scholarly journals Found in translation: the global constitution of the modern international order

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Jaakko Heiskanen

Abstract This paper brings the notion of translation into dialogue with the growing literature on international hierarchies and the historical origins of the modern international order. Leveraging on the writings of Karl Marx, I draw parallels between the exchange of commodities and the translation of linguistic signs in order to unmask the inequalities and asymmetries that pervade the practice of translation. I then deploy these theoretical insights to illuminate the global constitution of the modern international order. In this Marx-inspired reading, the modern international order is cast as the ‘universal equivalent’ that has crystallized out of the asymmetries and contradictions that pervaded the global political economy of conceptual exchange in the long 19th century. As universal equivalent, the modern international order effectively functions as the socially recognized ‘metalanguage’ that undergirds the miracle of global translatability and makes international/interlingual relations possible on a global scale. The paper concludes by considering the implications of the analysis for the future of international/interlingual hierarchies and world order.

Author(s):  
Matthew Watson

This chapter focuses on the historical origins and the subsequent intellectual lineage of the three core theoretical positions within contemporary global political economy (GPE): realism, liberalism, and Marxism. ‘Textbook GPE’ privileges nineteenth-century understandings of political economy when discussing the pre-history of its own field. This helps explains GPE's treatment of feminist scholarship within the textbooks; feminism remains largely marginalized from textbook GPE, presented as something of a postscript to avoid accusations of it having been omitted altogether rather than being placed centre stage in the discussion. The chapter then looks at how the nineteenth-century overlay operates in textbook GPE. To do so, it makes sense to concentrate in the first instance on the issue that did most to divide nineteenth-century economists: namely, the free trade policies resulting from the general ascendancy of laissez-faire ideology. The most celebrated of the critics, Friedrich List, is treated much more as a dependable authority figure in GPE than he is in the history of economic thought. Indeed, in textbook GPE, the disputes between realist and liberal positions is very often presented initially through an account of List's work, despite the pre-history of liberalism being much the longer of the two.


2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gareth Dale

AbstractKarl Polanyi is principally known as an economic historian and a theorist of international political economy. His theses are commonly encountered in debates concerning globalisation, regionalism, regulation and deregulation, and neoliberalism. But the standard depiction of his ideas is based upon a highly restricted corpus of his work: essentially, his published writings, in English, from the 1940s and 1950s. Drawing upon a broader range of Polanyi’s work in Hungarian, German, and English, this article examines his less well-known analyses of international politics and world order. It sketches the main lineaments of Polanyi’s international thought from the 1910s until the mid-1940s, charting his evolution from Wilsonian liberal, via debates within British pacifism, towards a position close to E. H. Carr’s realism. It reconstructs the dialectic of universalism and regionalism in Polanyi’s prospectus for postwar international order, with a focus upon his theory of ‘tame empires’ and its extension by neo-Polanyian theorists of the ‘new regionalism’ and European integration. It explores the tensions and contradictions in Polanyi’s analysis, and, finally, it hypothesises that the failure of his postwar predictions provides a clue as to why his research on international relations dried up in the 1950s.


Author(s):  
Ernesto Vivares ◽  
Raúl Salgado Espinoza

This paper focuses on the differences between International Political Economy (IPE) versus Global Political Economy (GPE) in Latin America. It explores how IPE tends to be taught and researched beyond mainstream IPE but in dialogue with it. It engages with the main literature of this field to discuss the contours and extension of a transition in teaching and research. It rests upon a historical sociological approach and employs a qualitative analysis of syllabi and curricula of various masters and doctoral programs on International Relations/Studies and underlying disciplines, and is complemented with semi-structured interviews with leading scholars of IPE from across the region. The paper argues that there is a shift from mainstream IPE to a new Latin American GPE as the result of a revitalization of the field and as a response to the new regional and global challenges. New dynamics of development, conflict and a changing world order coexist with old problems, pushing our field to find new responses, demonstrating the limits of the traditional knowledge, and requiring the development of new contributions. While the shift may be minor, it is constant and steady, and is neither homogenous nor dominated by a unique vision of the field, but it is defined by heterogeneity and plurality.


