scholarly journals Not a Third Party: Home State Participation As a Matter of Right in Investment Treaty Arbitration

Author(s):  
Rebecca E. Khan

AbstractHost states are not the only sovereign parties that an investment dispute can impact. The sovereign interests of an investor’s home state are also potentially affected by an investment claim initiated by a national against an investment treaty partner, and more mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that the home state has access to the arbitration proceedings. This chapter argues for non-disputing state party participation as a matter of right in investment treaty arbitration cases. Whether or not the home state of the investor is informed of and allowed to participate in an investment dispute has largely been left to the discretion of arbitral tribunals; arbitration rules and jurisprudence have regarded the home state no differently than non-governmental third parties seeking to participate in the arbitration as amici curiae. From the perspective of increased transparency in the investor-state dispute settlement system, this chapter posits that non-disputing state parties must be accorded an elevated status in investor-state arbitration, with the following rights: first, to be formally notified at the outset about an investment treaty dispute; second, to have access to the documents of the arbitration case; and, third, to make written submissions with respect to the interpretation of the international investment agreement invoked in the claim. The analysis begins by identifying the sovereign interests of the home state that come into play in an investment treaty arbitration. The perils of diplomatic protection are examined in this chapter, to provide the perspective from which to delimit the parameters for non-disputing state party participation. A survey of arbitration rules and jurisprudence outlines the level of participation thus far accorded to home states in investment treaty arbitration.

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-91
Author(s):  
BERK DEMIRKOL

AbstractThis article explores the conditions under which it is possible to bring claims based on non-international investment agreement (IIA) norms of international law in investment treaty arbitration. For that purpose, it analyzes in the first instance broad dispute settlement clauses incorporated in IIAs that make reference to the settlement of ‘any investment dispute’. Such clauses grant jurisdiction to investment treaty tribunals to hear non-IIA claims. However, at least two additional conditions need to be satisfied for the investor to bring a self-standing claim based on a non-IIA norm of international law. First, the non-IIA instrument (a contract or another international treaty) may include a dispute settlement clause envisaging exclusive jurisdiction in favour of another forum. Second, the investor's standing to bring a claim based on a non-IIA norm of international law depends on whether this norm attributes any legal entitlement in the benefit of the investor.


Author(s):  
Salacuse Jeswald W

This chapter focuses on investment treaty dispute settlement, examining the nature of conflicts between investors and states and the various means provided by treaties to resolve them. In general, investor–state disputes governed by treaties occur because a host state has taken a ‘measure’ that allegedly violates that state's treaty commitments on the treatment it has promised to accord to investments protected by that treaty. Before the advent of investment treaties, investors basically had three methods to seek resolution of their disputes with host states: (a) direct negotiation with host state governments; (b) domestic courts in the host country; and (c) diplomatic protection by their home states. In order to establish a stable, rule-based system for international investment, treaties provide means to resolve disputes about the interpretation and application of treaty provisions. Most investment treaties provide four separate dispute settlement methods: (1) consultations and negotiations between contracting states; (2) arbitration between contracting states; (3) consultations and negotiations between covered investors and host governments; and (4) investor–state arbitration.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 205
Author(s):  
Vunieta . ◽  
Walida Ahsana Haque

A dispute between two or more countries involved in a foreign investment may arises<br />from investment agreement agreed upon by the parties. If one of the parties breaches<br />the agreement, the parties will automatically agree to resolve the dispute to the agreed<br />arbitration forum based on the dispute settlement clause on the agreement, those<br />forum such as the ICSID arbitration. Therefore, the existence of dispute settlement<br />clause on an investment agreement (Bilateral Investment Treaty) is very necessary.<br />The result of the above-mentioned arbitration proceeding is a binding and final<br />decision for the parties. An arbitral award, should contain relief or compensation<br />set by the arbitrator as the result of the proceeding. The reliefs are given as orders to<br />indemnify the damages obtained by Claimant. Issues arises when Respondent has been<br />proven to have done detrimental damage to the Claimant yet Respondent deliberately<br />neglected his/her obligation to compensate Claimant accordingly based on the relief/<br />compensation specified in the award. The non-compliance of the Respondent to<br />fulfill the compensation obligation is due to the fact that the party habitually assume<br />that the arbitration award does not have the legal force equivalent to the decision<br />of general court, even though the nature of the award is final and binding. Thus the<br />interests and rights of the Applicant who has been declared entitled to compensation<br />based on the arbitration award must be protected so that their rights can be fulfilled<br />according to the law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-177
Author(s):  
Joshua Karton

Abstract This article explores the sources, nature, and implications of an arbitrator’s duty to decide according to the governing law in investor-state arbitrations. It advances a contractarian conception of arbitral authority in investor-state arbitration, whereby the agreement of the states parties to the investment treaty is the source of both the arbitrator’s power to make decisions and the primary constraint on that power: the duty to apply the law. It argues that the choice of law provisions in investment treaties have a constitutional character for arbitral tribunals, such that a failure to apply the chosen law constitutes an excess of the tribunal’s powers which, if manifest, justifies annulment or non-enforcement of the award. The article concludes by considering the implications of this contractarian theory of arbitral powers and duties for arbitrators, disputing parties, and states seeking to reassert control over the investor-state dispute settlement system.


