Political Economy and International Order in Interwar Europe

2021 ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Jaakko Heiskanen

Abstract This paper brings the notion of translation into dialogue with the growing literature on international hierarchies and the historical origins of the modern international order. Leveraging on the writings of Karl Marx, I draw parallels between the exchange of commodities and the translation of linguistic signs in order to unmask the inequalities and asymmetries that pervade the practice of translation. I then deploy these theoretical insights to illuminate the global constitution of the modern international order. In this Marx-inspired reading, the modern international order is cast as the ‘universal equivalent’ that has crystallized out of the asymmetries and contradictions that pervaded the global political economy of conceptual exchange in the long 19th century. As universal equivalent, the modern international order effectively functions as the socially recognized ‘metalanguage’ that undergirds the miracle of global translatability and makes international/interlingual relations possible on a global scale. The paper concludes by considering the implications of the analysis for the future of international/interlingual hierarchies and world order.


2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-106

Bronisław Malinowski sought throughout his career to make a scientific contribution to understanding and reforming the international order by making analogies with ‘primitive’ societies. His ethnographic material was important to Marcel Mauss’s internationalist project in The Gift, and can still provide lessons in internationalism. This article examines Malinowski’s ethnographic figuration of ‘the evolution of primitive international law’, and documents a set of intellectual exchanges between him and Mauss. This illuminates an unexpected avenue of Durkheimian influence on British social anthropology and situates Malinowski in contemporary imperial and internationalist debates. Despite Malinowski’s early criticism of Émile Durkheim’s account of ‘collective ideas’, his later writing shows the (unacknowledged) influence of Mauss’s understandings of obligation and intersocial exchange. Unearthing the terms of this exchange between Malinowski and Mauss helps to recover the central normative lesson of the former’s final book and his ethnographic work as a whole – namely, that sovereignty should be dethroned as an organising principle of international order in favour of intersocial exchange and the obligations it produces.


2021 ◽  
pp. 72-115
Author(s):  
Steve Chan ◽  
Huiyun Feng ◽  
Kai He ◽  
Weixing Hu

“Revisionism” is supposed to mean a rejection of the existing international order. Yet the meaning of international order has been underdeveloped in current research. This chapter delineates this idea, relying on the English school’s writings. It distinguishes the primary and secondary institutions of international order and introduces a collection of indicators to track and measure Chinese and US commitment to two aspects of international order: one that is norm-based and the other that is rule- or institution-based. These indicators encompass these countries’ official pronouncements, their involvement in wars and militarized disputes, their engagement in international political economy, and their participation in international organizations and multilateral treaties. The evidence shows that, contrary to customary depiction, the United States has become more revisionist over time and according to some measures, more so than China.


2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gareth Dale

AbstractKarl Polanyi is principally known as an economic historian and a theorist of international political economy. His theses are commonly encountered in debates concerning globalisation, regionalism, regulation and deregulation, and neoliberalism. But the standard depiction of his ideas is based upon a highly restricted corpus of his work: essentially, his published writings, in English, from the 1940s and 1950s. Drawing upon a broader range of Polanyi’s work in Hungarian, German, and English, this article examines his less well-known analyses of international politics and world order. It sketches the main lineaments of Polanyi’s international thought from the 1910s until the mid-1940s, charting his evolution from Wilsonian liberal, via debates within British pacifism, towards a position close to E. H. Carr’s realism. It reconstructs the dialectic of universalism and regionalism in Polanyi’s prospectus for postwar international order, with a focus upon his theory of ‘tame empires’ and its extension by neo-Polanyian theorists of the ‘new regionalism’ and European integration. It explores the tensions and contradictions in Polanyi’s analysis, and, finally, it hypothesises that the failure of his postwar predictions provides a clue as to why his research on international relations dried up in the 1950s.


2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-36
Author(s):  
BRUNA COELHO JAEGER ◽  
PEDRO VINICIUS PEREIRA BRITES

ABSTRACT Given the interdisciplinary nature of the field of IPE, this article aims to analyze the theoretical field of Geoeconomics, which is understood here as the study of the effects and the material causes of power disputes between different actors on the international order. In order to achieve this interconnection between the two analytical fields, checking the convergence with the IPE, it explores the parallels and oppositions between the theoretical aspects of Classical Geopolitics and Marxism, which are traditional IPE approaches. In addition, the concepts of Braudel and Gottmann are discussed as alternative and essentially geoeconomic views.


2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 559-586 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jørgen Møller ◽  
Svend-Erik Skaaning ◽  
Jakob Tolstrup

Scholars have convincingly argued that theoretical frameworks that combine international influences and domestic factors are needed to understand political regime developments. We argue that exogenous shifts in the balance of power between great powers (‘power politics’) spark demonstration effects. These, in turn, are filtered into the domestic political system of smaller states via changes in political polarization – but with the effects being conditional on the domestic vulnerability of democracy. To assess this framework we turn to interwar Europe, where the international order changed from undergirding democracy to facilitating autocratic rule. An analysis of three countries (Poland, Austria and Denmark), backed by a more general glance at the remaining interwar cases, shows that the interaction between demonstration effects, pressure from great powers and the domestic resilience of democracy offers substantial leverage in accounting for patterns of democratic regression.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Milan Babić

The COVID-19 pandemic accelerates and exacerbates many preexisting tendencies in the global political economy. Consequently, the crisis of the liberal international order (LIO), which has been ongoing for several years, is also being affected by the pandemic. These effects are, however, not uniform: some aspects of the crisis of the LIO, as a multidimensional phenomenon, are under more pressure than others. In this article, I detail these varied effects with a specific focus on questions of geopolitics and hegemonic change. I argue that especially the societal level, where socioeconomic distortions and popular discontent are long-existing drivers of crisis, will be severely hit by the social and economic fallout of the pandemic. I conclude by suggesting a set of hypotheses regarding the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the crisis of the LIO that can be tested once more data becomes available.


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