Author(s):  
Matthew Watson

This chapter discusses the historical origins and the subsequent intellectual lineage of what many textbooks inform the beginning student are the three core theoretical positions within contemporary Global Political Economy (GPE): realism, liberalism, and Marxism. It first considers the use of textbooks in teaching GPE before analysing the historical relationship between realist GPE and the nineteenth-century nationalist political economy tradition, focusing in particular on the political economy foundations of nineteenth-century economic nationalism. It then examines the link between GPE liberalism and Smithian political economy, taking into account Adam Smith's political and moral critiques of mercantilism as well as his views on self-command. The chapter also assesses GPE Marxism's roots in the nineteenth-century Marxian political economy tradition and concludes by looking at GPE feminism and its relation to the nineteenth-century popularization of classical economics for women.


Liberal world order is seen by many as either a fading international order in response to declining American hegemony, or as a failing international order riddled with internal tensions and contradicting positions. Either way, it is assumed to be in crisis. This book does not reject this claim. Nor does it deny that liberalism contains many inconsistencies. Instead, it argues that much of the literature has been conditioned by a view that sees liberal order's crisis primarily as a crisis of authority and which does not look further back than the twentieth century. As a result liberalism was shorn of its historical origins and previous rich debates about similar tensions and contradiction to those of today's liberal order. The volume questions the nature of liberal order's crisis by positing that liberal order's continual renewal was achieved through crisis, and it challenges the way in which the debate about liberalism has been conducted within the International Relations academy. Against the theoreticians it holds the position that liberalism has suffered from being too closely tied to the quest for scientific authenticity, resulting in a theoretical perspective with little or no commitment to political values and political vision. By turning the classical liberalism of Kant, Paine, and Mill into neoliberalism, liberalism lost its critical and normative potential. Against the policymakers, the volume holds the position that the practices of liberal order are resilient and have proved durable despite liberal order's many crises and despite liberal order's inconsistencies and tensions.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 450-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. JOHN IKENBERRY

As these essays show, there is a lively debate over the future of world order. Sergey Chugrow offers a dark portrait of the breakdown of what he calls Western hegemony, driven in part by Russia's grievances and aggression in Ukraine. He points to a future where international order will have a mix of realist geopolitics and post-modern diversity. Keisuke Iida sees the debate over liberal international order as a return to older debates about the viability of hegemonic order and the role of regions and non-Western values in a post-hegemonic global system. Peter Haas sees the debate over liberal international order as a window onto various new forms of global governance. Behind these important observations is Amitav Acharya's vision of a post-American global order marked by diverse regional sub-systems; a world that is globalized, diversified, and localized. These developments lead Acharya to announce the ‘end’ of the American-led liberal international order.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Milan Babic

What are the consequences of the rise of foreign state-led investment for international politics? Existingresearch oscillates between a “geopolitical” and a “commercial” logic driving this type of investmentand is thus inconclusive about its wider international reverberations. In this paper, I suggest goingbeyond this dichotomy by analyzing its systemic consequences. Conceptually, I argue that foreign stateinvestment creates system-level patterns, which have consequences for international relations: similarsectoral and geographic investment behavior carries the potential for intensified geoeconomiccompetition and conflict. I map this phenomenon on a global scale for the first time, using the largestdataset on foreign state investment. Empirically, I show how foreign state investment is highlyconcentrated in Europe, North America and East Asia, and among a few powerful states as owners. Itis especially European geo-industrial clusters that represent opportunities for such competitivedynamics. The findings also suggest that three global industries – energy production, high-techmanufacturing, and transportation and logistics – form the key areas for current and future state-ledcompetition. With these conceptual and empirical contributions, the paper illuminates the increasingpresence of states as owners in the global political economy, and its consequences for internationalpolitics


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