Author(s):  
Llamzon Aloysius P

This chapter analyzes the nature of international investment arbitration and how that modality of dispute settlement differs from international commercial arbitration. The most obvious difference between investment and commercial arbitration is the nature of the parties' consent to arbitrate. In contract-based commercial arbitration, consent is expressed in a mutual, largely contemporaneous exchange of promises to bring a present or future dispute to arbitration. But in investment treaty arbitration, the host State's consent is usually expressed as an open offer of arbitration for all nationals of the counterparty State to the investment treaty. Investment arbitration proceedings also operate at high levels of transparency relative to commercial arbitration.


Author(s):  
Blackaby Nigel ◽  
Wilbraham Alex

This chapter discusses the issue of third-party funding in international investment arbitration. Third-party funding has become an established part of the investment arbitration landscape. Despite criticism in some quarters, tribunals and international arbitral bodies have tended to favour the view that third-party funding promotes access to justice rather than encouraging frivolous claims. Tribunals have consistently held that receipt of third-party funding is unlikely to affect a claimant’s position from a jurisdictional perspective and will not affect a claimant’s ability to recover legal costs in cases where tribunals make costs awards. The costs of third-party funding itself may be recoverable in some circumstances. There is a growing tendency among tribunals to require disclosure by funded claimants of the existence and identity of third-party funders. It is, however, unlikely that claimants will commonly be required to disclose the terms of any funding agreement except in rare cases when security for costs is being considered.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 1083-1110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan W. Schill

Since the late 1990s investment treaty arbitration has developed into one of the most vibrant fields of international dispute settlement with now almost 400 known cases. It involves claims by foreign investors against host States for breach of obligations assumed under one of the more than 2700 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), under the numerous investment chapters in bilateral or regional free trade agreements, including the North American Free Trade Agreement, or under sectoral treaties such as the Energy Charter Treaty. All of these instruments offer comprehensive protection to foreign investors by setting down principles of substantive investment protection, including national and most-favored-nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, protection against expropriation without compensation, and free capital transfer. They also allow investors to enforce these standards in arbitral proceedings directly against the host State, most commonly under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention). Investment treaty arbitration thereby not only empowers foreign investors under international law, but also introduces investment treaty tribunals as novel actors into the arena of international investment law. Although arbitration has been a classic form of dispute settlement on the State-to-State level, including for the settlement of investment-related disputes, modern investment treaty tribunals have wider jurisdiction and are more removed from State control than any of their predecessors.


Author(s):  
Stephan W. Schill

This chapter discusses the use of sources of international law in the settlement of disputes arising under bilateral, regional, multilateral investment treaties and investment chapters in free trade agreements, focusing specifically on particularities this field of international law displays in comparison to general international law. It first addresses the importance of bilateral treaties in international investment law and shows that their bilateral form is not opposed to the emergence of a genuinely multilateral regime that behaves as if it was based on multilateral sources. The chapter then considers the pre-eminent importance arbitral decisions assume in determining and developing the content of rights and obligations in the field. Next, the chapter looks at the increasing influence of comparative law and the influence of soft law instruments. It argues that the specific sources mix in international investment law is chiefly connected to the existence of compulsory dispute settlement through investment treaty arbitration and the sociological composition of those active in the field.


Author(s):  
Won-Mog Choi

The Korea–China–Japan Investment Promotion, Facilitation and Protection Agreement is the first treaty in the economic field that binds the three Northeast Asian countries together under a single legal instrument. The existence of effective dispute settlement procedures under the treaty will contribute to the creation of a favourable investment climate in the host country. Nevertheless, there have been fears about frivolous or vexatious claims that could inhibit legitimate regulatory actions by governments. How to compose an investment chapter of the Korea–China–Japan FTA that is being negotiated is a pressing demand for all in the region. Any pertinent answers to such a quest require a thorough comparison of the benefits and drawbacks of any development of relevant rules and governance. In the end, a quest for better international investment governance in Northeast Asia in the future requires sound evaluation of lessons from the past and present.


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