American Foreign Policy: Syria, Iran and North Korea

2019 ◽  
pp. 319-329
Author(s):  
Peter S. Jenkins
Author(s):  
M. Share

On April 30 the United States and the World marked the 100th day in office of Donald Trump as President of the United States. The first 100 days are considered as a key indicator of the fortunes for a new President’s program. This article briefly reviews the 2016 campaign and election, the 11 week transition period, his first 100 days, a brief examination of both American-Russian relations and Sino-American relations, and lastly, what the future bodes for each under a Trump Presidency. The 100 Day period has been chaotic, shifting, and at times incoherent. He has made 180 degree shifts toward many major issues, including Russia and China, which has only confused numerous world leaders, including Presidents Putin and Xi. There has been a definite disconnection between what Trump says about Russia, and what his advisors and cabinet officials say. So far Trump has conducted a highly personalized and transactional foreign policy. All is up for negotiation at this a huge turning point in American foreign policy, the greatest one since 1945. Given all the world’s instabilities today, a rapprochement between the United States and Russia is a truly worthwhile objective, and should be strongly pursued.


2008 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-174
Author(s):  
Michèle Lamont

The future of European Studies in the United States is certainly dim, if one presumes that it will parallel the declining importance of “old, tired Europe” for the United States, and for American foreign policy more specifically.1 Alternatively, it could be viewed in a more positive light if one emphasizes the lasting legacy of the European enlightenment for the United States and for world culture, even while China and India are gaining in global importance.


Author(s):  
Kevin Narizny

Nearly everything a state does has distributional consequences, including grand strategy. Societal groups with different stakes in the international economy and defense spending often have conflicting strategic priorities, and these groups pursue their parochial interests by supporting the nomination and election of like-minded politicians. Thus, grand strategy is a product of political economy. An overview of American foreign policy over the last several decades illustrates this logic. In the 1980s, the Democratic and Republican coalitions had conflicting interests over the international economy, so the two parties diverged on grand strategy. The recovery of the Rust Belt in the 1990s and 2000s, however, brought increasing convergence. Political discourse over foreign policy was fiercely partisan, but, with the notable exception of George W. Bush’s decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, the two parties shared essentially the same view of America’s role in the world. The disastrous outcome in Iraq led the Bush administration back to the middle ground in its second term, and Obama followed the same course. In contrast, the election of Donald Trump augurs change. Trump’s electoral coalition consists of a different balance of interests in the international economy than that of past Republican presidents, so he is likely to pursue different strategic priorities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 292-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thorsten Wojczewski

Abstract Employing a discursive understanding of populism and combing it with insights of poststructuralist international relations theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis, this article examines the conceptual links between foreign policy and populist forms of identity construction, as well as the ideological force that populism can unfold in the realm of foreign policy. It conceptualizes populism and foreign policy as distinct discourses that constitute collective identities by relating Self and Other. Identifying different modes of Othering, the article illustrates its arguments with a case study on the United States under Donald Trump and shows how the Trumpian discourse has used foreign policy as a platform for the (re)production of a populist-nationalist electoral coalition. Unlike common conceptions of populism as an ideology that misrepresents reality, the article argues that the discourse develops its ideological appeal by obscuring the discursive construction of social reality and thereby promising to satisfy the subject's desire for a complete and secure identity.


1958 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 499-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marshall D. Shulman

Whether we articulate them or not, the assumptions that we make concerning the future development of the Soviet system are fundamental to our thinking about American foreign policy. The objectives toward which we can reasonably direct our efforts, the philosophy of our situation, are in a very large measure a function of the image we have in our minds of the changes we discern or anticipate in the character of the society and the government of the Russian people.


Significance President Donald Trump said he dismissed Tillerson as he wants his cabinet to be more in line with his thinking; Trump and Tillerson had clashed over policies and priorities. CIA Director Mike Pompeo will be nominated to succeed Tillerson. The nominee to replace Pompeo at the CIA will be current CIA Deputy Director Gina Haspel. Impacts A better-coordinated foreign policy team could help Trump prepare for his new push on North Korea-US ties. Pompeo may find as secretary of state that he disagrees more openly with Trump; the CIA director is not public-facing. Conceivably, the 2018 midterm elections could further delay Trump nominees, but secretaries could work in an acting capacity.


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